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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ‘SILENT ARRIVAL’: 
THE SECOND WAVE OF THE GREAT MIGRATION  
AND ITS AFFECTS ON BLACK NEW YORK, 1940-1950 
 
By 
 
Carla J. DuBose-Simons 
 
Advisor: Judith Stein 
 
This dissertation explores black New York in the 1940s with an emphasis on the 
demographic, economic, and social effects the World War II migration of blacks to the city.  
Using census data this study examines the basic characteristics of the migrants moving to New 
York during the war years; characteristics such as state of origin, age, and sex.  It also maps 
where these migrants settled in the city revealing new areas of black settlement outside of 
Harlem, the largest black neighborhood in the city.   
Black New Yorkers, looking to escape the high rents, dilapidated living conditions, and 
increasing crime rates left Harlem.  Attracted to the integrated working-class neighborhood by 
the abundance of newer housing, better schools, and fresher air, hundreds of Harlem’s families 
settled in the Morrisania section of the Bronx.  Thousands of new migrants chose to move to 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn which was in close proximity to many of the city’s war industries 
and where a small black community already existed.  Many of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s white 
residents opposed black settlement; some organizing campaigns to prevent blacks from moving 
in and others fleeing the neighborhood.  By the end of the 1940s white flight and black 
settlement had transformed Bedford-Stuyvesant into New York City’s second largest black 
neighborhood.  
v 
 
  
One of the primary reasons southern blacks migrated to New York during World War II 
was employment opportunities available in war industries.  When New York factories began 
converting to war production, many did not hire black workers and those that did placed them in 
unskilled and janitorial positions.  This dissertation explains the process by which blacks found 
skilled and semi-skilled jobs in industries making ships, electrical instruments, and scientific 
instruments.   
Civil Rights organizations, most importantly the Brooklyn Urban League, pressured the 
state and federal governments into taking steps to integrate war industries.  These organizations 
used the State War Council’s Committee on Discrimination and the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee to open new occupations to African Americans and ensure the fair treatment of those 
blacks employed in war industries.  Initiatives for equal employment opportunities for blacks 
were at the center of civil rights activism during the 1940s.   
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Introduction 
 
 
World War II was a pivotal point in American history as it, according to historian Neil 
Wynn, marked the emergence of modern America.1  By creating a defense industry that pulled 
black migrants from southern rural areas  to northern and western industrialized centers, the 
government produced changes in the places from which migrants left and those to which they 
traveled.  The migration produced new and expanding black communities in northern cities, new 
jobs in war industries, and new racial antagonisms.  The new black workers earned more than 
they had and enjoyed more freedom to protest the discrimination that greeted them in their new 
homes.  Overcrowding of black communities and subsequent expansion of black residence into 
other communities, competition over war industry employment, unequal access to skilled 
employment, and race antagonisms were all effects of the World War II migration.   
The World War II migration has not been documented as richly as the migration of 
African Americans to northern cities during World War I.  There are few works devoted solely to 
studying the phenomenon and its consequences for both the southern areas from which the 
migrants left and the cities to which they traveled.2  The majority of works that do address the 
second wave of the Great Migration, focus on its social effects and not the demographic changes 
                                                 
1
 Neil A Wynn, “’The ‘Good War’: The Second World War and Postwar American Society,” Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Jul., 1996): 463-482. 
2
 Some studies that do look at the migration as the main subject are Peter Gottlieb’s “Rethinking the Great 
Migration: A Perspective from Pittsburgh,” in The Great Migration in Historical Perspective, ed. Joe William 
Trotter Jr. (Bloomington:  Indiana University Press, 1991), 68-82; Nicholas Lemann’s  The Promised Land: The 
Great Black Migration and How It Changed America (New York: Albert A. Knopf, 1991); Hollis Lynch’s The black 
urban condition: a documentary history, 1866-1971 (New York:, Crowell,1973.); James Gregory’s The Southern 
Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White Southerners Transformed America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Isabel Wilkerson’s The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of 
America's Great Migration (New York: Random House, 2010).  Most of these works are not devoted solely to the 
second wave of the Great  Migration but include an in depth look at the phenomenon as part of an examination of 
the migration as a whole.   
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it caused.  These works do not describe the basic characteristics of the migrants or precisely track 
where these migrants settled.  
 One work that focuses on the migration of blacks to urban areas in the World War II era 
and beyond is Isabel Wilkerson’s The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great 
Migration.  Wilkerson uses interviews to tell the story of three individuals who left the South and 
migrated to urban areas in the north and west.  She delves into the stories of these three 
individuals who left the south between 1937 and 1953 in order to paint a composite picture of the 
personal experiences of those migrating to northern, western, and mid-western cities.  Through 
the telling of these individual stories, Wilkerson is able to get at the view-point and motivations 
of the migrants in a way unlike any other monograph.  However her focus on the stories of three 
individuals limits the scope of her work.  The three stories she tells in detail do not stand in for 
nor are they representative of the stories of the millions of African Americans who migrated to 
urban areas during the Second Great Migration.  Moreover, the structural factors affecting the 
choices of these three African-American migrants and thus the larger power-structure within 
which they operate are sometimes secondary to the biographic stories in the book.3  This 
dissertation aims to tell the larger story of Wilkerson’s migrants in a particular place and time by 
exploring the demographic, economic, and social changes resulting from the migration of 
southern blacks to New York City during the 1940s.     
Many histories of urban areas at mid-century do not explore the demographic changes 
involved in the migration, the process of community formation, or its social ramifications in 
detail.  Nicholas Lemann’s The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It 
Changed America is an example.  Lemann described the way the urban landscape changed in 
                                                 
3
 Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great Migration (New York: Random 
House, 2010). 
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response to mass migration in the post-World War II era.  According to the author the migration 
was one of the largest and most rapid mass movements of people in history and the result was a 
situation in which “urban” became a euphemism for “black” and eventually black urban 
communities changed into ghettos.  Curiously Lemann does not begin his study with the World 
War II migration when the influx of blacks to urban areas began.  Examining blacks’ relocation 
from rural Mississippi to Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s, Lemann explained the social changes 
resulting from the migration such as overcrowded tenements, increased crime rates, and a 
general demoralization of character that took place in the ghettos formed after the migration.  
Lemann does this in an effort to explain how the sharecropper culture of the southern migrants 
precipitated ghetto mentality of those living in the urban cities to which they relocated.4  This 
cultural explanation of the problem does not stress the role of racial hostility or the 
deindustrialization taking place in urban areas in the 1950s and 1960s.  Though he gives some 
demographic data in the early chapters of the book, the majority of the remaining chapters are 
recollections of migrants used to illustrate the effects of the migration on the migrants and their 
experiences in the new and changing urban setting.  These recollections were based on several 
families, not a large enough basis on which to make the sweeping conclusions he does and 
hardly the most objective way of approaching the question.5  Like Wilkerson, Lemann’s focus on 
                                                 
4
 Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America. (New York: Albert A. 
Knopf , 1991), 6. 
5
 Lemann’s view that southern migrants bring with them a particular southern culture is a theme in migration 
histories.  James Grossman’s Land of Hope also posits this idea.  Discussing the initial wave of the Great Migration 
during World War I and immediately after, Grossman explained that these new migrants experienced a completely 
different environment that shocked their southern sensibilities.  Grossman highlights the difficulties and adjustments 
these migrants had to make in leaving a segregated, rural, agricultural environment, and settling in an integrated, 
urban, industrial environment.  Placing the migrants at the center of his book, Grossman explained how the ways 
migrants learned about the North and then moved and resettled drew upon and strengthened southern black culture, 
especially the role of kinship and community.  These migrants brought a racially centered world view which also 
shaped their response to the new urban environment.   
4 
 
  
a few migrants’ stories makes his work narrow in scope as it does not provide a comprehensive 
picture of the varied experiences of the migrants. 
Those works that explain the changes in community composition, emerging racial 
antagonism, and beginning of urban blight that resulted from the World War II migration are not 
focused on the North East, but on Mid-West and Western cities.  Thomas Sugrue’s study of 
urban decline in Detroit, The Origins of the Urban Crisis is a prime example.  Sugrue discusses 
the formation of centers of black urban life in the post-World War II era.  However, the 
migration does not figure in his work.  In his study of Detroit, Sugrue argued that the origins of 
the urban crisis are much earlier than social scientists have recognized, placing them in the 1940s 
instead of the 1960s.  In this analysis the Second World War plays a much larger role in the 
current situation of black urban areas than previously thought.  As migration of blacks into 
Detroit during the World War II increased, the housing available to them did not, causing severe 
housing shortages.  Few blacks were able to escape “Paradise Valley”, the black ghetto, and 
those who did were faced with many obstacles including fierce white resistance.6  Though 
Sugrue pointed to the migration as an important component that created “Paradise Valley,” there 
is no discussion of details of the movement in terms of who moved, how many people came, sex 
and age characteristics, and employment prospects.  Many studies of the World War I migration 
made distinctions between black residents and migrants.  Sugrue ignores this possible line of 
analysis.  He does not analyze the role that declining jobs and continued migration had upon 
racial discrimination.  In the end, Sugrue wants to tell the story of racial discrimination, not the 
history of blacks in Detroit.  
                                                 
6
 Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996.) 
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The clearest example of a study that fully examines the effects of black migration into an 
area and its social ramifications is Shirley Ann Moore’s essay “Getting There, Being There” a 
study of the black migration into Richmond, California.  Moore argued that the increasing 
employment opportunities and the passage of Executive Order 8802 banning race discrimination 
in defense industries accelerated the movement of black workers into California.  Between 1942 
and 1945 14,000 blacks moved into Richmond to take advantage of job opportunities, most 
importantly in the Kaiser shipyards.  The migrants were part of a general process of movement 
where black people relocated from the rural south to southern cities, and later on to the cities of 
the North and West.  According to Moore, blacks were recruited by Kaiser to fill the wartime 
labor shortages.  These migrants also relied on personal networks such as kinship ties and church 
associations, to inform and assist them in their move.  Upon arrival, they initially met a cold 
reception from the long-time black Richmond residents who felt the newly arriving blacks were 
uneducated, abrasive, and unrefined.  Though the black old-timers initially feared the migrants 
would threaten their tenuous position in Richmond’s economic and social hierarchy, in the face 
of increasing racial conflict the two groups joined to overcome prejudice.  One of the reasons for 
this change may have been that whites did not accept the distinction between long-standing and 
recent blacks in the neighborhood, a situation which forced the old residents to embrace the new.  
White Richmond residents responded to the influx of black migrants by establishing more 
stringent social, political, and economic restrictions on all black residents, newcomers and long-
time residents alike.  As black migrants entered Richmond, African Americans were isolated and 
confined to their North Richmond neighborhoods with little chance of moving from this 
burgeoning ghetto.  Richmond’s war industries provided enough jobs for African Americans, so 
the largest problem was the inadequate housing supply.  Furthermore, local newspapers and 
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police departments began to characterize criminal activity in racial terms, giving a distorted 
picture of black criminality and stigmatizing the entire community.7   
Many of the questions Sugrue asked of Detroit and Moore asked of Richmond can be 
asked about New York City.  Was New York City like Sugrue’s Detroit with blacks bottled up in 
certain areas?  At first glance, it appears that New York was different as African American 
migrants settled in new areas in Queens, Brooklyn, and the Bronx.  But one can still ask the 
question, was there white flight or did neighborhoods become integrated?  Was this integration 
contentious?  Did whites organize to prevent blacks from moving into various areas?  If the 
patterns of black settlement varied in different neighborhoods, why?  Were there intraracial 
conflicts between long-time black residents and the new blacks moving in?  What are the links 
between the Second Great Migration and black community formation across the city in the 
1940s?   
This dissertation attempts to fill a gaping hole in the historiography on African 
Americans in New York City during the 1940s.  Much of the existing literature on New York 
City in the 1940s lacks a study of the demographic significance of the migration.  They body of 
scholarship on New York in the 1940s has yet to explain where migrants originated, settlement 
patterns, and characteristics of these migrants for example their age and gender.  The 
overwhelming majority of studies that do deal with New York history during the 1940s 
document the economic and social trends but fail to mention the role of the migration.  
Employment discrimination, black poverty, mortality, and residential segregation in the 1940s 
are all subjects covered in works by Cheryl Greenberg, Nat Brandt and Frederick Binder, David 
                                                 
7
 Shirley Ann Moore, “Getting There, Being There: African-American Migration to Richmond, California, 910-
1945,” in The Great Migration in Historical Perspective, ed. Joe William Trotter Jr., (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1991), 106-126. 
7 
 
  
Reimers, and Craig Steven Wilder.8  All of these scholars wrote about New York in the 1940s, 
and often mentioned the migration as a contributing factor to the social, economic and political 
conditions of African Americans in the city; however none specifically deal with the details of 
the migration itself, only with the effects. 
The availability of better paying jobs in the factories producing goods for the war was the 
most important reason blacks moved to New York during World War II.  No works currently 
explain the process by which blacks were able to find employment in the city’s war industries.  
                                                 
8
 Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, “Or Does it Explode?”: Black Harlem in the Great Depression ( New York: Oxford 
University Press , 1991), Nat Brandt,  Harlem at War: the Black Experience in WWII (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1996), Frederick Binder and David Reimers, All Nations Under Heaven: An Ethnic and Racial 
History o f New York City (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), Craig Steven Wilder, A Covenant with 
Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.) 
Cheryl Greenberg in her book Or Does It Explode explores the continued problems Harlemites faced after the Great 
Depression.  While many of Harlem’s residents found employment, and often better employment, and while some 
improvements came as a result, black poverty, mortality, and residential segregation continued.  The new war 
industries discriminated against blacks even after the creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) 
and other wartime measures.  Greenberg argues that Harlem moved out of the Depression more slowly than other 
areas: for blacks, racism, segregation, and discrimination limited the wartime opportunities others enjoyed.  In this 
analysis the increase of blacks to the New York area is not even discussed nor considered as a possible reason for 
the continuation of African Americans’ denigrated position in the society of New York.  Again the migration and its 
effects on the social situation are conspicuously missing from analyses of social, political and economic conditions 
in Harlem in the book Harlem at War: The Black Experience in World War II.  The author Nat Brandt, outlines 
various events in Harlem and attitudes of Harlemites, however the World War II migration is reserved for only one 
line of the book.  Pointing out that the movement of blacks to New York City during the Second World War made 
blacks influential voters in elections.  Frederick Binder and David Reimers in their book All Nations Under Heaven 
discuss the development of ethnic enclaves in New York as well as relations among these groups.  Blacks achieved a 
widening of employment opportunities, however African Americans experienced economic recovery from the Great 
Depression at a slower rate than other ethnic groups throughout the city.  Mortality rates, housing discrimination and 
shortages, higher rents, and lower paying jobs still plagued black communities.  Racial tensions mounted throughout 
the war and post-war years and blacks moved out of Harlem and into other racially segregated neighborhoods or in 
areas becoming all black because of white flight.  The black settlement in Brooklyn’s Bedford Stuyvesant area 
expanded rapidly to adjacent Crown Heights and Brownsville, a trend that very well may have been due in part to 
skyrocketing black population augmented by black migration from the south, a source the authors ignore.  The 
economic woes of blacks in Brooklyn and the benefits from the World War II economy are a topic addressed in 
depth by Craig Steven Wilder in A Covenant with Color.  Wilder argues that though African Americans experienced 
a widening of employment opportunities, black men would find it nearly impossible to turn their wartime training 
into lasting opportunity.  Furthermore federal agencies exaggerated the opportunities that wartime production 
brought African Americans – in reality they never received their share of the benefits from the federal funds that 
inflated New York City’s defense industries during the war.  While providing invaluable information about black 
economic life in Brooklyn, the role of increasing black population again is not mentioned in Wilder’s analysis.  An 
actual study of how many blacks were employed in wartime industries, how they found employment, and their 
relations with labor has not yet been done, nor has there been any study of how black migrants fared in the job 
markets of World War II New York.  Many of these works do not use primary sources in their analysis of the 
reasons for these trends in New York, they simply site the conventional wisdom found in other books. 
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Craig Steven Wilder in A Covenant with Color describes discrimination against African 
Americans in war industries, but fails to explain where and how blacks were able to find jobs in 
war industries.  In Brownsville, Brooklyn Wendell Pritchett also argued that African Americans 
were denied employment in many occupations, especially in war industries.  Nevertheless, he 
argued, blacks were able to move into other industrial and white-collar jobs previously closed to 
them.  Though Pritchett made this distinction, he did not analyze where these barriers were and 
what blacks were doing to confront them.  He did however explain what jobs were open to 
blacks.  According to the author, many black women moved out of domestic service and into the 
factories (particularly in the garment industry), and they also made inroads in the clerical, 
communication, and sales sector.  In addition, some black men were hired for skilled positions, 
promoted to foremen in some factories, and secured jobs as trolley and train operators.9  This 
dissertation begins to systematically analyze black employment in New York during the 1940s in 
order to add to our understanding of the causes and effects of the second wave of the migration 
to New York.     
The role government agencies established to investigate allegations of discriminatory 
hiring by war industries played in opening new employment opportunities to blacks in New York 
City has not been studied thoroughly enough.  Though instances of discrimination continued in 
many war industries, by examining the records of local War Manpower Commission and Fair 
Employment Practices Committee offices and New York State Committee on Discrimination 
records it is clear that in the scientific instruments, electronic instrument, and shipbuilding 
sectors investigations by government agencies did indeed expand the number jobs and improve 
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the quality of the positions open to African Americans.  Moreover, this dissertation emphasizes 
where the most significant shifts were in employment opportunities – the opening of skilled and 
semi-skilled industrial jobs to black men in war industries.  After the war black women also 
moved into clerical occupations and as store clerks after the war.  These were white collar 
occupations not open to them before World War II. 
Several scholars have noted that the Second Great Migration, the widened employment 
opportunities blacks enjoyed, the participation of black men as soldiers in World War II, and a 
war-time national ethos of democracy and human rights spurred African Americans all over the 
country to fight for equal rights.10  Historian Harvard Sitkoff argued that the Second World War 
“would challenge the color line on many fronts for most minority groups in the United States.”  
In Sitkoff’s estimation  
“Jim Crow would be wounded, but not killed, by a series of interrelated 
developments, including (1) the hypocrisy of fighting for freedom abroad while 
denying it to minorities at home; (2) the equation of racism and Nazism by 
prominent American liberals; (3) the nation's need for the loyalty and manpower 
of all its citizens; (4) the massive migration of blacks to urban areas and out of the 
South; (5) the opening of new opportunities for minorities in industry and the 
military; (6) heightened expressions of white support for minority rights; (7) shifts 
in federal policies to lessen racial discrimination; (8) pressures arising from 
America's new world role; (9) fears that continuing racial violence would hinder 
the war effort; and, last but hardly least, (10) the growth and militancy of African 
American groups and institutions, who consciously used the war effort to extract 
concessions and make gains.11  
 
                                                 
10
 Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003.); Richard Dalfiume, “The ‘Forgotten Years’ of the Negro Revolution.” Journal of 
American History, Vol. 55, No. 1 (June 1968): 90-106; Robert Korstadt and Nelson Lichtenstein, “Opportunities 
Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement.” Journal of American History, Vol. 75 No. 
3 (Dec., 1988), 786-811., Harvard Sitkoff, ““Part Four: African Americans and Other Minorities on the Home 
Front,” in World War II and the American Homefront: A National Historic Landmarks Theme Study, pub. National 
Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, October 2007. 104-127.  Accessed June 23, 2011. 
http://www.nps.gov/nhl/themes/HomefrontStudy.pdf   
11
 Sitkoff, ““Part Four: African Americans and Other Minorities on the Home Front.”   
10 
 
  
African Americans all over the country began to a struggle for greater economic 
opportunities and by extension equal rights during the 1940s.  Though more historians are 
focusing on the early struggles for equal rights in northern cities, few examine the decidedly 
economic cast civil rights struggles took during the World War II era and the connection 
between labor and civil rights.   
The struggle for equal economic opportunity that took place in New York City during the 
Second World War is an additional subject of this dissertation.  Books like Delores Greenberg’s 
Or Does it Explode examine the economic focus of civil rights activism in New York during the 
Depression Era however that activism continued in the next decade and has largely remained 
undocumented.  Like Richard Dalfiume and Nelson Lichtenstein and Robert Korstad, I argue 
that the main focus of the movement for equal rights for African Americans during the war years 
focused on equal employment opportunity for blacks.12 
Korstad and Lichtenstein clearly examine the economic focus of early civil rights efforts 
in their article “Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights 
Movement.”  The authors locate the start of the civil rights movement in the early 1940s as the 
nation’s black population migrated to urban centers and became “increasingly urban, proletarian 
[in] character.”  In their view the key to this early civil rights activism was black membership in 
labor unions, particularly those of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.  Together these 
unions and black activists “were in the vanguard of efforts to transform race relations.”  The rise 
of egalitarian and inclusive industrial unions and the evolution of New Deal labor laws offered 
working-class blacks an economic and political standard by which they made demands and 
began a popular struggle for civil rights.  Korstad and Lichtenstein argue that by the mid-1940s 
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civil rights issues had reached a level of national political importance that they would not again 
have until the 1960s.  By the end of the 1940s the moment of opportunity for a lasting labor-
based civil rights movement passed because of attacks against organizations and individuals 
associated with communism.13    
Korstad and Lichtenstein make a very important point about the early movement for 
equal rights for blacks – that the goals of civil rights activists in the 1940s were based on the idea 
of equality of economic opportunity for all races.  Korstad and Lichtenstein’s stress on civil 
rights as a struggle for employment is critical and unexamined in the literature on the history of 
New York City.  Several works have explored black New Yorkers’ very public campaigns for 
equal rights in the years before and after World War II but none of those tell the story of the fight 
for equal employment opportunities in the war years.14   
Martha Biondi is the best known book on the early struggle for black rights in New York.  
Her book begins after the war in 1945 and focuses mostly on the activities of Communist 
organizations.  In To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Post-War Civil Rights in New York City 
Biondi examines grassroots efforts to achieve black rights in New York between 1946 and 1954.  
She argues that black leaders had a new urban agenda, pushing issues such as police brutality 
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and fair housing to the center of big-city politics.  The black struggle for equal rights changed the 
landscape of New York and helped to give it a liberal image.  After World War II, black New 
Yorkers increasingly asserted their right to patronize public accommodations without 
discrimination.  They challenged exclusionary practices in restaurants, bars, nightclubs, hotels, 
swimming pools, and trains.  These efforts to desegregate the city’s cultural life, nightlife, and 
transportation helped lay the groundwork for the rise of New York as a cosmopolitan global 
city.15   
 Biondi focused her study on leftist and Communist activism, arguing that the Cold War 
both advanced and hindered the aims of Civil Rights activists.  The Cold War opened up 
domestic policies to a global audience critical of American segregation and racial inequality but 
also caused the government to crack down on domestic dissent.  Biondi described how virtually 
every leading activist suffered persecution, investigation, repression, or censorship in the 1950s. 
The repression dramatically slowed black mobilization in New York City and undermined the 
civil rights-trade union alliance, reduced civil rights leaders’ calls for economic reform, and 
muted these leaders’ criticism of American foreign policy.  Biondi concluded that the movement 
for equal rights in New York City was ultimately derailed by the Cold War because the 
movement was so closely allied and associated with the American left.16  
Biondi acknowledged that the migration was important to spawning the Civil Rights 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s writing, “The massive Black migration of the 1940s 
transformed the racial geography of the nation and raised the question of whether segregation 
would intensify and spread in the North and West.”  She explained how civil rights leaders in 
New York City mobilized Black New Yorkers and pushed civil rights onto the city’s political 
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agenda.   Biondi clearly mentions that the early movement for equal rights in 1940s centered 
around employment issues.17  However, because Biondi focused on Cold War issues, she did not 
examine the migration itself or the employment concerns that were so important in mobilizing 
blacks in New York to fight for equal rights. 
Unlike Biondi’s work this study includes an examination of the migration and the 
employment issues Biondi identified as contributing to the emerging civil rights movement in 
New York.  It also explores the economic activism of civil rights organizations during the 1940s.  
I examine the activities of Communist Front organizations like the National Negro Congress and 
the Negro Labor Victory Committee but cast the net more widely to consider the activities of 
mainstream civil rights organizations as well.  The main goal for New York civil rights 
organizations – including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the 
New York and Brooklyn Urban Leagues, the National Negro Congress, and the Negro Labor 
Victory Committee – was equality of economic opportunity for New York City’s black residents.   
Of these organizations the Brooklyn Urban League was the most successful at opening 
employment opportunities for blacks in New York City because of the focus and goals of the 
organization as well as its collaborative relationship with state and federal fair employment 
agencies. 
The Silent Arrival also looks at the effects of black migration and skyrocketing New York 
City population on community formation in the city.  Other books have examined the effects of 
the World War II migration in New York in the context of community studies.  Wendell 
Pritchett’s Brownsville, Brooklyn, Craig Steven Wilder’s A Covenant with Color, Evelyn 
Gonzalez’s The Bronx, and Harold Connolly’s A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn all mention the 
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influx of black residents during the World War II era and explain the effects on the region they 
studied.18  This dissertation situates the changing demographic trends in several neighborhoods 
in the larger context of the migration’s effects on the city’s population distribution, neighborhood 
composition, and race relations.  
Wendell Pritchett examined the effects of the World War II migration as part of his study 
on the development of the black community of Brownsville, Brooklyn.  In his book Brownsville, 
Brooklyn Pritchett examined the increasing black settlement in this section of Brooklyn.  At the 
beginning of the 1940s Brownsville was a working class neighborhood of Jews and African 
Americans.  These two groups resided in separate communities within Brownsville and generally 
avoided conflict.  Pritchett argued that this arrangement worked as long as the percentage of 
blacks in Brownsville remained small.  However as the black population almost doubled because 
of the migration, white residents’ concerns about crime and juvenile delinquency in the 
neighborhood increased resulting in heightened racial tensions.  Discrimination against blacks 
rose and blacks claimed increasing incidents of police brutality.19  The 1940s brought on 
important shifts in racial composition of Brownsville and profoundly affected race relations in 
that area – changes that occurred in other neighborhoods in the city as well.  A continuation of 
the analysis Pritchett does in his work is necessary to fully understand black community 
formation in the city in the 1940s and beyond. 
This study seeks to address many of the same topics as Shirley Anne Moore’s work on 
Richmond, California as I attempt to explain how black communities in New York City 
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developed during the World War II era.  Through this dissertation I hope to add complexity to 
the story of the effects of the migration in urban areas and reveal how the migration contributed 
to the creation of modern cities for the second half of the 20th Century.  New York follows and 
departs from the general narrative of the effects of the migration on urban areas in this country.  
One significant difference is that blacks in New York moved to areas outside of the primary area 
of black settlement.  New black migrants and Harlemites moved to Bedford-Stuyvesant while 
other Harlemites moved north to the Morrisania section of the Bronx.  Brownsville as Pritchett 
proved also has a significant increase of blacks move to the area.  New York’s blacks were not 
hemmed into one district as the black residents of Detroit and Richmond were.  This dispersion 
of the black population affected the character of race relations in the city.  Black New Yorkers 
did not focus their frustrations and discontent on white residents and civilians during violent 
racial conflicts.  Instead African Americans in the city focused on the government and law 
enforcement to express their discontent in the 1940s.   
The dissertation also complicates the narrative of post-war urban decline that we see in 
works like Sugrue’s Origins of the Urban Crisis.  Though Bedford-Stuyvesant and Morrisania 
experienced declining living conditions, increased crime rates, and inadequate social services 
and became the picture of urban blight in the 1950s and 1960s; that outcome was not inevitable.  
This dissertation elucidates the process by which blacks began to move to these areas and seeks 
to present the 1940s as an era of burgeoning opportunity for blacks.  In the 1940s New York 
African Americans viewed relocation to Morrisania and Bedford-Stuyvesant as a chance to 
improve their living standards and quality of life.  This dissertation also seeks to compare the 
development of black communities in Bedford-Stuyvesant and Morrisania to examine intraracial 
class divisions and compare race relations in the two areas.  The class composition of the new 
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black residents in Morrisania and Bedford-Stuyvesant and the economic means of the white 
residents in each area had profound effects on race relations in each of these neighborhoods and 
ultimately determined whether they would become integrated communities or whether white 
residents would flee.  
 
Chapter 1 explores the demographic changes in the New York City population.  It 
explains where black migrants came from, where they settled, and the sex and age of the migrant 
population.  Most of the approximately 200,000 black migrants came from the South Atlantic 
states – Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.  The largest group of migrants was young 
women in their 20s.  The two primary areas migrants settled were Harlem, the existing center of 
black settlement in the city, and Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn which became a black 
neighborhood during the war years.  The black population already living in New York City also 
moved to new areas.  In particular we see black middle class families moving from Harlem to the 
Morrisania section of the Bronx creating integrated neighborhoods there.   
Many of the black migrants came to find better-paying employment in the city’s war 
industries.  Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines the changing structure of black employment 
in the early years of World War II and explains how war industries in the city came to hire black 
workers.  It explains which jobs were closed to blacks, the rationale used by employers for 
refusing to hire them, and the process that led employers to, for the first time, offer jobs to black 
workers. 
New York’s industries did not receive many government contracts during the first two 
years of the war.  The factories, which were mostly light industries, were not given federal 
contracts because they could not easily convert to produce the massive quantities of goods 
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needed for the war.  Therefore the labor market remained tight and jobs hard to find for black 
and white workers alike.   
Even though there was a tight labor market, African Americans protested for their fair 
share of the jobs that were available.  Civil Rights organizations like the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL) used 
boycotts, marches, and publicity campaigns to try to pressure the management of these industries 
to hire black workers.  These measures were largely unsuccessful.  Where black activists did find 
success however was in pressuring the federal and state governments into passing legislation 
barring hiring discrimination by war industries and creating agencies to investigate their hiring 
practices.  The New York State assembly also established a Committee on Discrimination that 
was eventually given the power to enforce state anti-discrimination laws. 
New York’s industries began receiving production contracts from the federal government 
in 1942 but despite increased production in war industries, African Americans did not 
immediately see employment opportunities in those factories.    Black organizations continued to 
pressure the management of war industries and state and federal fair employment agencies to 
open war industries to African Americans.   The activities of the New York State Committee on 
Discrimination in conjunction with the local offices of the FEPC to investigate discriminatory 
hiring practices made illegal by state legislation and Executive Order 8802 prompted some war 
industries in New York City to begin hiring black workers by the end of 1942.    
Though war industries began to hire black workers in 1942, these factories were not fully 
integrated until 1943.  Chapter 3 explains which industrial sectors integrated and what kinds of 
jobs blacks held.  It also describes the continuing role of civil rights organizations and fair 
employment agencies in expanding the occupations open to black workers.   
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A labor shortage in 1943, further opened skilled and semi-skilled industrial jobs to 
African Americans in the scientific instruments, electronic instrument, and shipbuilding sectors.  
Black men left their service jobs to work in skilled and semi skilled jobs at companies that 
produced scientific instruments, electronic instruments, and naval vessels during the war.  Black 
women also benefitted from war-time labor shifts as they found employment other than domestic 
work.  During the war black women worked in war industries in skilled, semiskilled and clerical 
positions.   
The NAACP, the Negro Labor Committee (NLC), the Negro Labor Victory Committee 
(NLVC) along with its Communist Party affiliated parent organization the National Negro 
Congress (NNC), and most importantly the Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) acted to exert 
pressure on the management of war industries and unions that discriminated against black 
workers.  Through community meetings, press campaigns, cooperation with labor unions, and 
anti-discrimination agencies these organizations produced the dramatic employment changes of 
the era.  The Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) was the most effective organization in opening 
new employment opportunities for blacks in New York City’s war industries.  The BKUL 
worked with the New York State Committee on Discrimination (COD) to identify war industries 
engaging in discriminatory hiring practices.  The organization also published reports of this 
discrimination to maintain pressure on the COD to continue its investigations.  In this way the 
Brooklyn Urban League acted with the state to open new areas of employment to African 
Americans.   
The war caused lasting changes in the employment available to black men and women.  
Though many of the city’s African American men were ousted from their skilled and semi-
skilled jobs when veterans returned from the war, not all black men were forced to return to the 
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low paying service jobs they had before the war.  In the five years after the war the number of 
black men working in service positions had declined and increasing numbers of black men 
worked in semi-skilled industrial positions, as skilled craftsmen, and in clerical jobs.  Likewise, 
most black women were forced from their war-time industrial jobs by the return of soldiers; but 
after the war many black women worked in clerical occupations, as phone operators, and as 
clerks in department stores.  These better-paying positions had been closed to black women 
before the war.  
The patterns and practices described in Chapters 2 and 3 are examined at the micro-level 
in Chapter 4.  This chapter presents a case study of how one Brooklyn company that produced 
scientific instruments for the Navy began hiring black workers.  The Sperry Gyroscope 
Corporation employed almost no African Americans before the war.  By the end of the war they 
employed more than one thousand African Americans and almost 60 percent of those employees 
worked in skilled or semi-skilled positions.  
Sperry became the focus of black protests for equal employment opportunities because it 
held large government contracts to produce scientific instruments for the war but had virtually no 
African American workers.  The NAACP, the NUL, and the NNC all worked to pressure Sperry 
to hire blacks. The initial efforts of these groups prompted Sperry management to hire its first 
black workers in 1941, but African American activists continued their protests because the 
company had only hired a few blacks.  The NAACP, the NUL, and the NNC brought their 
allegations of racial discrimination at Sperry to the attention of the local offices of the Fair 
Employment Practices Committee prompting an investigation of Sperry’s hiring practices.   
It was not until local offices of the FEPC and the state Committee on Discrimination 
investigated Sperry’s employment practices in 1942 that the company began to hire larger 
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numbers of blacks and more importantly placed them in skilled and semi-skilled positions.  A 
labor shortage in 1943 then prompted management to make more black hires.  Though historians 
have argued that the labor shortage was the primary reason for the employment of blacks in war 
industries; Sperry’s case undermines this argument.  Company management hired comparable 
numbers of blacks in the years before and after the labor shortage.  This indicates that Sperry 
changed their hiring policies before the labor shortage likely in response to the FEPC and COD 
investigations.   
The chapter also highlights the importance of the United, Electrical, Radio, and Machine 
Workers of America (UE) in facilitating black employment at Sperry.  The progressive, 
Communist-led union which advocated inclusion of black members took over representation of 
Sperry workers in 1942 and pressed management to hire black workers as well.  At the end of the 
war, the UE cooperated with the Negro Labor Victory Committee to prevent lay-offs of black 
industrial workers.  The activities of the UE underscore the point that labor unions, as well as the 
racial organizations, were important in integrating New York’s war industries.  
Sperry’s case also illustrates how individuals affected the process by which industries 
were integrated.  The employment of blacks by Sperry changed the attitude of the company 
President Thomas Morgan.  He became an advocate of fair employment for blacks in Sperry as 
well as in other war industries.  Morgan advocated for black employment and education outside 
of the company as well, extending his activism to fundraising for the United Negro College 
Fund.  After the war Morgan’s commitment to employing black workers prompted management 
to rehire black workers late 1940s after initial post-war lay-offs. 
The employment opportunities offered by companies like Sperry prompted thousands of 
African Americans to move to New York during World War II and the migration permanently 
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changed the composition of some communities in the city.   For migrants housing was a large 
concern, only second in importance to finding employment.  Moreover, many migrants left the 
south to escape Jim Crow and improve their quality of life.  Harlem, already overcrowded, could 
not hold the thousands of migrants moving to the city.  Therefore, many African Americans 
chose to move to other areas of the city during the 1940s.  Chapter 5 of this dissertation studies 
the demographic and social changes, as well as the changes in race relations resulting from the 
expansion of black residency to Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn and the Morrisania section of the 
Bronx.  This final chapter attempts to answer many of the questions Thomas Sugrue asked about 
Detroit in the post-war era.  It examines the neighborhoods where blacks lived in the 1940s, by 
exploring the migration’s effects on the extant center of black residency Harlem and the growing 
community of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant and Morrisania.  As Sugrue did with Detroit, 
Chapter 5 studies whether there was white flight or integration in these neighborhoods and 
whether whites organized to prevent blacks from moving into the new areas of black settlement.  
The chapter also compares the patterns of black settlement in different areas of the city and 
explores whether there was conflict between long-time residents and new black residents.   
Black migrants were not confined to one area of black settlement in New York as they 
were in Detroit and Richmond.  Black New Yorkers and migrants alike settled in Bedford-
Stuyvesant creating a second area of black settlement there.  Middle class and in the latter half of 
the decade working class blacks moved from Harlem to Morrisania as well, integrating that 
neighborhood.  As in Detroit, the second wave of the Great Migration caused overcrowding, high 
rents, crime, and deteriorating social conditions in Harlem.  These conditions prompted blacks to 
settle in other areas of the city.  The ability of blacks in New York to move outside of the central 
area of black settlement is very different from the way blacks in “Paradise Valley” and North 
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Richmond were bottled up in the black districts of those cities.  Finding available housing was 
not as acute a problem for blacks in New York as it was in Detroit or Richmond. 
Harlemites and migrants alike looked to settle in Bedford-Stuyvesant because of the war 
jobs available in close proximity.  Moreover, a small black population already lived in the area 
which attracted more African Americans. Bedford-Stuyvesant was less crowded than Harlem and 
had better housing, two of the primary reasons blacks moved there.  Furthermore, the area was 
easily accessible from Harlem because of the new train line directly connecting the two 
neighborhoods.  Thousands of working class and middle class blacks moved to the neighborhood 
and by the end of the 1940s Bedford-Stuyvesant was called “Little Harlem” because it was the 
second central area of black settlement in the city.  The name was even more accurate because 
the condition of blacks in the neighborhood increasingly resembled the condition of those living 
in Harlem.  Landlords began to charge higher rents of new black tenants in Bedford-Stuyvesant, 
housing in the area became overcrowded, real estate values plummeted, and crime levels 
increased.  All of these factors prompted white flight from the neighborhood.  But some whites 
would not leave without a fight.   
As in Detroit during the 1940s, Bedford-Stuyvesant whites organized in opposition to 
black settlement.  Monsignor John Belford, a priest at the Roman Catholic Church of the 
Nativity, led white protests against increased crime in the neighborhood.  He embarked on a 
public campaign against black residency by publishing articles in his parish newspaper and the 
Brooklyn Eagle highlighting the ignorant and destructive character of blacks migrating to the 
area.  He blamed blacks, and southern migrants in particular, for crime and vice.  The Midtown 
Civic League, led by Sumner Sirtl, became the primary organization fighting decreasing property 
values in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  The organization used numerous tactics to try to stop black 
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settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant and in 1943 pressured the King’s County Grand Jury to 
investigate the condition of blacks living in Brooklyn, primarily in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.  
The Grand Jury reported a general sense of lawlessness in Bedford-Stuyvesant detailing the 
various types of crime plaguing the area.  The activities of the Midtown Civic League, Father 
Belford, and the Grand Jury investigation drew public attention to the deteriorating conditions in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant prompting whites to associate black residency in the area with crime.  This 
precipitated white flight from the neighborhood.   
Despite the racial tension, higher rents, and deteriorating housing in Bedford-Stuyvesant, 
blacks still considered the area an attractive place to live in the 1940s.  The borough’s more 
modern housing and industrial job opportunities continued to attract middle and working class 
blacks from Harlem and the south.  The continued settlement of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant 
and the social effects it created precipitated white flight from the area and by the end of the 
1940s the formerly white neighborhood was predominately inhabited by African Americans. 
Black families from Harlem also moved to the Bronx in the 1940s to escape high rents 
and overcrowding.  During the war these families settled in present-day Morrisania in the 
southwest Bronx.  Most of the families who moved were members of the black middle class.  
Very often these families had the economic means to move because black men were hired as 
postal workers or Pullman porters.  Some of the earliest black residents of Morrisania could not 
find apartments due to discrimination.  Often the families that did move to the area were able to 
find apartments because the men of those households worked as superintendents in Morrisania 
buildings.   
The majority of Harlemites that moved to the Bronx were looking for better living 
conditions.  Parents moved their families to the area because of the abundance of better housing, 
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fresher air, more parks, and better schools.  Many blacks believed that settling in Morrisania 
would provide a better quality of life for themselves and their children.  Morrisania represented a 
step up not just in their living conditions but in their social status as well.   
In the 1940s some of the white residents of Morrisania had left the area for newer and 
more modern housing in the upper Bronx.  This left apartments vacant for blacks to occupy.  
However many of the white working-class population of the neighborhood did not have the 
economic means to move to emerging middle-class neighborhoods in the upper Bronx and had to 
stay in Morrisania.  African Americans living in the Crotona Park section, as the area was then 
known, were quite proud of the fact that they lived in an integrated neighborhood.  Integrated 
neighborhoods were not common in cities across the country in the 1940s.  In fact the growing 
black populations in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Chicago found themselves even more hemmed 
into distinct black districts as those cities became more rigidly segregated.  The residents of 
Morrisania, both black and white, worked together to foster a sense of unity resulting in very 
little racial conflict in the area.  Perhaps the fact that both populations tended to be employed and 
the Harlemites resettling in the area were mostly families; fostered good relations between the 
different races and ethnicities living there.   
As in Bedford-Stuyvesant some negative effects accompanied black settlement in the 
area.  Higher rents and increasing crime and juvenile delinquency levels accompanied increasing 
black residency.  Moreover the social and recreational organizations in the area were not 
sufficient to deal with the expanding black population.  These affects caused the area’s white 
residents to look for new places to live.  More affluent black residents of Morrisania were also 
unhappy with the social effects of increased migration from Harlem, especially towards the latter 
half of the 1940s.  These black middle class residents complained about higher rents, increased 
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crime, and more visible vice in the neighborhood as working class blacks began to move to the 
area.  Despite these complaints, both middle and working class blacks believed living in 
Morrisania was a much better alternative to living in Harlem.  Black churches and other 
organizations attempted to provide social services that would address the problems emerging as a 
result of black settlement in the area.   
Through this dissertation I hope to add complexity to the story of the effects of the 
migration in urban areas and reveal how the migration contributed to the creation of modern 
cities for the second half of the 20th Century.  The activism of civil rights organizations in the 
city pressured the state and federal government to establish fair employment legislation and 
agencies which looked into allegations of discrimination by war industries.  Continued civil 
rights agitation and the investigations of the FEPC and COD prompted companies with 
government contracts to hire black workers providing them with better paying industrial jobs and 
expanding the occupations open to African Americans.  These advances carried over into the 
post-war period as blacks found jobs on white collar, clerical and skilled industrial positions after 
the war.  The Silent Arrival also presents a revision of the history of New York City as it 
considers the creation of black neighborhoods outside of Harlem in the 1940s, a process has yet 
to be treated on its own terms in historical works.  Moreover, I hope that this examination of 
New York in the World War II era will complicate the story of urban decline in cities to show 
that the 1940s was not merely a decade creating the conditions for ghettoization of black 
neighborhoods in urban areas, but was an era of opportunity for New York’s blacks – 
opportunity to improve their jobs prospects, their economic standing, and their living conditions.   
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Chapter 1 
A Shifting Population:  
Black Population Growth and the Creation of Alternative African American Communities 
 
 
The 1940s was a decade of mobility for African Americans as approximately 1.5 million 
blacks moved out of the south to take advantage of better employment opportunities in war 
industries in the North and West.  Approximately 150,000 blacks moved to Detroit and more 
than 200,000 moved to Chicago between 1940 and 1950.  There was little provision made for 
migrants of any color during the war and the increased population resulted in housing shortages, 
racial antagonisms and, after the war, job competition. Nearly 350,000 African Americans chose 
to move westward to work in the newly established defense factories on the West Coast.  This 
new black migration to Los Angeles and the Oakland area created new black communities.  As 
the population of blacks increased, whites responded by establishing more stringent social, 
political, and economic restrictions on all black residents.  Most importantly there were housing 
shortages in these California cities and African Americans were confined to overcrowded and 
declining neighborhoods.20  
New York City, was part of these larger migratory trends.  Approximately 200,000 blacks 
moved from the South to New York during the 1940s.  Many of these new migrants initially 
settled in Harlem, already by that time the most famous northern center for black settlement.  
Like Detroit, Harlem became overcrowded, black residents were charged higher rents, and there 
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was competition for housing.  African Americans in New York, however, were not confined to 
Harlem.  There was already a black community in Brooklyn and many more migrants joined 
them  to take advantage of newly available jobs in the city’s war industries, several of which 
were in that borough.  Two of the city’s largest manufacturing plants, Sperry Gyroscope Inc. and 
the New York Navy Yard, were located in Brooklyn and hired blacks.  The migrants who moved 
to Brooklyn settled in Bedford-Stuyvesant, an area where a small black middle class community 
already resided.21   In the 1940s Bedford-Stuyvesant became the second area of black settlement 
in the city.  Middle and working class blacks also moved northward from Harlem to the Bronx, 
integrating neighborhoods in present-day Morrisania.  These new black residents of Morrisania 
were not new migrants, but had been living in Harlem. Many long-time Harlem residents moved 
to Morrisania in search of better living conditions.  At the beginning of the decade the Bronx was 
overwhelmingly white with very few African Americans living in the borough.  As the decade 
progressed Morrisania became an integrated multi-ethnic, multi-racial neighborhood.  There, 
blacks were able to escape the overcrowding of Harlem in larger apartments with more room, 
and more fresh air. 
Histories of New York City have mentioned the fact that thousands of southern African 
Americans migrated to the city during the Second World War.  However, the historical work 
lacks analysis of the social characteristics of this group, and the neighborhoods and districts in 
which they settled.  
 
Black mobility throughout the Nation 
The flow of African American migrants entering New York City during the 1940s was 
part of a larger movement of peoples throughout the country.  Overall the United States 
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population was moving from rural areas to urban industrialized ones during the war years to take 
advantage of employment opportunities in factories in need of personnel to accommodate the 
increased production demands of the war.  According to historian Richard Polenberg people 
were generally moving “from the country to city, from south to north, and from east to west.” 22  
The Southern agricultural economy had changed dramatically since the 1930s as a result of New 
Deal legislation.  Crop reduction during the depression, as well as mechanization of farming 
through the adoption of tractors, harvesters and sprayers reduced the need for black rural 
workers.  The lack of work in the south and the new availability of industrial jobs prompted 
blacks living in the rural south to migrate.  Furthermore, the Jim Crow system and potential 
violence at the hands of whites contributed to the factors pushing African Americans to leave the 
south.  
From 1938 through 1950 the federal government promoted economic growth in the south 
through federal legislation.  In the latter stages of the New Deal program, President Franklin 
Roosevelt focused his attention on industrializing the Southern economy which he saw as the 
most “backward” and “underdeveloped” in the nation.  According to historian Bruce Schulman, 
the Roosevelt administration “decrying the South’s economic backwardness and political 
conservatism,…launched a series of aggressive programs to reorder the southern economy.”23  In 
1937 the South’s per capita income was half of the standard of the rest of the nation.  The South 
registered the nation’s lowest industrial wages, farm income, and tangible assets.  Sickness, 
misery and unnecessary death were a direct effect of low farm and industrial wages in the region.  
Southern farms and businesses lacked mechanization, employed labor intensive modes of 
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production, and lacked access to capital.  The federal government saw industrialization as a way 
to end southern poverty.    
Tenants and sharecroppers, many of whom were black, suffered the most from the 
failures of southern agriculture.  They confronted deep and desperate poverty and suffered the 
machinations of powerful landlords.  One of the methods tenants and sharecroppers used to 
escape this situation was migration.  During the Depression the economic situation became much 
more grave.  Bruce Schulmann wrote, “The initial blows of the Depression hit hardest in the 
South, collapsing the already fragile foundation of many southerners’ subsistence.”   The region 
for decades had resisted federal intervention in favor of states’ rights, even at the expense of 
economic development.  However the Depression injured the economy so badly, southern people 
and their leaders who had rejected government assistance looked to the federal government for 
relief. 24 
Government efforts to rehabilitate the southern economy had ambiguous effects on 
blacks’ situation in the South.  The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) transformed 
southern agriculture at the expense of tenant farmers and farm laborers.  The legislation reduced 
the amount of acreage in production, replaced southern tenants with wage laborers, and 
mechanized farm work.  The implementation of these measures reduced the number of blacks 
farmers needed in southern agriculture and black sharecroppers and tenant farmers were 
displaced.25  
The displacement of black farm and industrial workers, Jim Crow laws, and threats of 
violence motivated African Americans to migrate to other areas in the country.  These dynamics 
stimulated black movement out of the south as many looked to improve their lives.  This 
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movement did not occur in the 1930s because there were few jobs available in the north for 
blacks then.  World War II provided industrial opportunities for southern blacks looking to leave 
a stagnant economy that had less and less of a place for them.  These better paying jobs attracted 
them to Northern and Western areas.  Even in the years after the war, when job growth in the 
North ebbed, the flow of blacks out of the south continued as mechanization on southern farms 
caused further displacement of black agricultural labor and shrinking economic opportunities of 
southern African Americans.   
Millions of Americans in northern cities, both black and white, had migrated at some 
point from the south.  Approximately five million people born in the south, or ten percent of the 
population, were in 1950 living in northern cities.  One million people born in southern areas 
migrated north between 1940 and 1950.26  The migration of both black and white southerners to 
northern and western communities during the World War II era was part of a long continual 
process of relocation that had been taking place since the First World War.  Both New York 
State and New York City were recipients of migrants from southern areas. 
During the 1940s New York City’s general population increased but the African 
American population increased at a higher rate than the white population.  The black population 
rose from 458,444 people to 749,080, an increase of 63.4 percent while in general the city 
population increased 5.8 percent and the white population increased by 1.90 percent.27  By 1950 
African Americans comprised 9.49 percent of the city population in comparison to 6.14 percent 
in 1940.   The black population in the entire New York metropolitan area (including portions of 
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New Jersey) increased by 56.6 percent between 1940 and 1950.28  State statistics were similar to 
the city.  Between 1940 and 1950 New York State’s population decreased overall, the net loss 
amounting to 34,000 people; however the non-white population29 increased by 477,685 
residents.30  During the 1940s the numbers of African Americans in the city increased, but more 
importantly the proportion of the population that was black increased at a rate much faster than 
the white population of the city, evidence that this increase was due to in-migration. 
 
Table 1: Population of Whites and Blacks in New York City 1940-1950 
 White 
population 
1940 
White 
population 
1950 
White 
Change 
Black 
population 
1940 
Black 
population 
1950 
Black 
Change 
New York 
City 
 
6,977,501 
 
7,110,275 
 
+1.90% 
 
458,444 
 
749,080 
 
+63.4% 
% of total 
city 
population 
 
93.6% 
 
90.2% 
 
- 3.4%  
 
6.1% 
 
9.5% 
 
+ 3.4% 
 
The largest number of migrants of all races into New York State came from the south.  
Most of the New York state population, 10,389,085, were native to the Middle Atlantic area 
(New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania).31  By 1950 the largest number of residents born out 
of state came from the south Atlantic - Virginia, Maryland, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
Georgia, and Florida.  Over a half million people (531,465) had migrated from these states.  The 
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largest number of migrants came from South Carolina (124,460), followed by North Carolina 
(104,895), Virginia (103,560), Georgia (77,955), Florida (44,005) and Maryland (35,725).32  
Very similarly to the case of the general population, in New York State most out-of-state 
born African American residents came from the south Atlantic region.  The state’s total nonwhite 
male population equaled 403,175 of which 49.34 percent was from the south, 42.29 percent from 
the north east, 1.87 percent originally hailed from north central states, and .63 percent from 
western states.  Of the southern states contributing nonwhite male migrants over the years South 
Carolina added the most people to the state population (48,225), followed by North Carolina 
(38,010) and Virginia (31,835).33  As for nonwhite females, of a total 477,205 54.53 percent 
were from the south, 38.31 percent were born in the north east, 1.65 percent hailed from the 
north central, and .37 percent migrated from the west.  Most non-white women originally born in 
other states came from South Carolina (66,900), followed by North Carolina (50,505), and 
Virginia (47,685).  These figures illustrate that the largest proportion of nonwhite men and 
women in New York State migrated north from southern areas.  Most of these migrants came 
from South Carolina, North Carolina and Virginia.34  Since 85 percent the African American 
population of New York State (749,080 of 880,380 people) lived in New York City at the time of 
the 1950 census, it is logical that the above proportions are similar for New York City’s Negro 
population as well. 
The census for 1950 does not provide direct information on the nativity of African 
Americans living in New York City; however the 1940 census does provide this information for 
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the years 1935 to 1940.  In that study it shows that most African American men and women who 
migrated from other areas to New York City between 1935 and 1940 were from southern states, 
most coming from South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia in descending order.35  These 
migratory trends most probably carried over into the next decade especially as the flow of black 
migrants to the city increased after the start of World War II.  
The largest increase of the population of African Americans was among people ages 25-
29 throughout New York City, as well as in Manhattan, Brooklyn and Bronx boroughs, 
indicating that most migrants were in this age range.  In New York City the number of African 
Americans between the ages of 25 and 29 increased by 33,812 persons.  In Manhattan the 
increase was 12,112 people, in Brooklyn 13,371, and in the Bronx 8,480.  This was true for both 
men and women in those same boroughs, as well as New York City overall.36  The higher 
proportion of single blacks to black families living in Manhattan suggests that many of these 
migrants were single.37   
Through further inspection of the statistics it is possible to ascertain the sex of many of 
the migrants.  African American females seemed to be moving to the city in greater numbers 
than black males.  This discrepancy was perhaps due, in part, to black males being overseas for 
military duty during World War II and later the Korean War.  Perhaps the available jobs in the 
city’s women’s industries in New York also attracted more women to migrate.  The Negro 
female population in New York City as a whole consistently increased more than the male 
population in each age group.  In 1950 there were 159,503 more females in the city than in 1940.  
In comparison there were 131,133 more males in New York in 1950 than there were in 1940.  
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Therefore though the population of both males and females increased, there was an addition of 
28,400 more women than men.38   Though there was a general increase in the population of 
blacks citywide and in the boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan, it is clear that the 
population of black women increased more quickly than that of men.  Perhaps New York 
attracted more females than other industrial cities with heavy industry which generally employed 
males.  
Other demographic factors must be considered.  Because the white population of New 
York was much larger than that of the black population, small percentage increases in the white 
population represented a much larger number of people than percentage increases in the black 
population.  Furthermore, there was much white migration out of the city.  Still, the large 
discrepancy in the rate of growth between these two groups indicates an influx in the Negro 
population from outside areas.  It is not probable that natural increase could produce such a 
marked increase in the number of African Americans in New York, particularly in Manhattan, 
Brooklyn, and the Bronx, over a ten year period. 
The statistics prove that the sharp increase in black population in New York indicated 
migration.  These migrants came from the South Atlantic states of Virginia, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina. Most were young people in their 20s no doubt looking for opportunities to 
improve their working and living conditions. 
 
Harlem: New York’s Continuing Black Mecca 
In Manhattan, where the largest population of African Americans in New York resided, 
there was a marked increase in the number of Negroes between 1940 and 1950.  The black 
population increased by 35.24 percent from 298,365 to 403,502.  This increase was much higher 
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than that of the general or white populations in the borough.  The general population increased 
from 1,888,942 to 1,960,101 or by 3.77 percent and the white population actually decreased from 
1,577,625 to 1,556,599 a loss of 1.33 percent.  By 1950 African Americans were 20.58 percent 
of Manhattan’s population in comparison to 15.79 percent a decade earlier.  The proportion of 
whites in Manhattan’s population fell from 83.5 percent to 79.4 percent.39  The gains in black 
population were due to migration. 
 
Table 2: Population of Whites and Blacks in Manhattan 1940-1950 
 White 
population 
1940 
White 
population 
1950 
White 
Change 
Black 
population 
1940 
Black 
population 
1950 
Black 
Change 
Manhattan 1,577,625 1,556,599 -1.33% 298,365 403,502 +35.24% 
% of total 
borough 
population 
 
83.5% 
 
79.4% 
 
- 4.1 
 
15.8% 
 
 
20.6% 
 
+ 4.8 
 
Negro population of central Harlem was very transient during the War years.  African 
Americans who lived in Harlem moved to other boroughs during the war.  Therefore the actual 
migration into the area, taking into account those who were also leaving, was much larger than 
statistics showed.40  
Most of Harlem’s new black residents came from southern states.  A survey of out-of-
state students in two school districts of central Harlem and white Washington Heights make this 
point clear.  In comparing the composition of the student population in each district from July to 
October 1945, the Urban League found that migration in the black districts was four times that of 
the upper Washington Heights section.  Furthermore it was found that the majority of pupils 
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moving into the central Harlem districts were from South Carolina and North Carolina, with 
Florida, Georgia, Virginia and New Jersey also contributing many. 41  These findings 
complement the information provided by the census as to the origin of increase of African 
American interstate migrants to New York. 
The increasing African American population in Manhattan remained concentrated in 
overwhelmingly black neighborhoods, like Harlem.  In the areas of Manhattan where blacks 
resided there were very few whites.  These areas, each of which was in or directly adjacent to 
central Harlem, retained these population characteristics during the 1940s.  In all but three of the 
tracts where African Americans were the majority, the number of black residents increased from 
1940 to 1950.42  Very few areas with a majority of white residents experienced a dramatic 
increase of black residents during the 1940s.  There were six in total, three of which were in 
central Harlem and the other three in northern sections of Harlem from 146th Street to 153rd 
Street along the Hudson River.43  Though more and more blacks moved into Manhattan, the 
areas blacks could live in did not.  Black residents in the borough remained confined to central 
Harlem and its adjacent areas although in a few adjacent white areas, the number of blacks 
increased.  The growing black population would strain the already overcrowded and dilapidated 
housing in the area. 
Like the city in general, the largest number of migrants moving to the area were between 
the ages of 25 and 29.  The second largest groups of migrants however differed from the city 
population in general.  In Manhattan the age group with the second largest population increase 
was 20 to 24 year olds.44  Unlike other areas in the city, in Manhattan a relatively equal number 
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of men and women entered the city.  Statistically, the increase in the number of men 
outnumbered that of women by only a small margin, 799 persons.45  The relatively young age of 
African Americans moving into Manhattan suggest those migrating were young adults in their 
20s.    
The black population was confined to Central Harlem because of white resistance. 
Whites living in Washington Heights (168th northward to 181st Streets) and upper Harlem fought 
black settlement in their neighborhoods.  Property damage, vandalism, and racial slurs were 
some of the tactics disgruntled whites used to discourage black families from moving into their 
communities in Washington Heights.46  The resistance was successful as black population in 
Manhattan remained primarily confined in Central Harlem. 
As a consequence of the southern migration, Harlem’s population continued to rise 
ultimately straining the housing and community facilities in the area.  If blacks were blocked 
from moving north, they did move to black enclaves in other boroughs.  Most black migrants 
initially settled in Harlem, the first area of settlement for the majority of migrants.47  Because 
Harlem could not accommodate all the migrants entering Manhattan, many African Americans 
moved to other boroughs like Brooklyn and the Bronx.  Bedford- Stuyvesant quickly became the 
second principal area populated by African Americans in New York in the 1940s.   
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Bedford Stuyvesant: The second area of black settlement 
The most striking increase of African Americans took place in Brooklyn.  That borough’s 
black population almost doubled, rising to 213,057 in 1950 from a population of 107,253 in 
1940.  This is in comparison to a general population that increased from 2,698,285 to 2,738,175, 
a difference of only 1.48 percent and a white population that decreased from 2,587,951 to 
2,525,118, a loss of 2.43 percent.  Brooklyn’s Negro population in 1950 comprised 7.78 percent 
of the county population in comparison to 3.97 percent in 1940. 48  As in Manhattan, the increase 
in blacks in Brooklyn’s population far outpaced white growth in the borough.   
 
Table 3: Population of Whites and Blacks in Brooklyn 1940-1950 
 White 
population 
1940 
White 
population 
1950 
White 
Change 
Black 
population 
1940 
Black 
population 
1950 
Black 
Change 
Brooklyn 2,587,951 2,525,118 - 2.43% 107,253 213,057 +98.65% 
% of total 
borough 
population 
 
95.9% 
 
92.2% 
 
- 3.7 
 
4% 
 
7.8% 
 
+ 3.8 
  
 As in Manhattan, most African American migrants to Brooklyn were between the ages of 
25 and 29.  However there were some subtle differences.  In Brooklyn the 30 to 34 year olds 
experienced the second largest population increase and 20 to 24 year olds had the third largest 
amount of increase in Brooklyn and the Bronx. 49  Moreover the gender composition of the new 
black population in Brooklyn differed from that in Manhattan.  The black female population 
increased by approximately 5,400 more than the increase of the population of black males.50  
This was a statistically marginal difference with regard to the 100,000 person increase in the 
black population of Brooklyn; but it is notable that the gender distribution was more skewed than 
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that of Manhattan.   The increase in the population of both sexes was significant.  The number of 
black men and women residing in the borough almost doubled and many of those new residents 
were young men and women many of whom would find increasing employment opportunities in 
Brooklyn’s war production factories. 
There were expanding job prospects for black men and women in the most important war 
industries in the city.  Some of the largest war production plants, including the Brooklyn Navy 
Yard and Sperry Corporation, accepted African Americans in various positions.  Though some of 
these positions were often the lowest paying in the factory, black men and women would receive 
higher pay than they could doing janitorial, domestic, or farm work in the South.  In addition to 
job openings in war industries, black women were also able to find better paying clerical and 
retail positions as white women vacated them for well-paid skilled and semi-skilled employment 
in war industries.51  The availability of higher-paying jobs in war industries as well as clerical 
and retail positions for black women served as a compelling pull factor attracting southern 
African American migrants to New York.  
    The fact that the largest increases in the black population in Brooklyn during the 1940s 
were people between the ages of 20 and 29 does not seem to be coincidence.  Harlem during this 
era was very overcrowded and had been since the first wave of black migration during World 
War I.  Furthermore, the majority of New York City’s war industries were in the outer boroughs 
(Brooklyn and Queens) and Long Island.  The Navy Yard and the Sperry Gyroscope Company, 
both located in Brooklyn, were major war-time employers in the city which would attract black 
workers. 
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The Bronx: Moving Away from the Hustle and Bustle 
Though the increase of African Americans in Brooklyn skyrocketed, there was evidence 
that blacks were moving into the other boroughs of New York.  The Bronx, previously an 
overwhelmingly white county, experienced an influx of black residents.  The population of 
African Americans in that borough more than tripled in the 1940s, increasing from 23,529 in 
1940 to 99,615 by 1950, an increase of 323.37 percent.  Like Manhattan and Brooklyn, the 
increase of black residents in the Bronx far outpaced the increase of white residents in that area.  
Between 1940 and 1950 the white population of the Bronx increased by only 1.56 percent, from 
1,370,319 people to a population of 1,391,662.52  Though the increase in the number of blacks 
moving into the Bronx was significant, the main areas of black settlement were Manhattan and 
Brooklyn during the 1940s.  Most of the early black residents that settled in the Bronx were 
middle class blacks relocating from Harlem for more space and quieter streets, not migrants from 
the south.53   
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Population of Whites and Blacks in the Bronx 1940-1950 
 White 
population 
1940 
White 
population 
1950 
White 
Change 
Black 
population 
1940 
Black 
population 
1950 
Black 
Change 
Bronx 1,370,319 1,391,662 +1.56% 23,529 99,615 +323.37% 
% of total 
borough 
population 
 
98.3% 
 
90.3% 
 
- 8 
 
1.7% 
 
6.5% 
 
+4.8 
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 The characteristics of blacks moving to the Bronx were more like those of blacks settling 
in Brooklyn.  As in Manhattan and Brooklyn, the largest number of blacks moving to the Bronx 
were 25 to 29 years of age.  As in Brooklyn the 30 to 34 year olds experienced the second largest 
population increase and 20 to 24 year olds had the third largest amount of increase in the 
Bronx.54  As in Brooklyn, more black women than men moved to the Bronx.  Of the 76,086 more 
blacks living in the Bronx by 1950 the population of African American women in the borough 
increased by 6,250 more than the population of men.55  These numbers show that during the 
1940s the largest group of people to move to the Bronx was young women.     
Many African Americans moving into the Bronx during the war years did so to escape 
the high rents in Harlem. The area of the Bronx with the largest population of African 
Americans, 161st Street to 169th Street and from Franklin to Prospect Avenues, experienced an 
increase in population from 3,000 in 1939 to a projected 30,000 by 1942.  At the time, it was 
estimated that 200 families moved to this area each month from Harlem, therefore the migration 
of blacks was secondary migration within the city not direct migration from southern states.56   
The west Bronx from Crotona Park south to 161st Street between Webster and Prospect 
Avenues in the present-day Morrisania section housed the majority of the new black Bronxites.57  
As the black population increased the white population did not significantly decrease, creating 
integrated neighborhoods.  This was unusual for demographic trends of the day.  Most urban 
areas in other cities that experienced black settlement also experienced white flight as an almost 
immediate response creating segregated black neighborhoods.  This was not the case in 
Morrisania in the 1940s.  Perhaps this was due to the middle class stature of the blacks moving 
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into the neighborhood but it was more likely due to the limits of whites’ finances to move to the 
new middle class developments being built in the upper Bronx.  It should be noted that some 
whites left the area as neighborhoods that were previously all white became predominately 
African American but it is not clear from the statistics alone whether the whites left the area 
before or after blacks began to move in.58  Maybe the fact that, in comparison to Brooklyn, 
relatively few blacks moved into the Bronx kept whites from fleeing Morrisania. 
There seemed to be relatively little racial tension as blacks moved into Morrisania.  A 
reporter for the  Amsterdam News  described Morrisania as being a veritable melting pot, with 
Italians, Jews, Germans, Poles, Irish, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans living all together with blacks, 
all getting along “remarkably well.”59  The lack of racial conflict was likely due to the marked 
efforts by middle-class blacks already living in the Bronx to prevent many of the social problems 
such as juvenile delinquency and crime present in Harlem.60  In any event, the effects of the 
movement of blacks into the Bronx played out quite differently from what happened in 
Manhattan and Brooklyn, and in many other cities across the country.  Integrated neighborhoods 
and relative racial harmony were not typical outcomes of the demographic changes of the 1940s. 
 
Conclusion 
Through examination of the census it is clear that African Americans were migrating into 
New York City.  The Negro population measured as the percentage of the total population in the 
city increased much faster than the white population during the 1940s.    The large difference in 
the rate of increase most likely is due to emigration from outside areas into the city.  The 
probable age and sex of the migrants can also be ascertained from census data.  The largest group 
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of blacks migrating to New York in the 1940s was between the ages of 20 and 34; and most were 
women.  These women found job opportunities in the city’s many war industries during the war.  
Most of these migrants came from states in the South Atlantic region just as they had during the 
first wave of the Great Migration.  Most of the migrants moved from South Carolina, North 
Carolina, and Virginia to New York City. 
During the 1940s the distribution of blacks in the city changed.  Due to the migration and 
resulting increase in the city’s black population, new areas of black settlement emerged.  Harlem 
continued to be the largest and most famous black neighborhood, but due to overcrowding in 
Harlem Bedford-Stuyvesant became the second major area of African American settlement in the 
city.  The majority of the African Americans who moved to Brooklyn during the 1940s settled in 
the Bedford- Stuyvesant neighborhood.  The migration transformed that section of Brooklyn 
from a predominately white community to an African American community.61  By 1945 central 
Brooklyn had become “the primary locale of nonwhite residency in the borough” and the place 
where most of those who were entering the borough settled down. 62  So many blacks moved into 
Bedford Stuyvesant that newspapers began to refer to Bedford- Stuyvesant as “Little Harlem.” 
In addition to these central areas of black settlement, blacks moved into new areas like 
the South Central Bronx.  Harlemites began moving to the ethnically mixed neighborhood in 
present-day Morrisania where a small number of middle class blacks resided.  Some whites 
abandoned the area both before and after the black migration but for the most part the 
neighborhood remained integrated.  Though the number of blacks in total in the Bronx remained 
low, black settlement in this area significantly changed the complexion of the neighborhood. 
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The creation of multiple areas of black settlement in the boroughs of New York made the 
racial spatial arrangement this city very different than in others.  As blacks migrated into Detroit, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles, new residents were forced to live in one black community.  
Overcrowding, declining living conditions, and increased crime resulted from the migration.  
This arguably caused more intense competition over space and access to community resources.  
Perhaps the creation of a black neighborhood outside of Harlem and the dispersal of New York’s 
increasing black population into other boroughs prevented widespread racial violence from 
breaking out in New York during the war. 
The expansion of employment opportunities for blacks in New York during the war was 
most probably a motivation for blacks to migrate and settle in New York City.  It is no surprise 
that many of those migrating to the city settled in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant.  Harlem had 
served as the center of black residence in the city since the 1910s and black migrants continued 
to settle there.  Brooklyn was the site of many of the employment opportunities newly opened to 
black New Yorkers.  Many of the major war employers had plants in Brooklyn and there 
growing numbers of jobs became available to blacks.  The expanding job opportunities available 
in the Manhattan and Brooklyn attracted migrants and changed the employment landscape and 
financial opportunities not only for black newcomers from the south, but for all blacks New 
Yorkers. 
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Chapter 2 
Opening Opportunities:  
Collaboration between Black Organizations and Fair Employment Agencies  
 
 
World War II ushered in important changes in the type of jobs open to African 
Americans.  Before the war most African Americans in urban areas held low-paying service jobs 
or worked as farmers in the south.  At the start of World War II in the cities of the Midwest and 
West, notably Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Oakland, the jobs in most factories were 
closed to blacks.  This changed after President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 in 1941 
prohibiting discriminatory hiring practices by defense industries.  Some industries which had 
excluded blacks, like the aircraft and shipbuilding industries, hired black workers only after the 
Fair Employment Practices Committee was established.  A labor shortage in 1943 also caused 
employers to begin to relax the bars to hiring and unions found it more difficult to maintain 
restrictive policies.63  Many of the war-time employment trends in New York fit that trajectory.   
During the early years of the war New York did not have large war production plants that 
could easily convert for the production of war goods.  Therefore the city’s industries received 
few contracts in the first two years of the war.  There were few job openings in most war 
industries and a labor surplus in the city.  By and large black New Yorkers did not find industrial 
employment in the first two years of the conflict.  Unlike other cities where factories were 
immediately converted or built for war production, it was not just discrimination that prevented 
blacks from getting jobs.   
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Despite the tight labor market African American civil rights activists protested for 
industrial jobs for blacks at the onset of war.  They wanted what they viewed was a fair share of 
the few jobs that were available in war industries for black workers.  Advocating for fair 
employment became the focus of several civil rights organizations including the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Urban League.  These organizations 
led protests to the headquarters of some of the city’s largest war-time employers, but these early 
initiatives were ineffective. 
Given the limited success of black activists’ efforts to pressure companies to hire African 
Americans, black organizations began to focus their agitation on the government.  The March on 
Washington Movement was one of the principle organizations to undertake this type of activity 
and successfully pressured President Roosevelt to establish the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee to investigate companies accused of discrimination.  Local offices of the NAACP and 
Urban League pressured the New York State government to pass legislation prohibiting 
discriminatory hiring practices by companies with government contracts. 
In 1941 the New York State Assembly prohibited discrimination against black workers in 
war industries and created a Committee on Discrimination in Employment in the New York State 
War Council.  During the war the Committee on Discrimination (COD) investigated hiring and 
employment practices in war industries, and worked with the regional offices of the United 
States Employment Service (USES), the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), and the 
War Manpower Commission (WMC) to see that war industries adhered to anti-discrimination 
legislation.  The COD also worked in conjunction with organizations focused on improving 
black employment, most importantly the Brooklyn Urban League, to expand the number and 
type of jobs open to black New Yorkers.   
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The passage of federal and state legislation outlawing discrimination in war industries in 
1941 and the enforcement of this legislation by state agencies also prompted some war industries 
to stop discriminatory hiring practices.   During the early war years, African Americans were 
able to find employment in skilled and semi-skilled industrial positions never before open to 
black workers.  The new jobs blacks found in war industries represented a definite and 
significant change which continued and increased after a labor shortage in 1943. 
 
No Conversion, No Jobs, No Place for Negroes: New York City War Production 1941-42 
Whether blacks obtained new jobs was initially a function of New York’s labor market, 
which was not too friendly in the early years of the war.  As the nation’s economy geared up for 
war and President Roosevelt moved the country towards supporting the Allies through the Lend 
Lease program in March, 1941, the seemingly far away conflict impacted the American 
economy.  New York’s industries were difficult to convert to war time production and the city 
received few production contracts from the government.  Most of the factories in New York were 
small scale factories that could not be converted into the large-scale factories needed to produce 
war goods.  To organize the growing economy and to ensure that it produced the goods needed 
for war, the federal government created mobilization agencies which purchased or arranged for 
the military to purchase goods, closely directed those goods' manufacture, and heavily influenced 
the operation of private companies and whole industries.   The government also curtailed 
production destined for civilians.  Moreover these agencies rationed steel, aluminum, copper, and 
cotton which were needed to produce military goods to ensure their availability for war 
industries.   
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The New York area was primarily a producer of nondurable consumer goods with more 
than a third of factories and industrial workers producing apparel.64  Moreover the majority of 
New York’s factories had to decrease production because of a shortage of materials which were 
increasingly being consumed by war production.  This resulted in a decrease in the number of 
manufacturing jobs in the metropolitan area.  The factories that did convert to war production did 
not use the same workers it previously employed because they did not have the technical skills 
required.    
Higher employment rates in New York City during 1941 were an effect of recovery from 
the Depression, not increased war production.  The 65 percent increase in job placement by the 
New York State Employment Service (NYSES), the state government’s apparatus for helping the 
unemployed find positions in state sponsored or supported firms and offices, seemed to indicate 
an improved economy in 1941.  Those placements, however, were in mostly non-manufacturing 
positions.65  Moreover, unemployment rates increased as well.  Layoffs due to conversion of 
civilian plants to wartime production, for which some workers were not qualified, was part of the 
reason for the increasing number of unemployed New Yorkers.  An unexpected drop in 
consumer buying caused plants that produced consumer goods to lay off workers as well.  
Government restrictions on the use of building materials also caused unemployment among 
construction workers.  More than 50,000 workers in the building and construction sectors were 
unemployed at the end of 1941 with little prospect of work unless they could be absorbed by 
other industries or find jobs outside of the city.  A government proposed cut back on use of 
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cotton textiles due to the redirection of cotton to war production prompted fears of more layoffs 
and dislocations in the apparel industry.66 
The shortage of manufacturing jobs continued through the first half of 1942.  In the midst 
of the wartime employment boom and the mounting demand for manpower state-wide, New 
York City was considered a “black spot” where thousands of skilled and unskilled workers were 
unemployed.  The city’s factory, construction, trade, and service workers continued to 
experience dislocation and unemployment as a result of materials shortages due to rationing, 
military priorities, and curtailment orders.  Of the 3.5 million employed New Yorkers, only 
300,000 were engaged directly in war production while another 300,000 were unemployed.  
Among the city’s factories, the apparel trades constituted a third of the establishments and 
workers.  Materials shortages and uncertainty of factory owners on government controls caused 
owners to fire some workers.67  Moreover, credit curtailment, higher taxes, and purchasing of 
war bonds caused the purchasing power of New Yorkers, and thus retail sales, to decrease.68  The 
demand for labor in the city’s construction sector in 1942 was still far below normal, but 
employment for skilled construction workers improved slightly.  The supply of skilled 
construction workers declined as workers migrated to other areas where work was readily 
available, reducing the labor surplus in that sector.  Moreover some construction workers 
converted their knowledge and training to industrial skills which further reduced the surplus.  
Unemployment was much higher for unskilled construction workers.69 
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 One reason New York City experienced difficulties converting to war production was the 
nature of city factories.  Establishments were small in size, employing on average only nineteen 
workers.  Typically war production required large-scale operations and highly specialized and 
integrated management.70  Thus, New York City could not be like Detroit, which had large auto 
factories which could be converted. Considering the state of the labor market in New York City 
and the general unavailability of jobs, it is little surprise that African Americans were not 
considered for the few war jobs available in 1941 and 1942.   
 
Finding a “Place for Negroes”: Pressure for Fair Employment Legislation 
In spite of the general lack of war contracts and jobs in New York, the city’s blacks 
mobilized to protest for equal employment opportunity.  Some organizations and black leaders 
used the press to voice their opinions and gather support.  Others took to the streets with protests, 
mass meetings, and rallies.  Before the Great Depression, organizations like the Urban League 
tried to convince employers to hire blacks.  But now these requests were powered by mass 
protests and legislation.  Targets widened too.  Initially the targets were managers of war 
industries, but black protest expanded to state and federal government.  Black activists in New 
York pushed the state and federal government to create and enforce legislation outlawing 
discriminatory hiring practices by industries with war contracts.     
Economic activism was an outgrowth of protests in New York City during the 
Depression.  Black New Yorkers felt the Depression most sharply as unemployment rates for 
African Americans were double that of whites in the city.  The problems blacks faced in the 
1920s had not been jobs, but the Great Depression changed all of that.  As unemployment levels 
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rose, the political activity of individuals, churches, philanthropic and social uplift organizations 
came together around the issue of employment.  Whether the organizations worked together, or 
at cross-purposes, these Harlem groups tried to improve economic opportunities for the city’s 
African Americans.  In the absence of laws prohibiting discriminatory hiring in industry, black 
political action was the critical force in gaining skilled and white-collar positions during the 
Depression.  Numerous Harlem organizations turned their energy toward this struggle, relying on 
activism from the Harlem community.  The campaign participants used mass protests, strikes, 
and boycotts as its most important weapons.71  No longer did blacks meekly petition employers. 
Blacks now demanded their rights.  Mark Naison argued that it was the Communist Party that 
pioneered this kind of action in Harlem.72  And as Harvard Sitkoff has argued, this militancy 
continued in the 1940s.73  As the nation, state, and city recovered from the depression, black 
New Yorkers used similar tactics to sustain the fight for economic rights and set their sights on 
equal employment opportunities in the city’s war industries.   
Again, unlike the 1920s, blacks had allies.  Historian Richard Chamberlain and others 
showed that, labor organizations were especially important to African Americans’ fighting for 
war jobs.  In the north and south black activists in trade unions and civic organizations, National 
Urban League (NUL) affiliates, and National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) chapters worked together and separately to advance black employment, the 
number one civil rights goal.  These activists advocated laws and demanded enforcement of laws 
to obtain jobs for black workers.74  
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Black protest began shortly after the outbreak of war in Europe. Though statistics showed 
there was little wartime conversion and few jobs in New York’s war industries, the city’s blacks 
felt that they were not getting their fair share of the war work that was available.  Week after 
week in 1940 and 1941 articles appeared in the Amsterdam News lamenting the lack of job 
opportunities for blacks in defense industries nation-wide.75  One editorial criticized defense 
industries for ignoring members of the National Technical Association, an organization of skilled 
black workers, and engineering graduates from Hampton and Tuskegee universities.  The author 
argued that labor shortages in the defense industries would be abated if employers would 
consider hiring black workers.76  It was not simply the morality of the issue. Defense industries, 
they said, could not efficiently produce goods because of their refusal to hire black skilled 
workers.77  The discrimination against black workers was particularly prevalent in the aircraft 
and shipbuilding sectors.  Aircraft companies notoriously refused to hire blacks to work on 
production lines, offering them only janitorial positions.  The following cartoon appeared in the 
Amsterdam News depicting an African American mechanic applying for employment at a 
company that made Triplane aircrafts.  In the cartoon the manager of the company told the 
applicant that though there is a need for manpower in the airplane industry, they refuse to hire 
Negroes.78   
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Figure 1: “It Just Doesn’t Make Sense”79 
 
 
In the early 1940s the NAACP’s primary concern was equal employment opportunities in 
war industries.  The NAACP began a national letter writing campaign to President Roosevelt, 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and members of Congress 
protesting discrimination in defense industries.  The NAACP tried to enlist the government, 
advocating a Congressional investigation into the status and treatment of black workers in the 
defense program.80  Walter White, the executive secretary of the organization, held a community 
meeting in Brooklyn to discuss the place of blacks in the nation’s defense industries and suggest 
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ways to fight for black employment in that borough.81  The New York branch of the NAACP 
declared January 26, 1941 National Defense Day, using radio, public forums, and meetings 
throughout the city to highlight the discrimination blacks faced.  On that day ministers, civic 
leaders, and prominent black New Yorkers described the patriotism of the race in defending 
democracy and the failure of the National Defense program to include blacks in military service 
or in war jobs.82 
Brooklyn proved to be one of the central areas for protest as many of the war industries 
were located there.  The National Negro Congress, NAACP, and other grassroots organizations 
focused their activities against discrimination in that borough.  Robert Washburn, the Executive 
Secretary of the State War Council’s Committee on Discrimination considered Brooklyn the 
“capital of discrimination.”  In a speech to the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities on March 12, 1942 
Washburn said that the entire borough had failed to stop or slow down job discrimination against 
blacks, Jews, and Italians.  In his view less progress had been made in Brooklyn than in any 
other defense industry center in New York State.83  Despite the tight labor market in New York, 
Washburn blamed discrimination by plant owners for low employment levels of African 
Americans in war industries.  He believed that the problem of discrimination could “not be 
solved by legislation, but by public opinion operating on employers and labor alike.”84  Black 
organizations did just that by publicizing discrimination in Brooklyn’s war industries and trying 
to turn public opinion against companies with discriminatory hiring practices. 
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In January, 1941 the Brooklyn branch of the NAACP called a mass meeting at which 
questions pertaining to blacks’ place in the national defense program were addressed.85  
Approximately 900 Brooklynites heard Walter White, the National Secretary of the NAACP, 
speak.  White urged blacks to unite to combat racial discrimination in the Army, Navy, and Air 
Corps.  He also agreed to lead a delegation to the Brooklyn offices of the Sperry Gyroscope 
Corporation, one of the largest wartime employers in New York, in an effort to secure jobs for 
African Americans.86  Though the initial meeting was not successful, black organizations 
continued to target Sperry and the company hired its first black workers later that year.87  
Following White’s failed trip to Sperry, E. Frederic Morrow, the Branch Coordinator of 
the NAACP asked Fred Turner, the President of the Brooklyn Branch for his help in a campaign 
against discriminatory hiring practices in war industries.  The national organization was looking 
to compile information on hiring practices of war industries to make recommendations to 
Congress for more stringent rules against hiring discrimination based on race.  The NAACP 
focused on Brooklyn for the campaign because there were many large plants in the area with 
millions of dollars worth of war contracts.  Sperry Gyroscope, Worth Engineering Corporation, 
Atlantic Basin Ironworks, the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Arma Corporation, and Brewster Aircraft 
were just a few of the many war production plants located in Brooklyn.  Morrow asked Turner to 
personally investigate whether African Americans were being employed and generally what the 
policies of these plants were in this regard.88  It is not completely clear what became of this 
NAACP campaign.  However it is clear that the organization targeted Brooklyn companies for 
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legal action against discrimination because of the overt racism of companies’ hiring policies and 
the concentration of federally funded war industries in that borough.   
The NAACP’s activism in Brooklyn was indicative of the organization’s new focus on 
expanding employment opportunities for African Americans.  From its inception the NAACP 
was an interracial organization, with a middle class membership, that concentrated their 
strategies for expanding black rights on legal campaigns.  According to historian Beth Tomkins 
Bates the NAACP was influenced to begin focusing on African Americans’ economic problems 
during the late 1930s due to challenges from outside and within.  New activists like A Philip 
Randolph and organizations like the National Negro Congress, along with pressure from several 
local branch offices pushed the NAACP to endorse collective action and mass unionization.89 
Just as civil rights organizations and black newspapers urged defense industries to hire 
black workers, they urged blacks to learn trades to increase the supply of skilled blacks.  One 
writer to the Amsterdam News urged African Americans to acquire the technical skills war time 
employers were looking for.  The author also recommended that New York’s skilled black 
workers assert themselves in the job market.90  Special courses in skilled trades were offered to 
blacks in Harlem through a variety of programs such as the New York Urban League’s job 
training courses for black workers at Columbia University.91  When war industries opened their 
doors to black employees, African Americans would be trained and ready to take those jobs. 
Refusal to hire black workers in skilled positions was not unique to employers in war 
industries; it was a problem that plagued many skilled crafts as well.  Though blacks were urged 
to get training in trades, they found that training did not always convert into jobs.  In fact Alice 
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Citron, a delegate of the Teacher’s Union in New York, reported her experience with the 
Vocational Guidance Council for Students.  She said that Negro graduates, although they left 
school with extensive training and were qualified in various trades – plumbing, mechanics, 
electrical work, sheet metal work – could not find positions upon graduation.  She alleged that 
this was due to the fact that unions controlling these trades refused to accept black graduates.92  
The exclusion of African Americans in some labor unions was a problem blacks would have to 
overcome to attain more profitable employment. 
Consequently in addition to addressing the problem of discrimination in defense 
industries, New York’s African Americans fought discrimination in labor unions, especially the 
craft unions which had some control over training and hiring.  At the 1940 annual convention for 
the American Federation of Labor, A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping 
Car Porters, asked the union federation to officially end discrimination against black workers in 
all if its locals.  Randolph’s demand was met with apathy and disinterest.  In fact the federation 
reneged on its promise to integrate blacks into the administrative organizations of its national 
body and claiming local autonomy, the AFL refused to terminate lily white crafts which 
prohibited black membership.93   
The Negro Labor Committee (NLC) and the Negro Labor Victory Committee (NLVC) 
also attempted to integrate war industries through labor unions.  Due to the strong belief in the 
rights of workers and the unity of the working classes regardless of race they were prompted to 
try and work for black rights through the labor movement.  These leftist organizations worked 
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under the assumption that if craft unions would accept black members then black workers 
through the unions could obtain training for skilled industrial jobs.   
 The Negro Labor Committee was founded in 1935 by Frank Crosswaith to organize and 
guide black workers in trade unions and to establish solidarity between black and white 
workers.94  The organization was active in seeking better wages, working conditions, and 
improved benefits for all workers.  The Committee attempted to organize black workers and to 
lend its support to unions interested in organizing blacks.95  Many of the labor unions affiliated 
with the NLC were locals of garment industrial unions. 
The International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), an affiliate of the 
American Federation of Labor, was known for its socialist leaders, inclusive ethos, and 
progressive stance with regard to race.  Therefore the union was open to black workers and 
advocated for black employment in garment firms in the city.  In fact the “ladies’ garment 
workers union became one of the most militant promoters of civil rights for blacks.”  The 
ILGWU had a particularly strong relationship with the Negro Labor Committee and Frank 
Crosswaith who also worked as a general organizer for the union.96  The activities of the NLC 
therefore focused mostly on expanding job opportunities for blacks in the needle trades through 
black membership in the ILGWU. 
The Negro Labor Victory Committee, founded on June 27, 1942, was a subsidiary of the 
National Negro Congress.  The purpose of the organization was to open the doors of industry to 
all Americans regardless of race and to encourage black workers to join trade unions.  Leaders of 
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the organization were all Communist trade unionists including Ferdinand Smith, Secretary of the 
Maritime Union; Dorothy Funn a member of the Teachers Union; and the most active member 
Charles Collins, Executive Secretary of the Hotel and Club Employees Union.  The 
organization’s leaders sought to make the fight for equality for blacks and other minorities an 
integral part of the program of the organized labor movement.  By the 1940s, the National Negro 
Congress was mainly Popular Front organization that was labor oriented, but also supported 
freedom for the Scottsboro Boys, anti-poll tax legislation, and freedom for colonial peoples of 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean; goals that evidenced its connection to the 
Communist Party.97  
Most of the Committee’s efforts focused on forcing union locals to alter their practices 
and influencing national unions to enforce their non-discrimination policies.  The NLVC did this 
through anti-discrimination committees it set up in union locals affiliated with the AFL and CIO 
such as the Fur Dress and Dyers Union and the National Maritime Union.  The organization 
functioned mostly in unions affiliated with the Communist Party.  While the NLVC failed to 
reach a majority of unions, the organization pushed labor unions to open its doors to black 
workers, thus negating industries’ claims that union discrimination prevented them from hiring 
African Americans, and expanding the industries in which black workers could find jobs.98  
Though the Negro Labor Committee and the Negro Labor Victory Committee had the 
same goal and attempted to reach it through the same mechanisms, the relationship between the 
organizations was contentions.  These two groups represented the division between Socialists 
and Communists on the left.  Frank Crosswaith and the leadership of the NLC viewed the NLVC 
as a rival group which tried to replace the NLC as the premier organization representing black 
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labor.  Crosswaith seemed to be trying to protect his turf as the younger NLVC began looking for 
labor affiliates and tapping potential donors for financial support.  Moreover Crosswaith’s ire 
towards the Communist NLVC was linked to the decades long political rivalry between the 
Socialist Party and the Communist Party.99   
 The National Negro Congress, the NLVC’s parent organization, was founded in 1936 as 
a coalition of activists with diverse view-points fighting for improvement of African American 
rights.  The organization was not affiliated with any political position or party.  Black trade 
unionists, community activists, women’s clubs, Communists, and disgruntled NAACP members 
advocating a greater focus on labor issues supported the NNC.  The NNC focused its efforts on 
the immediate concerns of African Americans – including the repeal of the poll tax, passage of a 
federal anti-lynching law, abolition of discrimination in public services, and enactment of a 
comprehensive civil rights program.100   
By 1940 the NNC had lost much of its ideological diversity.  The majority of the NNC’s 
members were American Communist Party members or supporters and CP ideology and the 
Popular Front’s agenda began to dominate the position and activities of the NNC.  After Soviet 
leader Stalin surprisingly signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler in 1939, NNC leadership also 
went along with the CP party line criticizing Roosevelt’s retreat from New Deal programs as the 
country pumped more money into production for war goods.  The changing position of the NNC 
prompted A Philip Randolph, the NNC’s president, to refuse to stand for re-election paving the 
way for Max Yergan, a former YMCA official and NNC vice-president firmly in the CP camp, 
to be elected president.  Many of the NNC members opposed to the pro-CP position the 
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organization had taken also left.  Ralphe Bunche and the Urban League’s Lester Granger 
publicly criticized the new ideology of the NNC. 101 
After Germany invaded Russia violating their non-aggression pact in 1941, the 
Communist party changed their position and supported the war.  Communist affiliated civil 
rights organizations like the NLVC became less isolated.102  Many Communists, therefore, were 
involved in initiatives to better job opportunities for blacks in New York during the war.  Harlem 
leaders such as Ben Davis affiliated with Communist influenced organizations like the National 
Negro Congress and the Negro Labor Victory Committee and advocated for fair employment for 
black workers.103  For the remainder of the war Communists in New York forged collaborative 
relationships with liberal interracial organizations like the NAACP and Urban League.     
Some of the early campaigns to end discriminatory hiring practices by war industries 
found success.  In August of 1941 the NAACP set its sights on the seemingly impenetrable 
airplane industry, using the press to pressure Brewster Airplane Company in Long Island City, 
Queens into hiring black workers.  Criticism from representatives of local NAACP branches and 
other New York City groups, combined with accusations of discrimination and bad publicity, 
caused the company’s management to hire their first ever black worker in August of 1941.  The 
NAACP’s criticism of Brewster revolved around the case of Edmond Van Osten.  Van Osten 
was a black tinsmith with nine years of experience whom Brewster management had deemed 
under-qualified for a position.  Though he was not hired, the company readily employed 
numerous white candidates with only two years experience in the same position refused Van 
Osten.  The NAACP brought Van Osten’s case to the attention of the New York Employment 
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Service, where an agency official confirmed Van Osten’s qualifications.  After the NAACP’s 
criticisms were published Brewster hired four other black workers.104  These hires, though small 
in number, were large in significance as the aeronautic industry was one of the toughest for 
blacks to penetrate.  Bad publicity highlighting discriminatory hiring practices pressured some 
companies to hire black workers in an era in which discrimination was increasingly looked down 
upon and viewed as un-American, especially in the face of Nazi fascism and xenophobia. 
  Even more dramatic was the People’s Court of Inquiry’s town meeting to address many 
of the problems facing Harlem’s blacks including discrimination in the job market.  New York 
City government officials were invited to attend the meeting and respond to the complaints and 
opinions of the Harlem community.  Designed to resemble a mock trial, the People’s Committee 
planned to present witnesses who would testify to their deplorable living conditions and lack of 
employment opportunities.105  The People’s Committee was created out of the Greater New York 
Coordinating Committee for Employment by Adam Clayton Powell Jr. to support his bid for 
City Councilman in 1941.106  Powell publicly announced that the People’s Committee would 
attempt to bring together African Americans and Puerto Ricans to use their organized strength to 
obtain employment.107  Interestingly one of those scheduled to be interviewed at the Court of 
Inquiry meeting was a migrant single mother who left the South and brought her children to New 
York in “pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness for herself and her children.”  The mother was 
disappointed when instead she found “unemployment, poverty, and public officials who had 
consistently attempted to deprive her of a miserly relief.”108  Meeting organizers invited city 
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officials to the inquiry and urged them to directly respond to the problems blacks faced.  The 
inquiry was an attempt on the part of the People’s Committee to bring the problems of black 
New Yorkers to the direct attention of city leaders. 
Blacks widened their efforts to open employment in defense industries to black workers, 
pressuring not only the companies themselves but the state and federal government as well.  
Blacks believed that the state employment service did not refer blacks to jobs.  So, in January of 
1941 the New York Urban League pressured the State Employment Service to assign black 
interviewers to all of its New York City offices so that black applicants would be better served.  
This was done in order to avoid the tendency for white interviewers to refer only white 
applicants to jobs.109   
Black politicians looked to find legislative solutions to the problem of employment 
discrimination.  In March of 1941 three Harlem assemblymen William Andrews, Daniel 
Burrows, and Hulen Jack introduced bills aimed at destroying all forms of job discrimination.  
These proposed laws would make discrimination in companies with government contracts 
illegal, increase punishments for those who violated these laws, and amend state laws to include 
racist hiring practices as transgressions of the civil rights of state residents.110  In the spring of 
that year Governor Herbert Lehman established the New York State War Council Committee on 
Discrimination in Employment (COD) and the state assembly passed legislation outlawing 
discrimination in war industries.  State Senators Walter Mahoney, Charles Perry, and Phelps 
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Phelps introduced three supporting measures to the State Senate. 111  This was a critical first step 
in state prohibition of employment discrimination.  
Though these bills were not passed by the assembly, Governor Herbert Lehman 
established the New York State War Council Committee on Discrimination in Employment 
(COD) to deal with complaints of hiring bias.112  Lehman, a long time supporter of progressive 
legislation for equal opportunity, appointed the members of the COD in March of 1941, and 
chose Frieda S. Miller, the Industrial Commissioner of New York, as its chairman.  The COD 
operated under the State War Council, which oversaw the mobilization of all state resources for 
the war effort, and its initial purpose was to fight bias against blacks and Jews who had suffered 
discrimination for decades, as well as Italians and Germans who were discriminated against 
because of their perceived association with the Axis powers in Europe.113  To ensure efficient 
production Lehman impelled the committee to make war industries utilize all individuals without 
consideration of race, color, creed, or national origin.  The committee consisted of twenty-seven 
members appointed by the governor representing industrial, labor, civic, and racial 
organizations.114 
  The committee’s first task was to mold public opinion against discrimination in 
employment so their first action was a publicity campaign.  The COD staff sent ten thousand 
letters to leaders in the state asking them to endorse full employment for minority groups.  When 
                                                 
111
 “Harlem Assemblymen Spur Movement to Air Racial Discrimination in State,” Amsterdam News. March 1, 
1941, 1 & 17. 
112
 Cheryl Greenberg, Or Does it Explode, 203. 
113
 History of the Committee on Discrimination in Employment, New York State War Council Committee on 
Discrimination, 8/14/1942, Papers of the New York State War Council’s COD, Reel 14, Box 6, Folder 265 – 
Committee Reports March-December, 1942.  
114
 “They Also Served --- Committee on Discrimination in Employment,” History of the State Committee on 
Discrimination in Employment, New York State Archives website, accessed February 10, 2012  
http://www.archives.nysed.gov/a/research/res_topics_mi_homefront_cde.shtml    
65 
 
  
a large number responded, they were sent to local newspapers to drum up more support for the 
committee’s activities.115 
The COD itself had little power to concretely end discriminatory employment practices.  
Its members and chairman conferred with war contractors throughout the state in an attempt to 
expand job opportunities for minorities through moral suasion and education.  Complaints were 
investigated by voluntary organizations because the COD lacked field staff and the committee 
could do little in the face of delay, obstruction, or noncompliance by companies.  Though it is 
not clear from the COD documents what they considered voluntary organizations, the 
organization actively cooperated with black organizations such as the National Urban League.  
There were few concrete advances made by the COD during its first year of existence.116    
It was not until the fall of 1941 that legislation went into effect giving the COD legal 
grounding for its activities.  In April of that year, Governor Lehman signed the Mahoney bill 
which barred discrimination in government funded or supported industries.  The bill, which was 
sponsored by the Congress of Industrial Organizations and strongly backed by Lehman, read 
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation engaged to any extent 
whatsoever in the production, manufacture or distribution of military or naval 
material, equipment or supplies for the State of New York or for the Federal 
Government to refuse to employ any person in any capacity on account of the 
race, creed or color of such person.117 
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In September 1941 the Mahoney Act went into effect.118  
New York’s black activists pressured for similar anti-discrimination legislation at the 
federal level.  Leaders of national civil rights organizations headquartered in New York led the 
charge to pressure the federal government to eliminate discriminatory hiring practices in defense 
industries.  Lester Granger, in charge of industrial relations for the National Urban League, 
blamed the National Defense Advisory Commission for the virtual exclusion of black skilled 
workers from defense projects.119  Granger believed the Commission could secure compliance 
with its non-discrimination order through the Office of Production Management (OPM).120  The 
OPM, which had representation in the Advisory Commission, exercised general direction over 
federal war procurement and production programs.121  Granger urged OPM Associate Director 
Sidney Hillman to withhold special tax privileges from defense industries if they discriminated 
against black workers.  Granger argued that the government could rightfully penalize these 
companies because by not employing black workers, they were compromising war-time 
production and thus the national interests.122   In the spring and summer of 1941 black leaders 
went further and aimed to take their protests directly to the president.  
In April,1941 A. Philip Randolph, leader of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 
announced plans for an “all-out march” to Washington, D. C. to demand an executive order to 
end racial discrimination in defense industries.  It was his hope that 10,000 blacks would 
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participate in this March on Washington.123  On April 1, 1941 Lester Granger, Walter White, 
Channing Tobias of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), Mary McLeod Bethune of 
the National Youth Administration (NYA), and Randolph asked President Roosevelt to forbid 
discrimination in the armed forces and defense industries.  When Secretary of War Stimson and 
Secretary of the Navy Knox refused to desegregate the armed forces, Roosevelt, afraid of 
angering employers and Southern Democrats, did not insist.  Instead he weakly issued a 
statement condemning discrimination.  African American leaders were incensed.  The black 
delegation felt that this was not enough and proposed a March on Washington at a meeting in 
Chicago.  Randolph agreed to lead the March on Washington Movement (MOWM) and issued a 
formal call for support.124   
Responding to Randolph’s call, local blacks formed a greater New York Committee to 
aid in mobilizing thousands for the proposed March on Washington which was scheduled for 
July 1941.  The New York Committee planned a mass demonstration on City Hall to urge Mayor 
Fiorello LaGuardia and the City Council to assist in the efforts to ban discrimination in national 
defense industries.  A large committee of black women supported the March on Washington 
Movement as well.  These women began a March on Washington button campaign throughout 
the Greater New York area.125   
In June Randolph spoke to more than 500 Brooklyn residents at a mass meeting at the 
Alexander Hamilton High School.  Randolph told the crowd the story of a black New York 
University of Technical Engineering student who applied to twelve companies for employment.  
The student received replies from six telling him no employment vacancies were available, and 
did not hear from the other six companies at all.  Randolph used this episode to illustrate the 
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need for the federal government to step in to end unfair employment practices, and gain popular 
support for the Movement.126   
The March on Washington did not come to be.  On June 25, 1941, the pressure from 
blacks and the March on Washington Movement pushed President Roosevelt to issue an 
executive order banning discriminatory hiring practices in industries with government war 
contracts.  Threatened by the embarrassment of having a mass protest in the U.S. capital 
highlighting government injustice; the President issued Executive Order 8802.  Not only did 
Executive Order 8802 prohibit hiring discrimination, but it also prohibited government training 
programs from discriminating against black workers.  Finally the executive order established the 
Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC) in the Office of Production Management.127  
The committee was to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination in violation of the 
executive order, and take appropriate steps to redress grievances which it found to be valid.  The 
MOWM was successful in exerting enough pressure on the president to force him to outlaw 
discrimination in war industries and create a federal institution devoted to identifying and 
investigating discriminatory hiring practices.   
Buoyed by the passage of the executive order, black New Yorkers were euphoric and 
optimistic about their place in the workforce.  Roosevelt’s executive order received front page 
coverage in the Amsterdam News, and was the subject of many editorials in the following weeks.  
The newspaper published a political cartoon entitled “It Means What it Says!”  In the cartoon the 
large hand of the federal government delivers the executive order prohibiting discrimination in 
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the national defense program to “Prejudiced Employers”128  By the summer of 1941 black protest 
had pressured the state and national government to take first steps towards outlawing 
discrimination in employment.   
After the passage of New York State and federal anti-discrimination legislation, there 
were some immediate gains.  Brewster Aeronautical Corporation in Long Island City hired a 
crew of black sheet metal workers, but it was clear that Executive Order 8802 and the FEPC 
were not immediate and complete solutions to the problem of job discrimination.129   In order to 
get those sheet metal workers employed at Brewster Aeronautical, heavy pressure from the 
NAACP and other black organizations in New York was needed.  Despite the executive order 
passed only two months before, it took public press campaigns about the discriminatory hiring 
practices of Brewster Aeronautical to force the corporation to begin to employ blacks.  The 
NAACP concluded that, “the Brewster Company furnishes an example of the necessity of 
constant vigilance by organizations outside of OPM [Office of Production Management] and the 
need for close examination of all the ‘smooth excuses’ of companies seeking to dodge the 
employment of Negroes by one pretense or another.”130  Black protests brought attention to 
discriminatory hiring practices in war industries under the purview of Executive Order 8802 in 
an effort to influence the companies to employ African Americans. 
The passage of the Executive Order 8802 and the Mahoney Act in and of itself was not 
enough to convince employers to hire black workers.  The situation at Brewster was not 
uncommon.  Employers continued to refuse to hire black workers.  Companies often blamed 
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white workers, claiming they refused to work with blacks. Furthermore some unions refused to 
accept black workers.131  It was clear that the vigilance of black organizations would be needed 
to address these problems in order for the executive order and Mahoney Act to be effective.   
The Brooklyn Coordinating Committee on Defense Employment for Negroes found some 
success in placing black workers after the establishment of the Committee on Discrimination and 
the FEPC.  From April to October of 1941 more than 600 African Americans received help from 
the Committee, 199 being directly referred to jobs and 122 of them being placed.  Defense 
training was obtained for 183 African Americans through the NYA and Board of Education.  The 
NYA worked alongside the New York City Board of Education to offer training opportunities for 
black men in a variety of occupations.  The Board of Education accepted African Americans in 
all categories of training, but trained black women only for jobs in the garment trades (one of the 
few industrial areas open to black women during the early years of the war).  The National Youth 
Administration however provided training for black women in the radio trades as well.132  
Industrial training for African Americans was very important in the fight for black employment.  
Training would create a group of skilled blacks ready to enter jobs in war industries, effectively 
eliminating managers’ claims that they could not hire black workers because they were not 
trained in the needed skills to work in the factories.     
During the New Deal, the National Youth Administration had operated youth training 
programs and continued to do so during the war.  The NYA, when it was conceived, aimed to 
combine economic relief with on-the-job training in federally funded work projects designed to 
provide youth with marketable skills for the future.  The organization, which was directly 
controlled by the federal government, attempted to encourage training and full employment for 
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African Americans as well.  In 1937 it launched a program specifically targeted for African 
American youths headed by Mary McCleod Bethune.133   In January of 1941 the NYA launched 
a drive to place Negro machinists and placed every black applicant in a position.134 
The NYA also collaborated with the BCCDE’s parent organization the Brooklyn Urban 
League to achieve greater black employment in defense industries.  The NYA aided the 
Brooklyn Borough Urban League’s (BKUL) defense employment drive which it launched in 
April 1941.135   The National Urban League had close ties with the NYA as Lester Granter, the 
Urban League’s assistant Executive Secretary in charge of industrial relations, served on the 
Advisory Committee on Employment problems of Negro Youth for the NYA.136  In May 1941, 
twelve National Youth Administration workers assisted the Brooklyn Urban League’s drive to 
get technically skilled blacks hired by industries with government contracts.  These NYA 
workers compiled lists of recent black technical school graduates and submitted them to the 
league.  BKUL Industrial Secretary Charles Berkley then approached employers with the names.  
The NYA workers also went to unions to query about their policy for admitting qualified black 
workers.  Trained black workers were then encouraged to apply for industrial positions and 
union membership.137 The BKUL collaborated with government offices with which it had 
personnel ties to train and place black workers in war industries a tactic that it would continue 
throughout the war years.   
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After the passage of Executive Order 8802, the NLVC also looked to use the federal 
government to open up jobs in war industries to African Americans.  They called on the War 
Production Board to immediately place trained black workers in jobs in war industries, asked for 
additional war contracts for New York City, and urged that blacks be appointed to policy-making 
boards and commissions.138   
The creation of the COD and the FEPC and the passage of the Mahoney Act were very 
significant in that the federal and state governments took measures to protect minorities from 
hiring discrimination.  Each however had its limitations.  Though black organizations 
increasingly looked to use government agencies to open up jobs in factories with government 
contracts to African American workers, the COD lacked the staff to investigate companies and 
enforce its legislation and the FEPC did not have mechanisms to force companies to comply with 
its findings and suggestions.  Therefore the agencies were not very effective in opening jobs to 
blacks in war industries.  This would change in 1942 as increased war time production created 
more available jobs, the government strengthened the powers of the COD and FEPC, and civil 
rights organizations stepped up pressure on these government agencies and employers alike for 
more jobs in war industries. 
 
America at War: More Contracts, More Job Opportunities in New York City 
After the United States officially entered the war on December 8, 1941, the United States 
government looked to gain a firmer grasp on the economy.  As in previous American wars 
money and resources were of the utmost concern to the federal government.  Consequently, the 
government expanded its power to oversee production of war materials and food as well as the 
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manpower supply for factories within the states, especially in centers of production.   The War 
Manpower Commission (WMC) was created in April, 1942 under the chairmanship of the 
Federal Security Administrator Paul V. McNutt.  The WMC consisted of representatives from 
the War Department; the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and the Navy; the Federal Security 
Agency; the War Production Board; the Selective Service System; and the Civil Service 
Commission. The WMC recruited labor for war and essential civilian industries, trained labor for 
jobs essential to the war effort, analyzed manpower utilization practices to increase labor 
efficiency, and accumulated national labor market information.139   
Many other government offices were incorporated into and operated under the umbrella 
of the War Manpower Commission during the war in order to centralize oversight of the nation’s 
wartime economy.  The FEPC was part of the WMC from 1942 until its reorganization by 
Executive Order in 1943.   In May, 1943 the President issued an executive order that moved the 
FEPC under the president’s jurisdiction and required all government contracts to have a non-
discrimination clause.  Though it was no longer under the jurisdiction of the WMC, the FEPC 
retained close ties with the organization.140  The cooperation of these two organizations would 
help ensure that racial discrimination did not interfere with war production.141  
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The United States Employment Service (USES) also operated as part of the WMC during 
war years (1942-1945).142  Local USES offices were responsible for taking action against 
companies who discriminated and USES officials were responsible for persuading employers or 
anyone acting on their behalf to eliminate restrictive hiring or training practices.143  These 
activities during the war years were overseen by the WMC.    
Not only did the federal government integrate national offices, it also began to 
incorporate and cooperate closely with offices of the state government.  On January 1, 1942 all 
staff and facilities of the New York State Employment Service were transferred to federal 
jurisdiction at the request of President Roosevelt.144  The USES and the State War Council’s 
Committee on Discrimination in Employment cooperated closely.  As the COD investigated the 
hiring policies of corporations, it asked USES and other interested social, religious, and racial 
organizations to refer black applicants to companies lacking colored workers.145  Tightening of 
federal control over offices of state government provided a unity of purpose, at least in New 
York. 
The COD looked for new tactics to increase its effectiveness.  Early in February of 1942 
it intensified its attacks on discriminatory hiring practices using a two-pronged strategy.  It tried 
to end the evasion of existing laws with a bill to prevent employment agencies, utility 
companies, and not just the defense industries, from discriminating against minority job 
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applicants.  Second the committee hired more field staff to increase the pressure of persuasion on 
employers with discriminatory practices.146   
Just as the COD was becoming more active, the city’s economic conditions improved.  At 
mid-year state and city authorities secured additional war work for New York City.  Until this 
point, the city had received less than four percent of the total volume of war orders when it did 
nearly 8 percent of the nation’s peace-time manufacturing.  As a result, USES encouraged New 
York City’s unemployed workers to find jobs in the more active markets in adjacent counties in 
Long Island, New Jersey and Connecticut.147   
As more jobs became available, state and local government organizations more actively 
tried to obtain jobs for New York’s blacks, but war industries continued to discriminate against 
black workers.  Several members of the Committee on Discrimination expressed frustration with 
the organization’s inability to make employers comply with their findings and asked Governor 
Lehman to strengthen the powers of their committee.148   New legislation was passed to allow 
Lehman to do just that by establishing more severe consequences for those who evaded the law 
and giving state officials the ability to enforce anti-discrimination legislation.     
In the spring of 1942 two amendments to the Mahoney Law, the Schwartzwald and 
Washburn Acts, were passed by the state legislature giving the Committee more power.  The 
Washburn Act made it a misdemeanor to exclude a citizen of the state by reason of national 
origin, race, color or creed from employment in war industries or enjoyment of privileges 
furnished by innkeepers, common carriers or employment agencies.  The second law, the 
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Schwartzwald Act gave the State Industrial Commissioner administrative powers in relation to 
discrimination in war industries.  This meant that the Commissioner could enforce the laws 
against discrimination.  The Commissioner could also require submission of information, records 
and reports pertinent to an investigation of discriminatory hiring practices.149  Consequently the 
COD began a campaign to eliminate all questions regarding race, religion, color, or national 
origin from employment applications for war contractors.150 
The amendments to the Mahoney Act also authorized the Industrial Commissioner to use 
the “powers of administration, investigation, inquiry, subpoena and hearing vested in him to 
enforce of anti-discrimination laws in war industries.”  The commissioner could require 
submission at regular intervals of information, records and reports pertinent to discriminatory 
practices in industries.  Frieda Miller, the state Industrial Commissioner, promised to use the law 
to issue orders to defense contractors prohibiting discriminatory hiring practices and to request 
affirmative action to correct past discrimination.151  Miller’s tough position and threat to use 
administrative orders that demanded action was an outgrowth of her past work in the labor 
movement.  As a longtime labor official, she “reached for the regulatory tools most familiar to 
her.”  Administrative orders like those she promised to issue were commonplace in labor 
relations since the Wagner Act, which conferred cease-and-desist authority to the National Labor 
Relations Board as well as the power to order offending companies to take affirmative action to 
compensate people who had been victimized.  Many state labor boards, including New York’s, 
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enjoyed such powers.  Therefore when Miller began to invoke similar powers she was just 
extending a regulatory model prevalent in industrial relations.152 
The passage of the Mahoney Act and the Schwartzwald and Washburn Acts gave the 
COD the power to actually achieve its goals.  In March, 1942, a field staff was organized to 
investigate specific complaints and to undertake investigations on the Committee’s own 
initiative. 
The state legislation was reinforced by new legislation from the city.  A New York City 
law aimed at employment agencies was added to the arsenal in the legal war against racial and 
religious discrimination.  The Hart Bill, signed into law by Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, outlawed 
employment agency ads which specified race, creed, or color limitations.  If an advertising 
agency ran such an ad at the request of a factory or company, the agency would be held liable for 
violating the law unless it could prove it had written instructions from the employer to do so.  In 
addition when an employer ordered an agency to place limitations in the ad, the employer’s name 
had to be given in the advertisement.  Therefore if there were discriminatory ads being placed by 
employers, state officials could identify them easily.  Violation of the law was a misdemeanor 
and could result in the offending agency losing its license to operate.153   
Other state offices attempted to adhere to the mandate from federal and state 
governments to end discrimination in war industries and government offices.  Anna Rosenberg, 
regional director of the Social Security Board, cracked down on discriminatory practices in the 
United States Employment Service in the New York area.  In July of 1942 she warned USES 
staff that there could be no misunderstanding of her 1941 ban on bias against minority groups, 
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which she issued when she took over direction of the office.  She also declared that any future 
violation would be interpreted as willful.  Rosenberg’s new order also clearly defined 
discrimination by USES and other employers as a “failure to refer occupationally qualified 
applicants” to jobs because of their race, color, creed, national origin, or citizenship.  Under these 
new orders it was discriminatory for an employer to pay one group higher wages than equally 
qualified members of other groups.  It was also considered discriminatory to refuse to hire an 
applicant on the grounds that he or she will be excluded from a union because of race.  Confining 
any group to a specific occupation under the guise of maintaining a balanced staff was also 
considered discrimination.  Rosenberg stated that it was also discrimination when a union, acting 
as an agent for an employer, excluded any person from membership because of any of the above 
reasons.  Rosenberg asked the COD to advise USES when factories were utilizing discriminatory 
hiring practices.154   
The COD strengthened its efforts to end discrimination after passage of the Schwartzwald 
amendment to the Mahoney Law.  Industrial Commissioner Frieda Miller, Chairman of the 
COD, announced the beginning of a new phase in the committee’s fight against discrimination.  
The State Labor Department implemented machinery to prosecute war industry employers who 
discriminated.  All employers holding war production contracts who continued to use 
discriminatory hiring practices could be served a formal order by the state Department of Labor.  
Unless the employer complied with the order within ten days of its receipt, he was subject to 
criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of no less than fifty dollars and no 
more than five hundred.  In fact the State War Council, of which the COD was a part, began 
carrying out provisions of the New York State Penal Law effective September 1, 1942 
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prohibiting private employment agencies from accepting job orders from war industries which 
contained discriminatory specifications referencing race, color, creed, or national origin.155   
The employment situation slowly began to improve for blacks in the summer of 1942.  
Placements of skilled and semi-skilled blacks had increased in New York and New England.  At 
the same time enrollment of blacks in war training classes in the metropolitan area and New 
York City also increased from 4 percent to 10 percent of total trainees.  The WMC attributed this 
increase to the coordinated efforts of the regional offices of the WMC, FEPC, COD, and the 
cooperation of trade unions in the area.  One indicator that the employment situation was 
improving was the willingness, albeit reluctantly, of firms to train black women for skilled 
positions in industrial sectors that were very hard for blacks to obtain.  Black women were being 
trained in aircraft classes, after the Eastern Aircraft plant of General Motors in the New York 
City suburb of Tarrytown accepted black women trainees.  Moreover the United Electrical, 
Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE), a progressive Communist led union, continued to 
campaign for the placement of Negro workers in the New York area, with locals 1225 and 1227 
placing more than fifty colored workers in shops.156 
As more jobs became available African Americans stepped up their efforts to pressure the 
government to end hiring discrimination.  The city’s blacks used regional offices of the FEPC 
and COD to secure employment for skilled black workers.  These agencies provided African 
Americans with a venue through which they could improve the job opportunities available to 
them and consequently their economic standing.  Black organizations brought instances of 
violations of state and federal anti-discrimination legislation to the attention of these agencies 
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which then conducted investigations of the accused companies, oversaw their hiring practices, 
and forced them to comply with the state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination.   
The Brooklyn Urban League was one of the main organizations that brought 
discrimination cases to the offices of the COD and FEPC.   African American job applicants who 
had been discriminated against reported the bias to the League’s Industrial Department.  The 
BKUL would often publicize these instances of discrimination.  In a public statement in 1942 the 
New York and Brooklyn branches of the Urban League charged several industrial companies 
with war contracts of having discriminatory hiring practices and obeying “the letter but not the 
spirit” of the executive order, by hiring a few black workers for unskilled jobs making them 
token black workers in plants with hundreds of men.  Furthermore they alleged that war 
industries often had higher qualifications for Negro applicants and frequently never reviewed the 
accepted employment applications from black job seekers.157  The League brought these cases to 
the attention of the COD for the dual purposes of bringing public attention to the discriminatory 
practices of the companies and to make the government anti-discrimination agencies aware of 
them as well.  In most instances the BKUL conducted investigations into the hiring practices of 
the accused companies and upon finding evidence of discrimination would forward complaints to 
the appropriate offices of the COD and FEPC for investigation and, hopefully, corrective action.   
The goals and activities of the Urban League made it a perfect working partner for fair 
employment agencies.  From its inception the NUL had been concerned with the problems faced 
by blacks living in cities.  Throughout the organization’s history, a major goal had been to 
broaden economic opportunities and break barriers to black employment.158  The Urban League 
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focused its efforts on meeting the needs of the nations’ urban black communities and in New 
York and other large cities dealt with massive migrant populations, discriminatory housing and 
labor markets, and radical political movements.  According to historian Toure Reed from the 
League’s birth thorough World War II the organization used two major strategies to achieve its 
goals. The first was that it attempted to prepare blacks for life in the industrial city by offering 
moral and vocational training and assisting migrants and longtime residents in locating housing, 
employment and city services.  Secondly the Urban League encouraged employers, unions, and 
landlords to open jobs and housing to blacks.159  This second goal was the focus of New York 
City’s Urban League branches. 
After the strengthening of the COD’s power to enforce anti-discriminatory legislation, the 
Urban League increasingly looked to use government agencies to aid its efforts at opening up 
new posts and new occupations to blacks New Yorkers.  According to the state Committee on 
Discrimination, the League served as the most important employment agency for blacks in 
Manhattan and Brooklyn because of its highly developed placement service.160  Therefore when 
the COD wanted to steer black workers towards jobs in industries it deemed had discriminatory 
hiring practices, the agency often looked to the Urban League placement service to provide 
qualified applicants.  Strengthening this collaborative relationship was the fact that Charles 
Berkley, appointed to the COD in July of 1942, was the former Industrial Secretary of the 
BKUL.161  As a result the Urban League, the Brooklyn branch in particular, also became the 
primary conduit of skilled black laborers that the COD sent to integrate companies with 
discriminatory employment practices. 
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During late November and early December of 1942 the city economy continued to 
improve.   Employment increased in the skilled trades, in the longshore sector, in delivery 
services, hotels, and other service industries, and in war plants.  Employment in the six leading 
war industry groups – shipyards, ordinance, aircraft, electrical and non-electrical machinery, 
professional and scientific instruments – increased 8 percent between September and November.  
The Navy Yard, where employment was expected to increase, contributed largely to these gains. 
The employment of women and African Americans during the same period showed large gains – 
25 percent and 21 percent respectively. There were labor shortages in a few trades.  Acetylene 
welder trainees (male and female), arc sender trainees (male), skilled molders, wood and metal 
patternmakers (mechanics and trainees), typewriter, office machine and refrigerator repairmen, 
and highly skilled airplane sheet metal mechanics were needed.  Reports from both building and 
repair shipyards in November disclosed a gain of 12 percent over employment in September.  In 
many of the shipyard trades (shipfitters, boilermakers, machinists, welders, and caulkers) the 
supply of all classes of workers was exhausted.162  As employment prospects improved in the 
city, more jobs in war industries became available to black workers. 
 By the end of 1942 leading war plants in New York City hired many more blacks.  From 
September to November the number of blacks more than doubled.163 
Table 5: Negro Employees in War Production firms, 1942 
 Number of 
firms 
Total 
employment 
Black workers % of total 
July 1942 289 264,469 4,933 1.9 
September 
1942 
302 252,102 4,705 1.7 
November 1942 309 263,155 11,463 4.4 
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Several historians have argued that a labor shortage in 1943 was the most important reason for 
this increase in black employment.164  But this increase in the number of blacks employed in war 
industries took place before the labor shortage began.  Therefore it could not have been just a 
labor shortage that prompted the city’s war industries to begin hiring black workers.  The 
expansion of posts and occupations available in war industries in the first two years of the war 
was more likely due to a combination of factors.   
Agitation from local chapters of the NAACP and National Urban League pressured the 
New York State government to pass legislation baring hiring discrimination in war industries and 
to establish the Committee on Discrimination.  Black activists also lobbied the federal 
government for similar measures which resulted in President Roosevelt’s establishment of the 
FEPC.  As a result, a few war industries hired black workers in skilled and semi-skilled positions 
for the first time.  The NYA also trained black workers in skilled trades to make them qualified 
for jobs in war industries.  Many companies continued to discriminate against African Americans 
however and due to weaknesses in the FEPC and COD these government agencies could not 
force them to comply with state and federal laws outlawing discriminatory hiring practices.  
Black organizations therefore continued to pressure government agencies to end discrimination 
in war industries.  In 1942 the state government responded by strengthening the COD by passing 
measures that allowed the organization to enforce the state anti-discrimination laws.      
In 1942 the labor market also improved as city manufacturers received more production 
contracts from the government.  Civil rights organizations like the Brooklyn Urban League 
cooperated with government agencies to place black workers in newly available positions in war 
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industries.  The Urban League forwarded trained black workers to companies with government 
contracts that were hiring.  Despite some scholars’ depictions of the Urban League as a 
conservative black organization with regard to civil rights activism, in this period and in this 
borough, the Brooklyn Urban League was an active agent of change.165  The focus of black 
organizations on working towards economic opportunity gave the movement for equal rights a 
decidedly economic cast in the 1930s and 1940s.  The activities of the NAACP and the Urban 
League in the early 1940s illustrate that equal employment opportunity for African Americans 
was the civil rights issue of the war years.  
The improved labor market, civil rights activism, and the enforcement of laws barring 
discriminatory hiring practices by war industries caused companies to hire black workers. 
Consequently the number of blacks working in war production plants increased in 1942.   The 
expansion of employment opportunities for blacks in war industries continued after 1943 as 
increased production and a labor shortage prompted war industries to hire even more black 
workers.   
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Chapter 3  
The Road to Full Integration: 
The 1943 Labor Shortage, Government Agencies, and Civil Rights Activism 
 
  
Across the nation a 1943 labor shortage caused employers to begin to relax the bars to 
hiring and unions found it more difficult to maintain restrictive policies.166  1943 proved to be a 
watershed moment in New York City’s war industries as well.  In that year New York firms 
began receiving more defense work prompting factories to hire large numbers of blacks.  Though 
the labor shortage was the most important reason New York industries employed black workers, 
a combination of circumstances seemed to have contributed to the hiring of black workers for 
skilled and semi-skilled jobs in New York’s war industries.   
Though not all companies had exactly the same reasons for hiring black workers, many 
employed them because in the face of a severe labor shortage, black labor was the most readily 
available pool.  Other companies were forced to hire black workers because they were targets of 
protests from civil rights organizations and investigations by the Committee on Discrimination or 
local offices of the War Manpower Commission.  Some of these companies’ workers were 
represented by integrated unions.  Many of the companies hiring black workers had a 
combination or all three of those situations.   
Though war industries in the city began hiring black workers discrimination persisted and 
black activism was still needed to ensure fair hiring and fair treatment of the blacks employed in 
war industries.  Civil rights organizations like the Brooklyn Urban League and National Negro 
Congress continued to cooperate with the COD and local offices of the FEPC to investigate 
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discrimination against workers employed in war industries.  Other organizations like the Negro 
Labor Committee and the Negro Labor Victory Committee cooperated with progressive labor 
unions to ensure black membership and training which would open more industrial jobs to 
African Americans.   
Some of New York’s African Americans took to the streets to protest continued hiring 
discrimination.  The Harlem Riot in August of 1943 drew attention to the inequality of job 
opportunities for blacks in war industries and prompted Mayor La Guardia to organize a 
committee to investigate race relations in the city.  Moreover, the riot prompted the state 
government to pass fair employment legislation pertaining to all employers in the state. 
The convergence of these factors pushed industrial producers in the shipbuilding, 
scientific and electric instrument sectors to hire black workers in skilled and semi-skilled 
positions.  This was a dramatic shift.  Blacks who could only formerly find employment as 
janitors, casual laborers, and domestic servants during the war years, found higher paying, 
unionized jobs never before open to them. 
Across the nation at the war’s end as soldiers returned to reclaim their jobs, demand for 
production decreased, and factories formerly producing war goods reconverted to consumer 
production, many blacks in these cities were ousted from the jobs they held during the war.  
Black women workers here hired in newly available service positions as secretaries, store clerks, 
and phone operators.  As veterans returned to jobs in factories many black men were fired and 
returned to the low-paying service positions they held before the war.167   
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Similarly as New York’s factories decreased their production capacity and soldiers 
returned from combat, many black men were ousted from their jobs in war industries.  Many 
other black men however were able to use the skills they acquired working in war industries to 
find skilled and semi-skilled industrial work by the end of the decade.  By 1950 the percentage of 
black men working in unskilled service positions had decreased.  Black women also found 
employment in new sectors of the city’s economy after the war.  As in other cities as soldiers 
returned from the war, black women were laid off from their jobs in factories.  Though they 
could no longer find industrial jobs, black women worked in clerical and retail positions - jobs 
which were closed to them before the war.  These jobs were better paying than the domestic 
positions black women had before the war.  The types of jobs blacks could find expanded during 
the 1940s, providing black workers with more options for gainful employment moving forward.  
World War II thus served as a watershed of employment opportunities for New York’s African 
Americans.168 
 
1943: A Turning Point 
Until late 1942, factories across the nation could fill their labor needs with workers from 
the large reservoir of Depression era unemployed.  From that time forward there was a shortage 
of labor which became progressively more severe as production needs grew.169  In New York 
City this was also the case.  New York’s war industries received more war contracts in 1943.  
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Industries therefore increased production which meant more jobs for New Yorkers.  As the labor 
market in the city improved blacks and women saw increased and expanded job opportunities in 
some of the leading war production factories.   
 The increase in black workers in New York’s war industries was, in large part, caused by 
increased production.  Between 1942 and April of 1943 the dollar value of New York City’s war 
contracts increased from approximately 140 million to 980 million dollars.170  The conversion 
process in New York had differed greatly from other industrial centers throughout the state.  
Steel plants and heavy industry in the Buffalo area had been readily converted to defense 
production.  Existing aircraft industries and shipbuilding plants upstate needed only to expand 
and the electrical, chemical and precision machinery plants there had been ready for war-
production.  As we have seen, New York City was a different story.  The thousands of small 
plants producing consumer goods, most of which were concentrated in the city, did not readily 
convert.  Moreover in the metropolitan area, labor costs had been too high to compete 
successfully with other areas for war contracts.  Among the 35,000 manufacturing plants in New 
York few were large factories employing thousands of workers.  Most of these plants were 
packed into lofts and old industrial buildings.  Only 2 percent of New York City’s work force 
was employed in plants of more than a thousand employees.171   
Some of the most important sectors of the New York economy finally began to convert to 
war production in 1943.  One of those areas was the garment sector.  The apparel industry was 
one of the largest industrial employers in the city before the war; however few contracts were 
given these small shops during the early war years.  Those shops for the most part did lighter 
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sewing and did not have the heavy, multiple stitch sewing machines required for defense 
production.  In addition the garment trade in the early days of the war was handicapped by high 
labor costs.  The government began to offer New York’s garment factories more contracts in 
1943.  The city’s 3,700 metal-working shops were also fairly successful in converting to war 
work, subcontracting with plane, ship and ordnance plants elsewhere in the region.172   In 1941 
and 1942 the government did not give woodworking plants war contracts, but in the early months 
of 1943 that changed as well.173   
The result was that industrial employers in the city hired more black workers.  The 
number of black workers in war industries increased rapidly at the end of 1942 growing by 12.5 
percent between November 1942 and January 1943.  By February of 1943 close to 4 percent 
(13,000) of the approximately 350,000 workers at 281 major metropolitan war plants were 
black.174  By April of 1943 the city’s unemployed were being rapidly absorbed by plants that 
converted to war production.175  By July of that year the city had become the second largest 
holder of war contracts in the country and as a result both essential and non-essential industries 
hired more African Americans.176   
Not only did the number of African Americans employed by war industries increase, but 
the proportion of workers who were black did as well.  The proportion of African Americans to 
all employees in war industries rose from 1.5 percent in May 1942 to 6 percent in May 1943.  
Moreover, by May approximately 4 percent more black workers were employed than in March in 
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354 selected war factories in the city.  By mid-1943 nearly 20,000 non-whites worked in New 
York City war production plants, a threefold increase from May 1942.177   By January, 1944 the 
workforce in New York almost doubled from the summer of 1942, while the number of black 
employees quadrupled.178   
The largest increases in black employment occurred in the electrical machinery and 
chemical industries.  Employment of non-whites in all private shipbuilding yards increased 3.7 
percent between March and May of 1943.  Nonferrous metals, chemicals, electrical machinery, 
iron and steel industries as well as the shipyards employed an average or above average 
proportion of black workers by mid-1943.  The non-electrical machinery and aircraft industries 
had the lowest proportion of non-white employees.  Of the war production plants shipyards 
employed the largest number of African Americans (7,000), followed by professional and 
scientific instrument factories (2,200), and electrical machinery firms (1,850).  The non-electrical 
machinery and aircraft industry, notorious in the past for discrimination against African 
Americans, had the lowest proportion of non-white employees.179  
 In many cases it was the labor shortage that prompted war industries to hire large 
numbers of African Americans.  This is evident in the hiring practices of Titeflex Metal Hose 
Company, Fairchild Aviation, and Curtis Wright.  These companies hired more black workers 
during 1943 than they had the previous year.  Fairchild Aviation had hired only six black 
workers from February to December of 1942.  By January of 1944 they hired 96 more totaling 
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102 black workers.  Titeflex hired 110 black workers between February and December of 1942.  
Over the course of 1943 the company hired 625 more blacks to make it 800 black workers.  
Wright Aeronautical hired 672 during 1942, but hired more than 3,000 black workers the 
following year.  These numbers indicate that the labor shortage created by increasing contracts 
caused this large increase in the hiring of African Americans.180 
 The labor shortage in 1943 was felt in New York’s very lucrative shipbuilding industry 
causing shipyards to hire large numbers of black workers.181  In June of 1943 the labor shortages 
at the Brooklyn Navy Yard became so acute that it began to appeal directly to blacks to fill jobs.  
Lieutenant Commander N. D. Hubbell released a statement to the Amsterdam News alerting 
black workers to skilled and unskilled job opportunities at the Brooklyn Yard.   Openings 
included mechanic learners (open to female applicants), 1st, 2nd, and 3rd class skilled laborers, 
helper-trainees, and apprentices.182   
The labor shortage in the shipbuilding industry continued into the late summer and fall.  
In fact by August there was a manpower shortage in specific occupations in the shipbuilding 
industries.183  And in September the shortage became so acute that the War Manpower 
Commission (WMC) ran stories in Harlem newspapers on cooperation between the agency and 
the Harlem Branch of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) to recruit ship yard 
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workers.184  The press release announced a job drive to recruit shipyard helpers and laborers for 
thousands of openings in shipyards in and around the Port of New York.  Benjamin Barnette, 
Employment Secretary of the Harlem YMCA, explained that applicants for these jobs needed no 
previous experience, and that chances for advancement were good.  Those hired as helpers would 
be used to assist journeymen electricians, outside machinists, welders, and pipefitters and would 
be upgraded to journeymen on the basis of their ability not seniority.185  Skilled and semi-skilled 
positions had opened to black workers in one of the largest shipbuilding yards in the Greater 
New York area.    
The labor shortage had similar effects on the hiring practices of other major war factories.  
By the end of 1943 the Calco Chemical Division of the American Cyanamid Company, the Arma 
Corporation, and the Sperry Corporation specifically set out to hire black employees.  These 
companies promised black workers everything under the sun – good wages, good working 
conditions, and even union membership – to attract them to their companies.186 
Though the labor shortage seemed to be the most compelling reason for war industries to 
hire black workers, state and federal government organizations also played an important role in 
changing hiring practices.  One important achievement was that in companies that had never 
hired black workers state and federal anti-discrimination agencies influenced management to 
integrate their workforce.  Several war industries investigated by the FEPC for employing very 
few blacks, began hiring African American workers in the wake of their FEPC hearings.  One 
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such firm was Babcock and Wilcox.187  The company, which had no black employees before 
1943, hired thirty-one African Americans by January, 1944.  The change in Titeflex Metal Hose 
Company’s hiring practices was most impressive as the company hired 746 black workers 
between the summer of 1942 and early 1944, increasing their hires by almost 1400 percent.  
More importantly in January of 1944 these black workers represented 20 percent of the 
company’s workforce after previously having comprised a mere 3.2 percent.  Curtis Wright, the 
largest employer of African Americans in this group of companies appearing before the FEPC, 
increased their black workforce more than fivefold from 2,995 to 16,155.  In total these six firms 
provided 15,461 black New Yorkers with jobs between the summer of 1942 and January of 
1944.188  Though the percentage of black employees working at firms appearing before New 
York City FEPC hearings seemed small, the increase in employment levels was impressive as 
the resistance to hiring blacks had been unusually strong in these industries. 
The more significant change in employment trends was that employers hired larger 
numbers of African Americans for skilled and semi-skilled positions.  Government agencies 
aided in making this happen as well.  This is particularly true of factories investigated and then 
monitored by the New York FEPC.  In May of 1942 100 percent of Ford Instrument’s black 
workers were unskilled workers (110 of 110) and represented 1.83 percent of the company 
workforce.  One year later in May of 1943 30 percent of the company’s 343 black workers were 
in skilled and semi-skilled positions.  Wright Aeronautical, in 1942, had 31 skilled and semi-
skilled black workers with 241 African Americans in unskilled positions.  The next year the 
company had 1,703 African American workers, of which almost half (891) were skilled or semi-
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skilled workers.  The general statistics for companies who came before the FEPC for hearings 
show that there was a significant increase in black skilled and semi-skilled workers.  In the six 
companies with hearings before the FEPC the changes in employment trends are apparent.  In 
these industries where there were 1,035 total black workers in 1942, one year later these same 
companies employed 1,308 black skilled and semi-skilled black workers alone with another 
2,294 African Americans in unskilled positions.189 
Though many historians of World War II assert that the FEPC failed to make war 
industries hire black workers en mass and fully end discriminatory hiring practices they fail to 
highlight the positive achievements of the organization, especially those FEPC offices that were 
successful at the local level.190  Though, by the end of the war, many of the companies 
investigated by the FEPC and found to have discriminatory hiring practices achieved black 
employment levels lower than the national average of blacks in the American population, the 
change was significant.  These companies employed very few blacks before the war; therefore 
the increase in the number of black workers was gradual causing black workers to comprise a 
smaller percent of the companies’ workforce.  This was the case both nationally and in New 
York.191  Moreover, FEPC- investigated firms in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, and 
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Birmingham, showed larger proportional gains in black employment than other companies.192  
Therefore the seemingly small gains represented large achievements for FEPC investigated 
companies.  Perhaps the most important effect of FEPC investigations on companies’ 
employment policies is the noticeable increase in the number of blacks employed in skilled and 
semi-skilled positions in FEPC monitored war industries.193  In New York the FEPC’s 
importance goes beyond being a symbol of the United States government’s first foray into 
protecting the civil rights of its black citizens.  The organization helped foster material advances 
for black workers in the war years. 
Black women in particular benefitted from expanded job opportunities in 1943, leaving 
positions as domestics and laundresses to find jobs in factories.  According to the Brooklyn 
Urban League, black women, many of whom were “recent migrants from the South”, found 
employment in industries producing consumer goods and those engaged in war production.   
Black women sought inspection and blueprint reading, bench assembly, machine shop, radio 
assembly, aircraft mechanics, and riveting jobs.  Many females between the ages of sixteen and 
twenty-five who applied to the Brooklyn Urban League’s placement services took advantage of 
the National Youth Administration’s (NYA) training program.  The industrial and clerical 
training of the NYA allowed the Industrial Department of the Brooklyn Urban League to place 
many women in industrial positions.  In the first half of 1943 alone 455 of 1,061 of the Brooklyn 
Urban League’s placements of women were in skilled or semi-skilled positions.194  The 
dissolution of the NYA in July of 1943 was a great disappointment to the members of the Urban 
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League’s Industrial Department.  Black women referred by the Industrial Department had been 
placed in a variety of occupations including precision instrument workers, turret and engine lathe 
operators, milling machine operators, inspectors, and drill press operators among other 
occupations.195 
 Beginning in 1943, as black women found employment in many major war production 
plants including the Brooklyn Navy Yard, the Intertype Corporation, the Arma Corporation, and 
garment firms, the Negro Labor Committee became active in organizing black women. 196   The 
NLC established a women’s division of the organization in 1944 to deal with the large increase 
in women workers in the city and a club room was set up for women workers in the Harlem 
Labor Center, a meeting place run by the Negro Labor Committee that served as headquarters for 
trade unions in Harlem.197  In the face of increasing racial hostilities and the foreseeable 
problems for black labor during reconversion, the Negro Labor Committee looked as early as 
1944 to take steps to provide black workers, especially women, with a stable place in unions and 
industrial positions.198 
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Table 6: Brooklyn Urban League Placements in the first half of 1943199 
Female Male 
General Factory 223 Laborers 102 
Packers & Wrappers 75 Porters 72 
P(ower) .M(achine) 
.O(perator). 
72 Machine Shop 22 
Clerical 25 General Factory 44 
Dial Painters 21 Welding 7 
Stock Clerks 20 Auto Machines 10 
Inspection 16 Machinist 2 
Assembly 16 Aircraft & Riveting 2 
Welding 9 Shipfitters 3 
Drill Press 3 Drill Press 1 
Unclassified (Civil Service, 
USES, menial) 
272 Training (with & without pay) 61 
Training (with & without pay) 309 Unclassified (Civil Service, 
USES, Menial) 
23 
Total 1061 Total 349 
Total Unskilled 606 
(57%) 
Total Unskilled 241 
(69%) 
Total Skilled / Semi-skilled 455 
(43%) 
Total Skilled / Semi-skilled 108 
(31%) 
Green – Unskilled Positions 
Blue – Skilled / Semi-skilled 
 
 
Work in war industries was not available to all black women however.  The great 
majority of the 2,546 female applicants desiring war employment were between thirty and forty 
years of age.  The Urban League’s Industrial Department found it hard to place these applicants 
in positions in war industries because of age requirements set by the factories.  Many factories 
set an age limit for women hired for work, and many African American women applying for jobs 
were older.  Moreover, most black women had limited factory experience and needed training.  
Though white women did not have experience or training for factory work either, management 
more readily accepted them into training programs, evidence of management’s preference for 
white workers.   Training with pay jobs were the most coveted positions by black women, but 
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high education, physical, and “type” requirements (requirements that did not explicitly have to 
do with race but would exclude most black applicants) demanded by the major war industries in 
the city automatically disqualified most Negro women from these training positions.  Although 
outright racial discrimination by war industries was illegal, factory employers used non- racial 
criteria to continue to exclude black women from skilled positions.  They did however place 
black women in unskilled positions in factories.200 
Despite these remaining bars to the employment of black women in war industries other 
areas of employment opened.  Because whites were vacating positions in department stores 
(termed at the time retail selling) and restaurants for war or better paying industrial jobs, Negro 
women were being hired in large numbers for the first time.201  Generally service occupations in 
non-essential industries were less desirable than jobs in war industry.  Because of lower pay 
there was heavy labor turnover in the service positions.  The complete shut-down of some 
luncheonettes, cutbacks on days of operation in restaurants, and the deterioration of services 
reflect the difficulties restaurants faced due to labor shortages.  As restaurant workers left their 
jobs to fight in the war or for better paying jobs in war industries and elsewhere, restaurant 
owners took the USES’ advice and began hiring women, older workers and blacks to fill vacant 
positions.  Placements of black workers increased considerably during the first five months of 
the year.  African Americans comprised 35 percent of the total restaurant placements as 
compared to 12 percent for the same period a year earlier.  Black membership in Local 6 of the 
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Hotel and Club Employees’ union increased as well, rising from 5 percent of the locals’ 16,000 
members to 20 percent.202 
Many black women also found employment in the needle trades as the Brooklyn Urban 
League placed its third largest group of applicants in positions in that sector.  Many black 
women who had worked in garment factories before the war had industrial experience.203  The 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), a major labor organizer for the apparel 
industry, had readily accepted black members since the 1930s.204  Black women however were 
reluctant to take these positions during the war because the pay in war industries was 
substantially better; but they were forced to by the lack of other job opportunities.205 
As more and more women used the Brooklyn Urban League’s placement service to find 
employment, the number of men using the organization to obtain jobs decreased.  In the first half 
of 1943 of a total 3,447 applicants to the League’s Industrial Department only 901 were males.  
Men made up 27 percent of all applicants interviewed by the organization, however a large 
percentage of those interviews were conducted in the first few months of 1943.  In fact the 
number of male applicants decreased so much that even with the increase in its service to women 
the Brooklyn Urban League’s total number of persons served in 1943 was lower than the similar 
period of the previous year.  Moreover the number of men placed in skilled and semi-skilled 
positions by the League was much lower than that of women applicants.  Aircraft industries 
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remained largely closed to both black men and women.206  There is no concrete information as to 
why this was the case.  Perhaps fewer men used the job placement service because the labor 
shortage had forced industries to lower their barriers against black employment.   
Despite the opening of new occupations to blacks in war industries, many companies 
continued to hire blacks for unskilled, low skilled and menial positions.207  Moreover, 
discrimination continued in various forms including refusal to hire African Americans and hiring 
of blacks for only maintenance and porter positions.  Some war industries also employed blacks 
as token workers, hiring just enough to avoid investigation by government agencies.  In addition 
some war plants would hire minorities sent by USES for jobs and then quickly fire them.208     
The U.S. Employment Service, a federal organization that was supposed to enforce laws 
barring discriminatory hiring practices, itself practiced racial discrimination.  In August of 1943 
the State, County and Municipal Workers of America (SCMWA), a CIO union, charged that the 
New York State USES was not following its own antidiscrimination policy.  James King, the 
New York district president of the SCMWA, criticized USES for allowing employers who had 
been refused service at a local office for discriminatory hiring policies to use the service at 
another location.  Moreover King charged that USES did not adequately and fairly train 
applicants because its employees did not want to work with blacks, Jews or Catholics.209  This 
was not surprising as USES was more closely oriented toward employers and concerned with 
continuous, efficient production.  No matter the reason, the continued discrimination against 
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African American workers, even by government offices that were supposed to uphold non-
discrimination policies was a source of disappointment for many African Americans. 
Despite continued challenges integrating war industries, 1943 proved to be a pivotal year 
for the employment of black workers.  As the government gave factories in the city more 
production contracts, they in turn hired African Americans.  Electrical machinery and chemical 
industries, shipyards, and scientific instrument factories hired black workers.  More and more 
African Americans found higher-paying skilled and semi-skilled positions, particularly in the 
case of companies investigated by the FEPC.  Employment opportunities were especially 
important for black women as many found jobs outside of domestic service positions.  Some 
found jobs in war industries as the Urban League placed 43 percent of women in skilled and 
semi-skilled positions as opposed to 31 percent of black men.210  Others found employment in 
restaurants and department stores.        
 
Continued Activism for Equal Employment Opportunities 
The success of efforts by the FEPC and COD in opening jobs in war industries to blacks 
could not have been achieved without the continued cooperation of black organizations.  The 
Brooklyn Urban League led in these efforts.  The organization continued to pressure both 
employers and government agencies for equal employment opportunity as New York City’s 
labor market improved in 1943.   
The Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) continued its close collaboration with the COD.  
The cooperation of BKUL and the New York State Committee on Discrimination was facilitated 
by close communication between officers in the two organizations.  The BKUL kept in close 
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contact with the COD in order to make the government agency aware of any activities 
concerning black employment and discrimination against blacks in companies that produced war 
goods.  The BKUL Industrial Secretary Lorenzo Davis sent letters to COD Executive Director 
Charles Berkley detailing the BKUL’s negotiations for black employment with companies with 
war contracts.211  In instances where Davis felt the Urban League’s activities were not enough to 
effect change, he referred the organization’s information on specific cases to the COD and asked 
for assistance in placing black workers.   
The BKUL also shared information its workers gathered on companies the COD was 
investigating.  In July of 1943 Davis sent Berkley reports on three companies the COD was 
currently investigating – Arma Engineering Corporation, Sperry Gyroscope Corporation, and the 
Bulova Watch Corporation.212  The BKUL claimed that Bulova, which had been paying for daily 
newspaper and radio advertisements for more than a week in a desperate effort to get women 
workers, told all qualified black women referred by the BKUL that there were no job openings.  
The BKUL charged that though there were supposedly no openings at Bulova, white women 
were being hastily hired. The report alleged the Arma Corporation, which manufactured 
scientific instruments - specifically analog computers - during the war, practiced a different 
method of discrimination equally effective.  The corporation set extra high qualifications for 
black female applicants that the BKUL sent for jobs.  At the time the report was published, only 
six of seventy black applicants sent to Arma had been hired.  The report also provided details on 
the use of higher employment standards and rigid testing standards to eliminate black workers at 
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the Sperry Corporation.  The BKUL claimed that Sperry, which had earlier in the year opened an 
employment office in Harlem in response to prolonged agitation for black employment, had 
announced that it would hire 500 black workers.  The Harlem office was almost entirely staffed 
by blacks and received a majority of black applicants for trainee and skilled positions.   The 
Harlem office rejected 93 of every 100 applicants through testing or while training.  Many black 
job applicants to Sperry made complaints to the BKUL citing difficult testing and arbitrary 
rejections by the company’s Harlem office. 213  From the evidence it is unclear whether the 
Urban League’s charges were true or how much direct effect this particular episode had on the 
companies’ employment policies.  It is significant however that after COD initiated 
investigations into the hiring practices of these companies, both Arma and Sperry hired black 
workers in positions not open to them previously and Sperry continued to do so after the war.  
The Brooklyn Urban League played an important role in relaying information about the hiring 
practices of companies suspected of discrimination. With an established record for job 
placements perhaps the COD believed the Urban League was the most reliable source of 
information on black employment.  The BKUL kept the COD’s attention on the continued bias 
of firms that it was investigating; pushing the agency to continually confront the companies to 
make them end discriminatory practices. 
 Not only did the Brooklyn Urban League transmit information to the COD, but it 
received information as well.  The COD provided the Brooklyn Urban League with information 
the COD had gathered during its investigations including statistics and official statements of 
companies’ policies.  After Bulova Watch Company rejected six of seven black female 
applicants for an advertised position in the company the BKUL looked to the COD for 
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assistance.  To help its efforts to get black women hired at Bulova, Davis asked the COD to get 
information on how many black women were employed by the firm in comparison to whites.214  
The Brooklyn Urban League incorporated these numbers in their reports and public statements. 
  In 1943 the BKUL also began to cooperate with federal offices.  The League became the 
official cooperating placement agency of the United States Employment Service.215  Officers in 
the League also cooperated with the FEPC to investigate one of the largest employers in the 
state, the Brooklyn Navy Yard.  Davis, Industrial Secretary of the Brooklyn Urban League and 
Chairman of the Citizens’ Anti-Discrimination Committee (CADC) on the Brooklyn Navy Yard, 
took steps to file a brief with the FEPC alleging discrimination by the Navy.  Having received 
numerous complaints alleging discrimination, intimidation, and unsatisfactory treatment from 
superiors, Davis asked members of the CADC to approve an official complaint about the Navy 
Yard’s discrimination requesting immediate FEPC intervention.216  These reports of 
discrimination against the Navy Yard, along with agitation from the National Negro Congress, 
led the FEPC to conduct intensive investigations of the employment practices of the Brooklyn 
Navy Yard in 1944 and 1945.217 
 The collaborative relationships between the Brooklyn Urban League and the FEPC and 
COD accounted for the organization’s success in placing black workers in industrial positions.  
The Brooklyn Urban League’s employment service placed 1,410 African Americans in jobs 
during the first half of 1943 alone.  Though the majority (60 percent) of black workers placed by 
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the employment service were placed in unskilled positions; the large minority (40 percent) of job 
applicants it placed in higher-paying skilled and semi-skilled positions was very significant.218  
These applicants held jobs that were closed to African Americans before the labor shortage in 
1943.219  The Brooklyn Urban League considered the State Committee on Discrimination one of 
its major supporters whose cooperation, along with the help of the FEPC, allowed the League to 
successfully facilitate the hiring of black women in civilian and defense industries.  In its 1943 
semi-annual report the BKUL Industrial Department paid tribute to the COD and the Fair 
Employment Practices Committee for aiding in its drive to secure equal economic opportunity 
for black workers in New York City.220  The BKUL’s placement of blacks in these positions 
constituted a definite and significant change in employment trends for the rest of the war. 
 The influence of black activism in opening employment opportunities for black workers 
is clear.  The Sperry and Arma Corporations, which previously did not employ African 
Americans, hired black workers and in 1944 were among the first companies to hire African 
Americans for office positions.  Though the labor shortage accounted for some of the appreciable 
gains for black laborers in 1943, Arma and Sperry had been the focus of very public protests 
from the NAACP and the Brooklyn Urban League.  Public protests, published reports of 
discrimination, and referral of complaints of discrimination also led to FEPC and COD 
investigations of the two companies.  It was through a combination of these causes; a labor 
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shortage, black organizational activity, and investigations by the FEPC and State War Council’s 
Committee on Discrimination; that many blacks were able to find industrial positions.  The 
cooperation between social organizations like the Urban League and government agencies which 
enforced progressive state legislation barring discriminatory hiring practices led to increases in 
the number of blacks working in war production plants.   In this way the Brooklyn Urban League 
became part of the enforcement infrastructure for fair employment agencies.  Despite some 
scholars’ depictions of the Urban League as a conservative black organization with regard to 
civil rights activism, in this period and in this borough, the Brooklyn Urban League was an 
active agent of change.221 
 
Unrest for Opportunity: The Harlem Riot of 1943  
In July of 1943 the Brooklyn Urban League issued a report stating that more job 
applications were coming in per day to war industries in New York than at any other time in 
history, but pondered why companies still complained of a labor shortage.  In their estimation the 
manpower deficiency in the Brooklyn / New York area was artificial, created by the 
unwillingness of these industries to hire black workers.222  As the report highlights, after the 
labor shortage the opening of industrial job opportunities to black workers did not come 
wholesale.  Not all war industries integrated, nor did every factory in integrated industries hire 
black workers.  The process was slow and incomplete.   
The frustrations blacks felt at employers’ continued refusals to employ them in higher 
paying war industries contributed to the Harlem Riot.  On the night of August 2nd a riot began in 
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response to a white police officer shooting an off-duty Negro soldier whom he charged with 
interfering in the arrest of a black woman in the lobby of a hotel on 126th Street.  False rumors 
circulated accusing the officer of having killed the soldier while trying to defend his mother.  In 
response to the rumors black rioters broke store windows, looted, damaged property, and 
attacked policemen.  By the morning of August 3rd 6 people had been killed, 189 injured, 606 
arrested, and hundreds of stores looted.  Property damage was estimated at two million dollars.223   
Though the catalyst for violence were the rumors of police brutality, many black New 
Yorkers and some African American leaders believed this burst of violent action was an 
outgrowth of unequal economic opportunities for New York’s Negroes.  In an editorial in the 
Amsterdam News one writer explained that equal treatment of blacks, including equal job 
opportunities, could have prevented the riot.  He wrote: 
While we are aware that absolute democracy cannot be attained for all of the 
people of this country in a short period of time, we believe that America will not 
be embarrassed before the world by other race riots if the Negro Americans are 
granted their just deserts [sic] of: 
1) Equal job opportunity. 
2) Equal treatment in the armed forces. 
3) Equal protection of their legal and civil rights. 
If these elementary rights of citizenship are not granted to Negroes now, other 
similar disturbances should cause no surprise.224 
 
In this instance it is clear that the lack of equal employment opportunity was thought by 
some to be a major precipitating factor for the unrest in Harlem.  From his placement of job 
discrimination at the top of the list of what blacks deserved, this writer believed that the lack of 
equal job opportunities perhaps was the most important factor in the riot.  Many black leaders 
believed the frustration blacks felt over job discrimination had contributed to the Harlem Riot.  
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Whether they were right or wrong, black leaders in New York used the new attention to advance 
their ideas for racial uplift.     
BKUL Industrial Secretary Lorenzo Davis similarly linked the discrimination against 
blacks in the war industries and the riots that swept the country in the summer of 1943.225  In the 
1943 semi-annual report of the Brooklyn Urban League Davis expressed his belief that the 
disturbance in Harlem was in part caused by the failure to integrate black workers into America’s 
war-time economy.  He emphasized the role of the Negro worker because all the major 
disturbances took place in centers of concentrated war activity where the status of black workers 
had been a controversial issue – Mobile, Alabama; Detroit, Michigan; Beaumont, Texas; 
Chester, Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland; and Brooklyn and Harlem, New York.  In all of 
those instances injustices to black workers contributed to the conditions which made these 
violent outbreaks possible.  The denial of employment opportunity, discrimination in the work 
place, segregation of blacks after employment, wage differentials favoring white workers, and 
the denial of promotion of black workers consistent with their skills were routine practices for 
war industries.  Davis believed that the government’s solutions had not been adequate and 
challenged it to treat these companies with a democratic firmness ensuring an end to 
discrimination.226 
Like Davis other black leaders urged the city, state, and federal governments to find 
solutions to the conditions that caused the Harlem Riot.  A. Philip Randolph called on Mayor La 
Guardia to create a Commission on Race to study the reasons for the riot.  Randolph himself was 
convinced that the inequality of opportunity for black economic advancement had contributed to 
the riot.  Though Randolph did not condone the actions of those who perpetrated the property 
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damage, he did urge blacks to “stand up and fight for their constitutional and economic rights 
with the ballot, constructive agitation, education through moral, religious and labor 
organizations, and all means lawful and orderly, of social protest.”227  In response to the unrest, 
and at the prompting of black leaders and the New York City Council, Mayor La Guardia created 
a commission dedicated to the study of race relations in the city called the Mayor’s Committee 
on Unity.  This new committee was significant as it was the first of its type and because it was 
made into a permanent institution.228 
In the wake of the riot, labor activist Frank Crosswaith called a meeting of the members 
of the Negro Labor Committee to consider the need for a worker education program to combat 
racism within unions.  Crosswaith believed educating workers about black contributions to 
American life was one way to foster better relations between workers of all races and ethnicities.  
Elmer Carter, a NLC representative from the COD, felt that unions themselves should improve 
conditions between black and white workers.  In his opinion, members of unions affiliated with 
the CIO needed to be acquainted with what their union constitutions stood for – the inclusion of 
workers of all races and the solidarity of all workers regardless of race.  Crosswaith suggested 
using Education Committees in unions affiliated with the AFL and CIO to educate their white 
members.  The committee resolved to focus on using the existing union machinery to make 
workers recognize that blacks were human beings and should be treated as such.  Their hope was 
that this education would allow white union member to accept black workers.  In the NLC’s 
estimation this was the only way to avoid continued racial upheaval and bloodshed.229   
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The NLC created a Committee on Race Relations in October of 1943 to survey union 
practices and identify unions that discriminated against black members.  They would then 
campaign for an end to these racist practices.  The committee was also focused on teaching 
workers about the problems black workers faced.  The Committee looked to achieve this through 
collaboration with the FEPC, the COD, the National Urban League, the Young Men’s Christian 
Association., the Young Women’s Christian Association, and the Labor Committee of the 
NAACP.230  Racial tolerance among workers became the primary focus of the NLC after the 
Harlem Riot. 
The riot also prompted black organizations to increase the pressure on federal offices to 
investigate discrimination by major war industries in the area.  The National Negro Congress and 
Brooklyn Urban League continued their efforts to end racial bias in New York’s war industries 
focusing in particular on the Brooklyn Navy Yard, one of the largest employers in the city.  By 
1943 the Navy Yard, which experienced an acute labor shortage, had begun hiring black 
workers, so many of these cases were not about discriminatory hiring practices but alleged 
inequitable treatment of black workers.  Many black women working in the yard filed 
discrimination complaints with the NNC alleging that black workers were forced to labor under 
conditions detrimental to their health and assigned menial work that was beneath their job 
classifications and abilities.  Moreover, these women reported that when workers complained 
about the practices to managers, they were given low efficiency ratings and assigned to 
undesirable jobs.  Rear Admiral Kelly, the Commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, 
categorically denied the existence of any racial discrimination toward black workers.  The 
                                                 
230
 Memo, October 1943, NLC Papers, Box 3, Folder a34 – Race Relations Committee 1943-1944. 
111 
 
  
National Negro Congress, with the cooperation of the Brooklyn Urban League, began a drive to 
get the complaints of black workers in the Navy Yard registered with the FEPC.231   
 Blacks’ discontent with unequal employment opportunities led leaders of government fair 
employment agencies to renew their efforts to end racial prejudice in war industries.  Joseph 
O’Connor, WMC Deputy Regional Director, promised a clear cut procedure to put teeth into the 
anti-discrimination policy of the USES in New York.  He did however defend the activities of 
the USES using its record and cooperative relationship with the State Committee on 
Discrimination as evidence of its commitment to ending discriminatory hiring practices.232 
 The new state governor Thomas Dewey, in an effort to win public, support took on the 
issue of discrimination in employment but did not use the COD as his main instrument to do so.  
In May, 1943 Dewey publicly expressed his deep dissatisfaction with the committee and he 
slashed233  the COD’s budget by 25 percent in June, a move that New York’s black activists 
feared would cripple the agency.234  As the allies’ victory in Europe became more probable, 
perhaps the agency seemed less necessary.  After all the mandate of the COD would vanish with 
the end of the war as would the war contracts over which it had jurisdiction, and even if the 
agency survived it had no independent authority to enforce the law.  Fearing that the COD would 
end, Alvin Johnson, the new president of the Committee worked with committee members to 
draft a legislative proposal creating a permanent, independent commission with centralized 
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jurisdiction over public and private employment. 235  The COD also used public reaction over the 
Harlem Riot and revulsion against Anti-Semitism and the lobbying activities of the American 
Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith to argue for the creation of a 
permanent Committee.  In response Dewey appointed an ad hoc commission against 
discrimination.236 
 By the end of 1943 the activities of the Committee on Discrimination and other fair 
employment agencies would be even more important.   The scope of the activities of the COD 
and FEPC expanded after 1943.  Not only did the organization try to integrate war industries, but 
it also began to eradicate unfair and discriminatory treatment of blacks hired by war industries.  
Moreover, as the end of the war loomed so did the prospect of reconversion.  The competition 
over jobs would increase as soldiers returned from the war and war industries reconverted to 
consumer production, losing lucrative government contracts and perhaps cutting jobs.  This 
caused the COD to undertake efforts to prevent of a return to lily-white industrial factories.  The 
violent outburst in Harlem the previous August increased fears that reconversion and the loss of 
jobs for blacks would result in another burst of violence as it had after World War I. 
 
Anxiety and Action: Government Agencies’ Increased Efforts for Black Employment 
 In 1944 the Committee on Discrimination, renamed the New York State Committee 
Against Discrimination (CAD), stated that racial and religious tensions in the state had reached 
serious proportions.  The critical need for increased war production coupled with the necessity to 
fully utilize manpower resources gave the committee a sense of urgency which was reflected in 
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the increased number of investigations it conducted in 1944.  Various factors contributed to the 
increase in racial antagonisms in the city.  Prospects for an early peace brought with it cutbacks 
in production, talk of reconversion, and mass layoffs.  Perhaps most importantly there was fear 
of post-war unemployment, which much like the unemployment in the wake of World War I, 
would more adversely affect African Americans and women as they were the first ousted from 
jobs in war industries.  All of these factors played a part in creating a climate of fear, which the 
CAD considered conducive to the growth of racial and religious tensions.  For these reasons, the 
work of the Committee increased considerably in volume.237 
 The field representatives of the committee conducted more investigations during 1944 
than in either of the two previous years.  The CAD investigated war plants, employment 
agencies, labor unions, defense training schools, and some public utilities.  Field representatives 
followed the Committee’s established practice of persuasion and conciliation with companies 
with discriminatory practices rather than compulsion to comply with the law.238  Fifty percent of 
the 505 companies investigated by the CAD in 1944 involved war plants, employment agencies, 
labor unions and miscellaneous organizations in the New York City metropolitan area.   Because 
this area was the country’s largest industrial center and the center of the state’s black population, 
most of the Committee’s efforts were concentrated there.239   
 The CAD found that though more blacks were being hired by war production plants, in 
1944 African Americans were still underrepresented in war industries throughout the state.  
Blacks constituted less than 2 percent of the New York State work force in war plants but made 
up 4 percent of the state’s population.  Furthermore, the CAD found that blacks had not been 
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upgraded to the highest positions for which many were qualified, a situation that the committee 
considered important to understanding why there were critical shortages of skilled labor in many 
occupation categories.240  
 Continued discrimination caused the disparity in employment levels.  Employers blamed 
their white workers for low levels of black employment claiming that they could not hire African 
Americans because white employees refused to work with them.  In addition companies used the 
“failure to apply” excuse for not hiring black workers.  They argued that there was a “total 
absence of Negroes” from the employment rolls because no African Americans applied for jobs.  
CAD field representatives however found evidence to the contrary.  African Americans 
frequently did not seek employment in positions where blacks were not typically hired.  CAD 
therefore pointed out to employers that a negative policy of waiting for blacks to apply for jobs 
would not bring positive results.  To overcome blacks’ belief that they would not be hired, the 
committee suggested that the companies send letters to organizations responsible for placing 
black workers in positions – like the USES and the Urban League – explaining that they would 
hire blacks.  These companies were required to send copies of such letters to the CAD.  The 
refusal of an employer to take such action was considered evidence of discrimination and would 
subject the company to other compliance measures.241  
 Obtaining employment was not the only challenge black workers faced.  Members of the 
CAD field staff also found that some war industries refused to integrate minority groups after 
hiring.  The discrimination against employed African Americans included failure to pay equal 
wages for equal work, failure to upgrade, segregation, isolation, and use of separate dressing 
rooms, sanitary and toilet facilities.  Some employers discriminated by assigning black workers 
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to menial, janitorial, or other low-paying laboring jobs.  According to the CAD, segregation of 
black workers created in the collective minds of the white workers “attitudes of racial 
exclusiveness and fosters a myth of race superiority.”242  These attitudes, therefore contributed to 
employers’ excuses that they did not hire black workers because white workers refused to work 
with them.  CAD itself was pessimistic about the gains blacks had made, cautioning against 
conflating employers’ increased willingness to employ blacks with an end to racism.  In fact the 
organization claimed the relaxation of discriminatory practices may have been an effect of the 
increased need for labor.243 
 Despite the Committee’s pessimism, CAD statistics showed that the news was not 
completely bleak for blacks looking for war-time employment.  Towards the end of 1944 24,900 
blacks were employed in 270 leading New York City war plants constituting 8.4 percent of the 
total staff.244  This was due, in part, to continued improvements in the labor market of the war 
industries.  In the first quarter of 1944 it was not difficult for either a white or black worker to 
secure a job.  It was easier however for a white worker to secure certain types of work, namely 
skilled positions.  Despite this difference, it was less difficult for African Americans to secure 
more desirable, higher paying kinds of jobs than in the previous three years.245  Statistics 
demonstrated these trends.  The ratio of all black workers to total personnel in these same 270 
war firms a year earlier in November of 1943 had been only 6 percent.  Moreover despite an 
overall decrease of 6,400 workers in the plants between September and November, nearly 1,300 
blacks were hired during the same period.  In addition, there were above average percentages of 
                                                 
242
 Ibid., 9-13. 
243
 Labor Market Report, October – November 1944, New York State War Council COD, Box 7, Folder 319 – War 
Manpower Commission. 
244
 Labor Market Developments Report, New York Metropolitan Region, October – November 1944, New York 
State War Council COD, Box 7, Folder 319 – War Manpower Commission.  
245
 Labor Market Developments Report, New York Metropolitan Region, February – March 1944, New York State 
War Council COD, Box 7, Folder 319 – War Manpower Commission.  
116 
 
  
black employment reported in plants producing steel products (16.3 percent), electrical 
machinery (11.4 percent), and nonferrous metals (11.1 percent).  In terms of absolute numbers, 
the shipbuilding industry remained the largest employer of blacks (8,969), followed by electrical 
machinery (5,696), ordnance plants (2,230), and factories making scientific instruments 
(2,028).246  
 Other encouraging black employment trends were recorded by the United States 
Employment Service.  There were fewer reports of discriminatory hiring practices filed against 
firms serviced by USES and local offices reported that employers seemed to be more receptive to 
relaxing their job specifications once they were investigated.  Placements of blacks in 
manufacturing firms increased during 1944.  In February of 1945 blacks constituted 30 percent 
of USES placement activity in manufacturing plants as opposed to 23 percent one year prior.  
Outside of household placements USES placed black workers in apparel, shipbuilding, and 
electrical machinery plants, all manufacturing industries which employed above-average 
proportions of black workers.247  
 
The Next Step: The Question of Upgrading in 1944  
Like the CAD, the regional office of the FEPC continued its activities to alleviate 
discrimination.  And like the CAD the FEPC began to investigate discrimination against blacks 
employed in war industries.  One of the industries under FEPC scrutiny in 1944 was the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard.  In 1944 and 1945, pressured by the complaints of black workers and the 
National Negro Congress, the New York office of the FEPC investigated and helped arbitrate 
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fifty-one cases charging discrimination against African American workers at the Navy Yard.  
Many of these cases were brought to the Navy Yard with the help of the Brooklyn Urban 
League.248   
By that time the Brooklyn Navy Yard had become the largest employer of African 
Americans in New York City, employing 6,250 black workers.249  Therefore, most of the 
complainants were skilled or semi-skilled workers who claimed they were denied requests for 
upgrades and promotions because of racial discrimination (22 cases).  The second largest amount 
of cases brought to the FEPC involved accusations that the Navy Yard dismissed or suspended 
them unfairly due to race (11 cases).   Discriminatory hiring was the third most common 
complaint brought to the FEPC about the Navy Yard (5 cases).  There were various other 
complaints filed with the FEPC including denials of transfers and unjust efficiency ratings due to 
racism, refusals to train Negro workers, and several instances of mistreatment because of race.250   
Of the twenty-two cases brought before the FEPC claiming denials of promotions and 
upgrades, half of those (11) were “satisfactorily adjusted.”  That is, in half of the cases the 
plaintiffs were awarded promotions after FEPC investigations.  The FEPC dismissed all of the 
complaints on unfair dismissals and suspensions and all but one of the complaints of 
discriminatory hiring practices.251  The FEPC had its most important and effective role in helping 
Negro workers already hired by the Brooklyn Navy Yard achieve higher status and pay in the 
company. The campaign of the NNC and BKUL had a large part in facilitating the adjustment 
and eradication of discriminatory employment practices. 
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Even in cases where the FEPC did not officially record a satisfactory adjustment, it is 
clear its investigations still had positive effects.  George DeYounge, a recent migrant, had 
worked as a mechanical and architectural draftsman and filed a complaint with the FEPC on 
February 1, 1945 alleging that he was denied a transfer to a position for which he was better 
qualified.  He also wanted to contest the efficiency rating he was given, as it was the reason the 
Navy Yard denied his request for a transfer.252  DeYounge had originally been assigned work as 
a Junior Engineering Draftsman with a SP-3 rating in April of 1942 after being transferred from 
Washington, D. C. to the New York Navy Yard in Brooklyn.  In October of that year he was 
promoted to Assistant Engineering Draftsman with an SP-4 rating and in December he was made 
an Engineering Draftsman with a SP-5 rating.  DeYounge requested a transfer from the General 
Arrangements Section in November of 1944 to the Diesel Section.253 
DeYounge’s application for a transfer was denied because of a severe shortage of 
personnel in the section in which he was already working.  Furthermore, DeYounge had been 
given an efficiency rating of “Fair” which did not warrant his transfer to a more skilled position.  
DeYounge appealed his efficiency rating.  Because of his persistent appeals, the Diesel Section 
granted DeYounge’s request for an interview and though he had no previous experience was 
given a job in that area.  DeYounge however declined and chose to remain in the General 
Arrangements department.254 
Part of the reason DeYounge declined the position in the Diesel Department may have 
been that the General Assignments department began giving him tasks that better utilized his 
skills.  Between January 30 (two days before his complaint was officially filed with the FEPC) 
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and July, 1945, DeYounge had been assigned work involving docking plans and data required 
for the dry docking of ships, such as checking and designating on drawings the appropriate 
locations for openings below the water line on ships which were placed in drydock.  It was 
estimated that these duties constituted about 25 percent of his assigned responsibilities.  
DeYounge, as of July of 1945, was interested and satisfied with his new duties and on July 2, 
1945 received an unofficial rating of good.255  Though the Navy Yard did not officially record a 
satisfactory adjustment for this case because Mr. DeYounge was never transferred to the Diesel 
Department, the fact that the FEPC investigated and workers had a place to voice their 
complaints affected the working conditions and tasks black employees were given. 
 
From the Factory to the Office: Black Employment in White Collar Positions 
 While African Americans were increasingly being employed in New York war plants, no 
corresponding progress was noted with respect to employment of blacks in positions connected 
with the administration of business, such as office or white collar workers.  Resistance to 
employment of blacks as stenographers, typists, or filing clerks was greater than in factory work.  
Some progress was noted though.  The Sperry and Arma Corporations were included in a list of 
establishments using black workers in office positions, not surprising since they had been 
investigated by the FEPC and WMC.  Of the twenty-nine companies listed as using blacks as 
office workers, twenty-eight were in New York City.256  
Though many white collar office jobs were not open to black workers, employment 
advances were made for black workers in telephone companies.  After complaints of 
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discrimination were filed against Bell Telephone Laboratories by well-qualified black women in 
October 1943, the USES suspended service to the firm while it investigated its hiring practices.  
Upon completion of the probe USES revealed that the charges of discrimination were justified.  
In a conference at the FEPC’s New York office, company officials stated that supervisors in 
local USES offices had not been complying with the company’s anti-discrimination measures 
which had been put into place in conformity with Executive Order 9346 which eliminated 
discrimination in regard to hire, tenure, terms or conditions of employment, or union member-
ship in war industries.  The FEPC sent instructions to remedy the situation.  At the time Bell 
Telephone Laboratories employed only sixty-seven black workers.  By August 1944 the number 
had risen to 186, and many of these workers held professional and clerical jobs, as well as skilled 
positions in shop and maintenance departments.257 
In December, a new occupation opened for black women at the New York Telephone 
Company.  Management hired twenty-six women as its first black operators.  Though the 
company had a stated policy of non-discrimination, black women who were denied jobs proved 
that statement untrue.  A young black woman filed a complaint with the regional FEPC the 
previous summer alleging that New York Telephone had refused her employment as a 
switchboard operator because of her race.  Although her specific complaint was dismissed, the 
FECP investigated the general complaint that blacks had not been hired for such jobs.  The 
company was ordered to advise the Committee of any progress it made in hiring minorities.  
Thirty days after the conference New York Telephone announced that it had found and accepted 
twenty-six African American women for training and employment as operators, four of whom 
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went to work the following Monday.258  Though the company claimed that the “employment of 
Negro girls … was in line with company policy” it is clear that the FEPC investigation was the 
stimulus for the company’s action since it hired them soon after FEPC proceedings.259    
 Though there was slow and incomplete success in integrating companies, there were 
tangible achievements through legislation and the courts.  The New York State Court of Appeals 
in July1944, for the first time brought unions within the purview of the antidiscrimination law.   
In an effort to comply with Section 43 of the state Civil Rights Law which prohibited labor 
organizations “from denying membership to persons by reason of race, color, creed or national 
origin”, the New York locals of the Railway Mail Association admitted seven black members.  
When the national union ordered the New York local to oust them, the New York locals referred 
the issue to the Committee Against Discrimination, which referred the case to the Industrial 
Commissioner for a hearing.  The New York Supreme Court found in favor of the national union 
which argued that the Railway Mail Association was a fraternal, beneficiary association and not 
a labor organization and therefore not subject to the state’s anti-discrimination law.  When the 
local appealed the decision to the state Court of Appeals, the ruling was overturned in a 
unanimous opinion therefore upholding the anti-discrimination law preventing labor unions from 
denying membership to minority groups.260  
 
Ives-Quinn Law:  Anti-Discrimination after the War 
 Another major victory in the fight against discrimination in employment came in 1945.  
The New York State assembly, for the first time anywhere in the country, created a permanent 
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fair employment practice commission.  In June of 1944 Governor Dewey created a committee to 
study discrimination in the state.  Irving Ives, a Republican assemblyman from central New York 
chaired the committee.  Ives was known for his consistent liberalism on civil rights and became 
the central legislative figure supporting the Ives-Quinn bill which would outlaw discrimination in 
employment on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.261   
  Governor Dewey’s study group advised the state government to create of a permanent 
State Committee Against Discrimination (SCAD) in the Executive Office of the State.  The 
SCAD would consist of five members, with the power to formulate policies; adopt rules and 
regulations; and receive, investigate and pass on complaints alleging discrimination in 
employment.  It could also hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and compel the production of 
records.  This new committee would also be able to create agencies and councils necessary to 
uphold the laws.  One significant feature of the proposed law was that it declared the opportunity 
to obtain employment without discrimination a civil right.262   
As expected organized labor (particularly the CIO-affiliated unions), the NAACP, NUL, 
and American Jewish Congress all rallied behind the bill.  Black leaders, organizations, and press 
in New York publicly rallied whole heartedly in support of the law which categorically barred 
employment discrimination based on race, creed, religion, or ethnicity in all industries.  Frank 
Crosswaith of the Negro Labor Committee sent telegrams to Governor Dewey, Senator Quinn, 
and Assemblyman Ives urging the necessity of the bill’s passage.263  African American leaders, 
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organizations and press publicly advocated the passage of this anti-discrimination law as a way 
to finally end racial bias and the treatment of black New Yorkers as second-class citizens. 
Ives promoted the law by explaining that discrimination was a threat to American 
democracy just as fascism was overseas.264  Republican Party leaders who held or aspired to state 
offices such as Dewey and Ives took a liberal stance on fair employment, supporting the bill 
because they needed to compete for minority votes in statewide elections.  However most rank 
and file Republican representatives from upstate, rural areas, where few racial and religious 
minorities resided strongly opposed the bill.  Their stance largely reflected that of their 
constituents.  There was also opposition from some residents of New York City’s suburbs – 
Westchester, parts of Queens, and Long Island – who disagreed with what they believed would 
be preferential treatment to black citizens.265   
Though many politicians opposed the law, most would not openly criticize its aims 
especially as intellectuals, liberal politicians, and minorities increasingly equated the war as a 
fight against the Nazis and racism.  Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, one of the most 
influential writings on race relations of the time, argued that the oppressive treatment of blacks in 
this country undermined the American creed which emphasizes liberty, equality, justice, and fair 
treatment of all people. White racism, and not any biological, innate inferiority, had produced 
African American inequality. Myrdal argued that discrimination forced blacks into lowly social 
positions, which in turn confirmed beliefs of African American inferiority.266  In this changing 
intellectual climate there was an increasing sentiment that discrimination was no longer 
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acceptable.  Therefore diverse segments of the business community – manufacturers, merchants, 
and the corporate bar – joined to praise the intent of the bill, but warned that if it was passed jobs 
would flee the state, discrimination would intensify, and disgruntled employees would unfairly 
threaten their employers with work stoppages.  Those opposing the bill also claimed the law 
would cause resentment that could spark race riots.  Conservatives compared Ives-Quinn with 
the Wagner Act which they claimed prevented employers from firing incompetent and 
insubordinate workers.267   
In February, 1945 Republicans, in an attempt to garner support opposing the legislation, 
called for a hearing on the bill in the Assembly.  Robert Moses inflamed matters by claiming that 
the proposed Ives-Quinn would force companies to use hiring quotas and would therefore 
prevent them from hiring workers based on merit.  Mayor La Guardia did not testify but sent a 
statement of support for the legislation, challenging Moses’ criticism.  At the hearings, 
supporters for the law outnumbered opponents by an eight to one margin, and the proceedings 
backfired against the racially conservative Republicans who had called for it.  Within weeks the 
Assembly and the Senate passed the bill. The Ives-Quinn Act mandated equal treatment in public 
and private employment and allowed the newly reformed State Commission Against 
Discrimination (SCAD) to enforce the law.  If the committee determined that discrimination had 
occurred, it could direct the company to stop such action and take affirmative action measures 
such as hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading employees. The orders handed down by the 
commission would be subject to judicial review.268   
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 As Robert Weaver, former head of the Negro Manpower Service of the War Manpower 
Commission, explained, at the end of the war in 1945 there was no adequate national legislative 
program for reconversion.269  Therefore there was no legal way for the national government to 
protect the employment gains blacks achieved during the war.  The FEPC remained a temporary 
agency and was deprived of federal funds.  New York was one of only three states in the nation 
to pass fair employment legislation.270  This was an important development to not only protect 
African Americans but to also prevent the racial problems that emerged in the wake of World 
War I. 
There were many advances in black employment during 1944 and 1945.  First, major war 
industries employed more black workers.  This was due to continued labor shortages as well as 
the activities of government agencies especially since the state was equipped with new weapons 
to fight employment discrimination. The State Committee Against Discrimination was able to 
use new laws barring discriminatory hiring practices in war industries to continue to investigate 
and prosecute companies discriminating against black employees.  Their actions were aided by 
the activities of the regional FEPC who cooperated closely with SCAD and the local offices of 
the United States Employment Service.   
New York’s black civil rights activists scored a major victory in the fight for equal 
employment with the passage of the Ives-Quinn Law.  The law was the result of mobilizations by 
community organizations.  The violence of August 1943 was in the forefront of the minds of 
numerous black leaders as many worried about how African Americans would fare as the 
nation’s economy reconverted after the war.  Many feared that if African Americans were ousted 
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from industrial positions as they were after World War I violence would again erupt, an 
especially troubling prospect in the wake of the Harlem Riot. 
New York was the first state to pass a fair employment practices law.  This law set the 
precedent for other states to follow suit.  The passage of the Ives-Quinn Act and the activities it 
allowed the FEPC and SCAD to undertake made the situation in New York unique in the 
national story of black employment during the Second World War.   
 
Inclusive Representation: Unionizing Black Workers 
As the war was coming to a close, black leaders and organizations also focused their 
efforts on increasing black union membership in an effort to secure black employment during 
reconversion.  In Detroit, where reconversion and subsequent cutbacks began earlier than in New 
York, those fired were almost exclusively black men and black and white women.  Because 
many industrial plants did not hire black workers until the war began, according to seniority rules 
cutbacks and layoffs disproportionately affected black workers.  A 50 percent cutback would 
mean a 60 to 100 percent loss of black workers.271  Black leaders feared this would be the case 
for black workers in New York as well.  Black organizations focused on integrating labor unions 
as a way to open training programs, and thus industrial jobs, to black workers; and as 
reconversion loomed hoped these unions would protect the progress they made during the war.  
The Negro Labor Committee and the NNC’s Negro Labor Victory Committee were the principle 
organizations to focus their activities on cooperating with unions during the war years. 
The Negro Labor Committee found measured success mostly in the unions of textile, 
clothing and shoe making industries.  The garment, textile and shoemaking industries supported 
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the Negro Labor Committee from its earliest days.  The New York Joint Board of Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers of America, the Textile Workers of America, and more than twenty locals of 
the International Ladies Garment Workers Union gave financial donations to the NLC.272  In 
1946 David Dubinsky, president of the ILGWU lauded the organization’s support of trade 
unionism and it’s fostering of solidarity among black and white workers.  According to 
Dubinsky the union and its affiliates in the Greater New York area recognized the equality of 
black workers and applied the principle of the equality of workers in its organization and 
factories.  In 1945 Dubinsky celebrated the progress the garment industry had made in the last 
decade as black workers entered shops, made better wages and attained a higher standard of 
living.  This, in his estimation, was accomplished through the union’s work with the NLC.  The 
progress blacks made in the garment industry went beyond union membership; black workers sat 
on the ILGWU executive board, belonged to shop committees, and represented their locals at 
union conventions.273 
The NLC made great strides in collaborating with unions in the garment trades to secure 
jobs for African Americans.  However as the war prompted more conversion and industrial 
positions became available black workers looked to get jobs in other industries with better 
paying positions.  This was particularly true for black women.  Though the garment industry was 
one of the only industrial sectors open to black employment before the war, black women 
preferred other industries during the war because they paid more than the needle trades by 1943 
when the labor shortage began.  Perhaps this was why the NLC was not as successful in placing 
blacks in new industries.  Their major collaborators were with unions representing the garment 
trades which were not where the majority of workers looking for war employment sought jobs.  
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The NLC’s rival, the Negro Labor Victory Committee, was more successful at reaching out to 
unions to place African Americans in jobs not previously open to them and eradicating 
discrimination against blacks employed in war industries. 
The NLVC was successful in attracting unions to support their efforts.  In 1943 fifty-
seven unions in Greater New York with a combined membership of over 200,000 were affiliated 
with the NLVC.274  By 1944 the number of unions affiliated with the NLVC increased to 107 
with a membership exceeding 300,000.  The organization later established branches in Newark, 
Buffalo, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Washington DC, and St. Louis.275   
The NLVC cooperated with affiliated unions to defend and advocate for black workers 
who had been hired by war industries.  In April of 1943 Sarah Williams, a messenger for the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard and member of the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and 
Technicians (a Navy Yard Civil Service association and CIO union), alleged that she was 
unfairly dismissed the previous month.  The Commander in charge of the Supply Department for 
which she was a messenger complained that Williams walked too slowly on errands and was 
dismissed for that reason a week after she was hired.  The Federation of Architects, Engineers, 
Chemists and Technicians (FAECT) notified the National Negro Congress of the accusation and 
asked for a member of the NLVC to sit in on the conference between the union and the Navy 
Yard.  The hope was that the NLVC would be an additional advocate for Williams at this 
meeting.  Though P.T. Roberts, Commander of the United States Navy found the dismissal to be 
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fair, this case illustrates the way in which member unions and the NLVC cooperated to try to end 
bias against black workers in industries making war goods.276   
One year later the NLVC again collaborated with the Federation of Architects, Engineers, 
Chemists, and Technicians (FAECT) to try and redress black workers’ claims of discrimination.  
In April 1944 Local 137 of the United Federal Workers of America, the local representing Navy 
Yard workers, embarked on a letter writing campaign and asked the NLVC to join them in 
pressuring the government to make the Brooklyn Navy Yard, a government agency, cease 
discrimination.277  It seems that the NLVC was good at protesting discriminatory hiring, but 
those protests by and large did not open job opportunities in war industries for blacks.  
The NLVC was more effective in fighting hiring discrimination when it functioned as an 
employment placement service.  Known for its activism on behalf of black workers and its good 
relationship with various unions, the New York State Committee on Discrimination asked the 
NLVC to refer qualified workers for jobs in war industries.  Often the NLVC sent workers from 
unions affiliated with the NLVC.278  In one such situation Charles Berkley, the director of the 
COD, asked the committee to refer five qualified black applicants to Acme Backing Corporation 
in Brooklyn which manufactured rubberized fabric.  Acme had placed ads in newspapers 
announcing available jobs for males and the COD asked the NLVC to send black males to apply 
for the jobs.  The NLVC would then make a report of Acme’s treatment of the men when they 
applied for the position in order to ascertain whether or not they were victims of 
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discrimination.279  In these instances the NLVC worked to refer qualified applicants for jobs in 
an effort to identify companies who discriminated against black workers.  In this instance, when 
the NLVC worked alongside the COD, their efforts at expanding employment opportunities for 
blacks in New York were most successful.   
As the war ended, the Negro Labor Victory Committee and its parent organization the 
National Negro Congress worked to minimize the loss of black industrial positions.  The NLVC 
continued to expand its education programs to foster racial tolerance and acceptance.   Both 
organizations called for unions to adjust their seniority policies to avoid the complete lay-off of 
newly hired black workers and a return to the exclusionary pre-war labor practices. 
One of the main purposes of the NLVC was to establish anti-discrimination committees 
in many of the unions affiliated with the organization.  In the fall of 1944 M. Moran Weston, 
Field Secretary for the NLVC, reported that both the CIO and AFL had broadly accepted the 
Committee’s aims to protect the gains of black workers and had undertaken this task through 
national, regional, and local conferences on post-war problems all over the United States.280  In 
addition to this national education program, Weston believed that unions had the responsibility to 
organize workers effectively for political action and to see that the program was adopted and 
supported by industry.  He urged industry and government to maintain war-time levels of 
production and provisions for the maximum employment of all workers.281 
Thomas Richardson, Executive Vice-President of the United Federal Workers of America 
(CIO) and member of the NLVC, urged organized labor and progressive industrialists to support 
a proportional lay-off plan as a solution to impending black unemployment after the war.  The 
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program would not eliminate wide-spread lay-offs of black or white workers, but would protect 
the rights of blacks to hold certain jobs in certain industries which had opened to black workers 
during the war.282  The NLVC argued that seniority rules protecting arbitrary termination and the 
drive to protect the new employment status of black workers came from the same goal – the 
protection of workers.  The organization thus urged unions to reconcile those two aims.  At a 
March 1945 conference attended by 300 representatives of CIO, AFL, and Independent unions 
Thomas Richardson proposed a proportional layoff plan which would “protect the rights of 
Negroes to hold certain jobs in certain industries which they have been able to win since the 
beginning of the war.”283 
Later that year the Executive Board of the NLVC designed a seven point program to 
protect the jobs of black workers during reconversion.  The plan urged unions to ensure 
maximum employment for all workers and maximum employment of blacks during large-scale 
layoffs.  The NLVC plan accepted seniority rules, but implemented special formulae and 
procedures to avoid the firing of recently hired black workers.  The Committee wanted full 
participation of blacks in all programs for re-employment, training, re-training, relocation, re-
settlement, and compensation.  In essence the measures would prevent blacks from being 
relegated to service and unskilled employment which would have effectively rolled back the 
advances black laborers had made during the war.284   
The modification of seniority rules was a very complex proposition for unions that did 
not discriminate on racial or any other terms.  Many union officers believed it would be an unfair 
privilege to black workers and a slight to long-time union members.  Moreover there was fear 
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among union members that any change in the system of seniority would undermine the union’s 
role as a safeguard to the rights of workers.  The NNC countered that because blacks were so 
unjustly treated in the past, special measures had to be taken to ensure equal treatment in the 
future.  The organization warned that if new measures were not adopted, blacks would disappear 
from industrial positions returning to the same situation before World War II.  The NNC said 
that the special provisions the CIO made for war veterans is an example of what could be done to 
ensure continued employment of blacks.285 
Under the rules of many CIO unions time away from the job was not counted towards 
seniority.  Strict application of this rule to veterans amounted to an unfair punishment for those 
who had served our nation.  Therefore the CIO made an agreement with the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars under which returning veterans are granted “accrued seniority” in which time spent in the 
service counts as time spent on the job.  At its national convention the CIO recommended to its 
affiliated unions that in the case of veterans in a given plant or industry, the same rule apply.  In 
this way a special provision was made to protect the jobs of war veterans.  The NNC argued that 
similar provisions to protect African American workers could be adopted as well.286 
Pressured by the NNC and NLVC the CIO made a statement reaffirming the 
organization’s anti-discrimination stance.  Organization leaders believed the advances made by 
African Americans through the FEPC and the enlistment of thousands of minorities in war 
production, were basically due to the anti-discrimination policy of the CIO which had brought 
those questions to the fore.  The CIO wanted to protect the gains black workers made during the 
war and urged affiliated unions to prohibit all forms of racial discrimination.  To those ends, the 
CIO also recommended the government make the FEPC a permanent institution and abolish Jim 
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Crow laws and poll-taxes.287  This position withstanding for the vast majority of unions in the 
CIO the prospect of changing seniority rules in unions was quite intimidating for union leaders 
and management alike.  There was very little support amongst rank and file workers for changes 
is seniority laws, even if failure to do so would end black employment and integrated factories.  
Even progressive unions like the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 
which had accepted black members and worked to integrate companies where it represented 
workers, did not amend its seniority laws.288  
Black workers found expanded employment opportunities in war industries with the help 
of some labor unions.  African Americans were accepted into labor unions, most readily into 
locals affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations; and those labor unions therefore 
pushed for black workers to be employed in industries in which they represented workers.  They 
also used educational programs to teach white workers about working with African Americans, 
thus dealing with the major problem employers cited for not using black workers.  However, the 
advances black workers made through unions were constrained in the post-war era.  Veterans 
returning for the war came home looking to reclaim the factory jobs they left.  Unions, which 
had always been champions of equal and fair treatment of members, could not easily adjust 
seniority rules in a way to protect black workers while maintaining seniority privileges of 
veterans.  To favor African American workers over returning veterans was an untenable solution.  
Therefore immediately after the war many black workers were laid-off from the manufacturing 
positions they procured during the war.  The loss of black jobs in the industrial sector was 
African Americans’ and Civil Rights organizations’ main concern for the rest of the decade.   
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The Fight to Hold On: The Process of Reconversion 
The prospect of reconversion unsettled African Americans.  By March of 1945 there were 
a total of 21,200 blacks working in the city’s war industries.289  Many worried that the gains 
blacks made in employment during the war would be lost and unemployment levels would rise 
as soldiers returned to reclaim their jobs.  The prospect of another round of violence like that 
which occurred in Chicago, Washington, and numerous other cities after World War I was 
worrisome to black leaders, government offices, and organizations looking for equality of 
employment opportunities for the city’s blacks.  But there was no major outbreak of violence or 
unrest in the period after World War II even though black employment levels in the city’s 
industries generally took a setback. 
    Faced with declining prospects in skilled and semi-skilled positions, the New York 
Urban League attempted to do what it could to stem the loss of black jobs in 1944.  The 
Industrial Department of the Urban League of Greater New York had an employment service 
with branches in Brooklyn and Manhattan.290  They also launched a Vocational Opportunity 
Campaign to encourage youths to plan and train for trades. 291  Despite these measures, the New 
York Urban League’s job placement rate dropped; only 25 percent of applicants were placed in 
jobs by the Service Operation.292   
The Brooklyn Urban League’s Acting Industrial Secretary Theresa Parker thus warned 
blacks against seeking war-jobs in 1944 and encouraged them to take lower paying jobs “with a 
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post war future” outside of the war industries.   Parker argued that there were plenty of war jobs 
for blacks but very few high salaried skilled positions. She encouraged black Brooklynites to 
take lower paying jobs outside of war industries that would not be affected by the return of the 
troops and reconversion.293   
Her fears of black displacement from war industries were well founded.  In the year after 
the war ended some of the advances black workers made during the conflict were eroded.  In 
June, 1945 the labor market in New York City was tight.  Lay-offs from war firms in the area 
increased during the summer of 1945 due to contract cutbacks and curtailments.  Government 
cuts in the wire, fragmentation bomb, and aircraft programs resulted in layoffs in firms 
producing parts for these industrial sectors.  Termination and rescheduling of contracts by the 
army’s Signal Corps and Ordnance branches accounted for the majority of the dismissals.294  
Blacks would have been among the first fired from these firms since they had been among the 
most recent hires.     
By 1947 the affects of the return of thousands of soldiers from World War II was 
apparent as many black workers were ousted from skilled and semi-skilled industrial positions.  
According to the Urban League of Greater New York the problem was no longer whether blacks 
could get jobs, but rather if they could get jobs using the skills they acquired during the war.  In 
1947 NYUL officials wondered “How can the gains that have been made in skilled and 
professional employment during the war be consolidated?”295  Most of the applicants to the 
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organization’s job placement program were from Manhattan and Brooklyn (94 percent) where 
the majority of the city’s blacks lived.296 
Despite cuts in these areas the city’s shipyards continued to experience a labor shortage.  
The number of vessels in the port being constructed or repaired was larger than at any other 
previous time.297  The recruitment program for Navy Yard workers continued.  The Brooklyn 
Navy Yard had become the largest industrial employers of blacks in the city.  Continued 
productivity in the shipyards proved to serve as a safeguard for black jobs in that sector.   
The Urban League of Greater New York tried to find solutions for the hiring problems 
blacks faced in the post-war years by providing preparatory classes for the civil service exams 
for social investigators in the Department of Welfare.  These courses were taught by instructors 
from other social agencies, government offices, and the United Public Workers of America, an 
organization affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations.  Civil service employment 
became another option for black job seekers.298 
 
 
Table 7: NYUL Employment placement statistics, 1947. 
 
 
 
Total 
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Brooklyn 
 
Queens 
 
Applicants 
 
 
7240 
 
5236 
 
1603 
 
401 
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1782 
 
1198 
 
516 
 
68 
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 Due to the changing labor market after reconversion the New York Urban League’s 
placement rate was low in 1947.  Only a quarter of applicants were placed in jobs by the Service 
Operation.  A third of those placed in jobs by the Urban League’s Employment Service worked 
in the clerical and sales areas and 10 percent were in professional, managerial and skilled 
positions.299  These placements constitute a significant shift in the types of jobs available to 
blacks after the war. 
 The Industrial Relations Department of the NYUL focused on steering blacks into 
clerical and sales positions because the training required was relatively little in comparison to 
skilled industrial positions.  They also believed that blacks would be employed in greater 
numbers in firms that were sensitive to public opinion and patronage – for example retail stores.  
Furthermore the League said that most of these retail and clerical positions were characterized by 
high turnover rates, which made integration easier since there was less sustained resistance from 
white employees.300 
 Retail, an expanding area of employment, seemed to provide the primary job 
opportunities available for black New Yorkers seeking jobs in the post-war era.  The report 
revealed that in Manhattan and Brooklyn the most important placement contacts were Gimbel 
Brothers and Franklin Simon which were both department stores.  Several placements in 
Brooklyn were in Brooklyn Safeway stores.  Therefore the League held meetings for black 
women interested in department store employment.  With the help of certain department stores in 
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Brooklyn, and the unions of the retail trade, job opportunities and requirements were 
discussed.301    
 Black women were also increasingly finding employment in white-collar office jobs and 
in clerical positions.  The New York Telephone Company had hired five hundred additional 
black operators in all borough offices.  Black secretaries and stenographers, both female 
occupations, were introduced in many businesses and professional offices.  Many of these 
placements were significant because they were firsts.  Successful placement of black women in 
white collar jobs was significant because of the general tightening of hiring specifications and 
increased competition for jobs after the war.302  These continued, though small, advances in 
clerical and sales occupations was due in part to general relaxation of personnel practices and the 
activities of the State Commission Against Discrimination.   
  Because of the collaborative relationship the Urban League and SCAD had fostered and 
the positive results achieved Olivia Frost the Research Secretary of the Urban League of Greater 
New York encouraged the organization to use the machinery in place and trusted tactics to 
achieve further economic gains for the city’s black residents.  Frost wanted the Urban League to 
increase the number of complaints filed with SCAD.303  This tactic however was hampered by 
the Urban League’s lack of financial resources which adversely affected its activities and 
therefore stemmed the opening of new job opportunities for black workers.   
In a self-assessment of its activities, achievements, and failures, Dr. Lloyd Bailer, the 
new Director of the Industrial Relations Department of the Urban League of Greater New York, 
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recognized the organization’s inability to continue the full arc of activities it had undertaken 
during the war due to a shortage of funds.  Bailer, former field examiner for the National Labor 
Relations Board, believed that the ULGNY needed more staff but had no money to hire 
additional personnel.  The industrial departments of most other cities’ Urban League branches 
expanded black employment opportunities, provided vocational guidance and training, had a 
labor consultant service, provided worker education, and conducted research into labor markets.  
Recent operations of the Industrial Department of the ULGNY were confined largely to 
employment service activity – interviewing job applicants, accepting job orders, and making 
referrals.  In 1948 the office was not geared towards obtaining new employment opportunities 
according to Bailer.304   
The lack of field staff and personnel prevented the Urban League of Greater New York 
from performing one of its essential duties – enforcing the Ives-Quinn law.  Perhaps this was 
because the New York Urban League focused more of its financial and personnel resources now 
on expanding the scope of its activities to address the issue of integrated education.  One of the 
NYUL’s major campaigns centered on eradicating discrimination in higher education through 
the passage of the Austin-Mahoney Act in the New York State legislature.  The League also 
engaged heavily in fund-raising efforts to expand the breadth of its activities in its Harlem, 
Brooklyn, and Queens offices as well as the creation of an office in the Bronx in response to the 
demographic changes in the city.305  It seems as if the priorities of the New York Urban League 
shifted away from employment.  Though there is no evidence directly saying so, this may be 
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attributed to the achievements in opening new areas of employment to African Americans.  
Perhaps the passage of the Ives-Quinn Act signaled an important legal triumph over employment 
discrimination and Urban League leaders felt they should use the majority of their limited 
resources to tackle new issues. 
The Urban League saw itself as bearing a heavy responsibility to contribute to the 
enforcement of the Ives-Quinn Law, but was derelict in this duty by the end of the decade.  In 
fact the League stated that enforcing the law “represents the most important single function we 
can perform.  It cuts across all occupational and industrial lines, affects males and females, 
veterans and non-veterans.  If full compliance with the letter and spirit of the Law could be 
effected the bulk of the Department’s job would disappear.”306  Bailer wanted the Industrial 
Department to return to the activities it had undertaken during the war - to seek out instances of 
employment discrimination, file complaints for aggrieved individuals, follow the progress of 
cases turned over to SCAD, and insist the Commission effectively handle such cases.  He also 
wanted to educate blacks on the importance of using the Ives-Quinn law to widen employment 
opportunities.  The League had begun to set up machinery for filing complaints, but 
implementation had hardly begun in 1947 when the report was written.307  Instead it focused on 
increasing the number of blacks placed in clerical and sales positions believing those that were 
employed were token hires because the number of blacks in sales and clerical positions remained 
extremely small.308 
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Despite the Urban League’s decrease in placements of black men in skilled and semi-
skilled positions, this did not indicate a loss of all the war-time employment gains black men 
won.  Between 1940 and 1947 the percentage of employed black men working in service 
occupations declined from 40 percent to 23 percent, while the proportion of black men in the 
crafts increased by 25 percent and those in semiskilled work increased by 50 percent.  The ratio 
of employed blacks in salesman and clerk positions also increased by over 27 percent; and that of 
proprietors, managers and officials by 40 percent.309  These changes represented the entry of 
thousands of black workers into industrial plants and into new white collar positions. Therefore 
though many black men were ousted from industrial jobs at the end of the war, many others 
retained their positions or found industrial and white collar jobs after reconversion. 
These gains are also evident in the employment figures at the end of the decade.  In 1950 
40 percent of working black men remained employed as service workers and laborers (51,716 
and 39,293 respectively) which were typically unskilled positions.   However significant 
numbers of African Americans remained in skilled and semi-skilled occupations.  More than a 
quarter of the 234,349 employed black men in the city worked as Operatives and Kindred 
workers (63,774); a class of workers which encompassed occupations that typically required 
some training in a skill.  Also significant numbers of black men worked in the Clerical and Sales 
sector (27,646), and as skilled craftsmen and foremen (24,954).  Moreover about 7,000 were 
employed in occupations classified as professional or technical.310  These figures show that in the 
five years following the war black men in New York City had access to white collar, skilled and 
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semi-skilled jobs.  Therefore the employment gains made during World War II were not 
completely lost when the war ended.  New, better-paying occupations remained open to blacks in 
the post-war period.311 
The changes in occupation distribution were even more striking for black women.  In 
New York City in 1940 three quarters of employed black females had been in domestic service. 
Only one half were in domestic service in 1947.  The proportion of black women workers 
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employed in retail and clerical occupations quadrupled.  The proportion of African American 
women in semi-skilled jobs, particularly laundries and manufacturing establishments, increased 
from 16 to 31 percent of black females in the labor market.312  In 1940 64 percent of all black 
women workers were in domestic service compared to only 8 percent of white working women.  
By 1947, only 36 percent of black women were in domestic work and 3 percent of white women 
worked in this area.  The wide discrepancy between black and white women workers was cut 
almost in half.  The sales and clerical field showed a striking disparity in 1940.  Only 3 percent 
of black women were working in these occupations in comparison to 41 percent of white women.  
By 1947, there were 13 percent black women in that field compared with 45 percent white 
women.313 
By the beginning of the next decade black women continued to find employment other 
than domestic work.  In 1950 of all the employed black women in New York City (193,402) less 
than 40 percent (71,442) labored as private household (domestic) workers.  A significant number 
of black women were operatives (61,207) and service workers (24,651).  There was also a 
marked increase in the number of black women in clerical positions; 17,716 black women or 9 
percent of employed black women worked in clerical positions.  Almost 9,000 black women 
were employed in professional or technical positions in the decade after the war. 314 
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Despite the fear blacks felt at the prospect of the loss of jobs during reconversion, the 
post-war employment situation for blacks was not nearly as bleak as it was after the First World 
War.  Even though many African Americans were displaced from skilled and semi-skilled 
industrial positions after the war, many were able to maintain jobs paying higher salaries than 
they had before.  Black men found jobs in crafts and semi-skilled positions and black women 
moved into retail, restaurant, and other service positions.  Due to the new types of jobs open to 
blacks, many of which were better paying than the service and unskilled positions they were 
relegated to before the war, the gap between the earnings of blacks and whites in New York 
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decreased over the course of the 1940s.315  The Urban League, though not as successful at 
placing black workers in industrial jobs, found jobs for black workers in white collar, clerical, 
and sales positions.  The NNC and NLVC found less success in preserving black jobs and union 
membership after the war.  Though many CIO unions accepted black members, when veterans 
returned from war seniority rules necessitated the laying off of many black workers who had 
been recently hired.      
   
Conclusion 
1943 proved to be a pivotal moment for black employment in war industries.  The labor 
shortage along with black activism and fair employment agencies led to the integration of some 
war industries.  African Americans who were previously relegated to domestic, janitorial and 
unskilled jobs found industrial jobs in the war-time economy. 
There were a number of factors that contributed to these industries agreeing to hire black 
workers.  One was a labor shortage that took hold of some industries in New York beginning in 
July of 1943.  The shortage prompted companies to seek black employees, subsequently offering 
more training for black workers.  The Harlem Riot in August of that year was another factor that 
prompted black employment by war industries.  The disturbance also caused the COD and other 
government agencies to intensify their investigations of war industries.  Moreover the riot 
prompted New York City mayor Fiorello LaGuardia and New York governor Thomas Dewey to 
more closely examine race relations in the city and state.  As a result more black workers were 
trained for and placed in skilled and semi-skilled industrial positions.  Moreover, the New York 
State assembly passed legislation outlawing racial discrimination by any employer. 
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  It was in this opening and shifting labor market that black migrants from the south were 
able to find more and better paying employment opportunities.  Though most employers seemed 
not to make any difference in their treatment of black workers from New York and those who 
had recently migrated from the south, the migrants were no doubt in the pool of black applicants 
for jobs in war industries, as better employment opportunities was a major reason for their 
migration.  There is very little evidence that the migrant experience was different from those of 
native born black New Yorkers. Neither the companies nor the Urban League or the newspapers 
distinguished between the two groups, which indicates that unlike World War I there was less 
conflict between longtime residents and the new migrants.   
Integration of the workforce did not happen wholesale in any one industry or geographic 
area in the city.  It tended to happen in larger companies with war production contracts that 
experienced labor shortages and were targeted by the Fair Employment Practices Committee and 
the Committee on Discrimination (later SCAD) for ignoring fair employment legislation.  
Factories in the scientific instruments, electronic instruments, and shipbuilding industries hired 
black workers, especially after 1943.   
Integration of these industries also did not mean an end to discrimination.  Hiring 
discrimination persisted in many industries.  Even in the war industries that integrated, black 
workers were treated unfairly.  Therefore black organizations continued to pressure for fair 
employment after 1943.  The Brooklyn Urban League and the National Negro Congress 
continued to pressure war industries to hire blacks and fair employment agencies to continue 
their investigations of discrimination by war industries.  They also brought cases of racial 
discrimination against blacks employed by war industries to the FEPC and COD as well.  Other 
groups such as the Negro Labor Victory Committee and Negro Labor Committee targeted unions 
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to achieve black employment.  They pressured New York City locals to accept black workers 
and cooperated with those that did to pressure industries to treat black workers fairly.   
The most significant and effective tactic used to secure black employment, specifically in 
war industries, was the cooperative relationships forged by the Brooklyn Urban League, the 
National Negro Congress and the Negro Labor Victory Committee with government offices 
dedicated to protecting the rights of African Americans.  The National Negro Congress and the 
Industrial Department of the Brooklyn Urban League acted as liaisons between black workers 
and these government agencies.    
The Brooklyn Urban League proved to be the most effective agency for the placement of 
black workers in war industries.  Federal government offices like the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee and United States Employment Service considered the Urban League the premier 
organization for the placement of black workers.  Therefore when these agencies needed 
information on the situation of black workers and wanted to place black workers in war 
industries they worked with the local Urban League offices.  The Brooklyn Urban League took 
on a role of particular importance in that many of the war industries in New York were located in 
Brooklyn, therefore the BKUL worked with state and federal fair employment agencies to 
facilitate the hiring of black workers.  Moreover the relationship between the Brooklyn Urban 
League and the New York State Committee on Discrimination was further strengthened by the 
personnel ties between the two organizations.  There was a great deal of communication and 
partnership between  Lorenzo Davis, the industrial secretary of the Brooklyn Urban League and 
COD head Charles Berkley who was the former BKUL industrial secretary as the two 
organizations collaborated to end discrimination in war industries and place black workers in 
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higher paying industrial jobs.  The BKUL was successful in opening new areas of industrial 
employment to African American New Yorkers. 
The activities of the Brooklyn Urban League, the National Negro Congress, the Negro 
Labor Victory Committee, and Negro Labor Committee indicate that civil rights organizations 
focused on achieving economic parity in the 1940s.  A continuation of their activism in the 
1930s, the civil rights struggle of the war years was one centered on employment.  As historians 
Nelson Lichtenstein and David Korstad have argued employment was the major civil rights issue 
in the 1940s.316  The activities of the city’s civil rights organizations in the 1940s were focused 
on opening employment in war industries to black New Yorkers.  These black organizations, 
particularly the Urban League, viewed the passage of the Ives-Quinn Law prohibiting hiring and 
employment discrimination as a major victory in their struggle for equal employment 
opportunities and weapon for future battles against employment discrimination. 
As reconversion approached African Americans, local politicians, and agencies against 
discriminatory practices in war industries took actions to maintain black industrial employment.  
They feared that widespread black lay-offs would result in the racial violence that broke out in 
cities after World War I.  Despite their efforts many industries let black employees go as they 
reconverted.  Violence however did not accompany black dismissals because the type of jobs 
open to black workers had expanded. 
Though many African Americans men were ousted from skilled and semi-skilled 
positions as soldiers returned from battle and industries reconverted, black men were not 
completely displaced by returning veterans.  By the end of the decade a larger number of black 
men worked in skilled and semi-skilled industrial positions than had before the war.  Black 
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women in particular benefitted from expanded employment opportunities as they found jobs as 
sales women, clerks, and phone operators.  The jobs open to African Americans during the war 
were better paying than the jobs they had previous to the conflict.  These new employment 
opportunities opened to African Americans helped expand the black middle class in the next 
decade. 
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Chapter 4 
The Sperry Gyroscope Corporation: A Case Study 
 
During World War II access to better-paying employment in war industries was a major 
reason for black migration to cities across the nation.  Many blacks found expanded 
opportunities for employment in war industries as well as in non-essential areas of the New York 
economy.  War industries hired blacks for skilled and semi-skilled positions allowing many 
black New Yorkers to find jobs other than the service positions to which they were relegated 
before the war.  However, not all industries opened their doors to black workers.  A combination 
of factors prompted management in some industries to hire African Americans.   
The passage of state and federal anti-discrimination legislation, black activism which 
forced state and federal agencies to enforce laws barring hiring discrimination, as well as labor 
shortages combined to pressure many companies to hire black workers.  The Harlem Riot in 
1943 and the problems it made apparent also prompted further action.  Still not all New York 
City industries and factories employed African Americans in skilled and semi-skilled positions 
during the war.  The Sperry Corporation was one of the war production plants that opened its 
doors to black workers.  Examination of the process by which Sperry Gyroscope hired black 
workers illustrates how some of the larger trends discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 worked with 
regard to one company.  Through a study of Sperry’s hiring process it is also clear that unions 
and individuals in management also affected the process by which industries integrated their 
war-time workforce.    
Employing no black workers before the war, Sperry management hired more than a 
thousand African Americans during the course of the war.  Black leaders and organizations 
publicized Sperry’s discriminatory hiring practices which pressured the company to hire its first 
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African American employees.  These organizations emphasized the hypocrisy of discrimination 
against blacks at the time when the nation was waging a war against fascism and xenophobia.  
African American leaders pressured state and federal government agencies to investigate 
allegations of hiring discrimination by Sperry and its affiliates.  The Fair Employment Practices 
Committee and the New York State Committee on Discrimination investigated and monitored 
the employment policies of the Sperry Corporation, forcing company management to adjust their 
hiring procedures.  Moreover the workers at Sperry were represented by the United Electrical, 
Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE), a union that actively advocated equal 
employment for all workers.  The activities of the UE also pushed Sperry’s management to hire 
black workers.  A labor shortage in 1943 further drove Sperry to employ more African 
Americans. 
As the war wound down African Americans, black organizations, and United Electrical 
were anxious about what would happen to black jobs at Sperry during reconversion.  As 
government contracts dried up, production slowed causing factories to cut jobs.  Black 
organizations appealed to war industries to maintain their levels of black employment.  The 
National Negro Congress and the Negro Labor Victory Committee along with the UE urged 
Sperry management to adapt seniority laws to keep blacks in skilled and semi-skilled positions.  
Though members of upper level management had changed their attitude about the capability of 
black workers, they and the UE were unwilling to adjust seniority laws and displace workers to 
keep blacks employed in the positions they held during the war.  Therefore black employment 
levels dipped immediately after the war. 
Due to economic forces and war demands many New York factories turned to blacks for 
labor.  Though each company had a very specific story behind why and how it employed African 
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Americans, there were similarities in the process.  By examining the employment trends at 
Sperry as a case study, the reasons for black employment and the process by which New York 
companies hired African Americans will be made clear.  Though Sperry was exceptional because 
its management reversed its policies on black employment in a short amount of time, Sperry’s 
history illustrates the profound effects World War II had on hiring policy of New York firms and 
the employment of blacks in the city. 
 
Black Pressure for Negro Hires 
 The Sperry Company mainly produced precision instruments for navigating airplanes 
and ships.  When Sperry Company was founded in 1910 it produced gyroscopes for aviation and 
maritime industries.  The company had a decades-long relationship producing instruments for the 
military before World War II.  During World War I Sperry worked closely with the Navy to 
provide steering and navigation instruments in their vessels.  By the 1920’s the Sperry 
Corporation had become known as the “Brain Mill” for the United States military because the 
corporation developed and produced goods for military use.  In 1933 Elmer Sperry sold his 
company to Curtiss Aero and Motor which was absorbed by General Motors.  The Sperry 
Corporation was created as a larger holding company.  In the years between the wars, Sperry 
developed the automatic pilot, the first airplane stabilizer, gyrostabilized bomb sight and other 
instruments.317  This close manufacturing relationship between the Sperry Corporation and the 
military continued during World War II.  Sperry Gyroscope produced highly technical precision 
instruments for the military during World War II.  
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Before the war Sperry was a comparatively small company that produced small quantities 
of goods and mostly employed very skilled workers.318  Sperry Company workers were initially 
represented by a company controlled union the Brotherhood of Scientific Instrument Makers.  
While the workers at the Sperry Corporation’s subsidiary company Ford Instruments were 
represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, a union affiliated with the 
American Federation of Labor.319  The skilled nature of the work Sperry employees did 
combined with discrimination in training programs and exclusion of blacks from trade unions 
barred blacks from jobs at Sperry. 
Sperry Gyroscope’s employment policies reflect common employment trends among 
New York companies during the early years of the war.  Sperry’s management, like many other 
employers in the city, refused to hire black workers in skilled and semi-skilled positions when 
the war broke out.  Though the company converted to war-time production earlier than most 
other industries in the city, management did not consider black workers for employment in jobs 
in areas other than service positions.  Few African Americans had the training to work in these 
skilled positions because of prejudice in trade unions and training facilities as well as 
discriminatory hiring practices.320  As a result it is no surprise that the company did not employ a 
single African American prior to the war. 
                                                 
318
 In its earliest days Sperry built large gyroscopes which are spinning wheels used in ship stabilizers to counteract 
rolling. The gyroscope is the nucleus of most automatic steering systems, such as those used in airplanes, missiles, 
and torpedoes. It is also produced gyrocompasses, directional instruments used on ships.  In the 1930s and 1940s 
Sperry Gyroscope worked with Stanford and MIT to develop the microwave technology that was necessary for 
modern radar systems. During the Second World War the company grew more than ten-fold as it produced 
computer-controlled and stabilized bomb sights for the B-17 and B-32 bombers, automatic pilots, fire control 
systems, airborne radar equipment, and automated take-off-and-landing systems. Information from the Hagley 
Museum and Library online research catalogue – Sperry Corporation History Accessed July 20, 2011. 
http://digital.hagley.org/u?/p268001coll1,1091   
319
 Raymond Steven Patnode, “Labor’s Love Lost: The Influence of Gender, Race, and Class on the Workplace in 
Post-war America,” Ph.D. dissertation Stony Brook University, 2008.   
320
 R. E. Gillmor, “How Can the Negro Hold His Job?” (1945) Sperry Gyroscope Company Records, Series II, 
Public Information and Advertising Department Records, Box 18, Folder 4. 
154 
 
  
During the war the Sperry Company became one of the most important factories in the 
state.  Sperry, unlike many other industries in the city, received large government contracts 
during the first two years of the war.  The company was paid large sums of federal money to 
produce sound locaters, anti-aircraft searchlights, fire control equipment and other instruments 
for the nation’s armed forces.  In July of 1941 the war department requested thirty-one 
companies begin work on Air Corps orders, pending an award of formal contracts.  Sperry 
received the largest allotment of federal money, $80,000,000.  In the following three months the 
company received more contracts worth an additional $22,000,000.321  In November of 1941 the 
War Department announced that the Sperry Gyroscope Company had been awarded additional 
contracts totaling $56,403,980.322  In total, over a period of just four months, Sperry received 
more than $100,000,000 in defense contracts. Around the same time Sperry Corporation, Sperry 
Gyroscope’s parent company, was building a new facility in Nassau County, Long Island in 
which 7,000 people would be employed.323  For those employees homes were developed by the 
company in New Hyde Park, Long Island.324  It is clear by Sperry’s expansion that the company 
was making large profits from government contracts in 1941.                                
Despite these large contracts African Americans did not readily find jobs at Sperry in the 
early years of the war.  Though there are no statistics on black employment in 1940 and 1941, 
hiring statistics do show that in early 1942 the Sperry Corporation had only 86 black employees 
of a total 19,260, therefore blacks comprised a mere .45 percent of company workers.  The racial 
disparity in employment levels was even more evident in the Sperry Gyroscope Company.  Only 
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21 of the company’s 14,184 workers were black.  Blacks comprised a mere 0.1 percent of the 
plant’s workers.325  Therefore, black organizations and other groups representing the interests of 
blacks targeted Sperry to protest racial discrimination in employment.  The National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Negro Congress (NNC) used 
rallies, press releases, and investigations to publicly call attention to the company’s racist hiring 
practices.  
In January of 1941 the Brooklyn Joint Committee on Employment (BJCE), which 
included representatives of the Urban League, NAACP, YMCA, YWCA, and members of 
Brooklyn’s black clergy, asked Executive Secretary of the NAACP Walter White to head a 
delegation from the Joint committee to the Flatbush Avenue extension of the Sperry Gyroscope 
Company.326   White agreed to head this delegation and in February of 1941 went to the Sperry 
plant to try and attain employment for black workers.327  Sperry ignored communications from 
the committee, ignored requests for interviews, and refused to admit the delegation.  Company 
management did speak with a second delegation in March but would not commit to hiring black 
workers.  Following this unsuccessful and unproductive meeting, the BJCE began picketing the 
plant and organized letter writing and telephone campaigns.328  Picketers from the NAACP also 
rallied outside of the company headquarters in Manhattan.329   
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These efforts to pressure Sperry to hire black workers failed.  In March, after several 
protests at Sperry’s offices, an official from the company admitted to a National Negro Congress 
delegation that Sperry management was not interested in hiring Negroes.  A company 
representative used the standard industrial excuse for refusing to hire black workers – that having 
blacks and whites working together would be problematic.  The spokesman insisted that he had 
no racial prejudice himself, however he claimed that the large government contracts Sperry 
received necessitated that the company have the “very best machinery, the very best tools, the 
very best techniques, the very best morale, and the very best men.”  Apparently the “very best” 
did not include black workers.  R. E. Gillmor, General Manager of the Sperry Gyroscope 
Company did however promise to bring the question of hiring black labor up to the firm’s 
executives.330    
In the meanwhile black organizations continued to protest.  The New York branch of the 
NAACP, led by Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Industry Eardlie John, picketed 
Sperry’s Manhattan offices at 30 Rockefeller Plaza in April.331  In the summer of 1941 these 
efforts found measured success.  In July the Brooklyn Council of the National Negro Congress 
pressured Sperry into allowing a black Cooper Union College graduate take an employment 
placement exam.332  Though the NNC achieved this symbolic victory, its effect was small as 
blacks remained largely absent from the Sperry workforce.  Another tactic would prove to be 
more successful in the long term.  In addition to pressuring industrial management to hire 
African Americans, black activists and organizations focused their efforts on the government as 
they looked to both state and federal agencies to stamp out discrimination at Sperry. 
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Black organizations pushed the federal government to outlaw discriminatory hiring 
practices in all companies with government contracts including Sperry Gyroscope.  In January of 
1941 the NAACP sought to introduce a resolution in Congress asking for an investigation of the 
status and treatment of African Americans in the defense program.  The resolution called for 
public hearings with testimony from Army, Navy and Air Corps officials, employers, leaders of 
trade unions, and those who had gathered information for the association.333  Brooklyn was a 
focal point for the NAACP’s campaign because of the large number of plants with government 
contracts in the area.334  Sperry one of the largest and most lucrative companies in the borough 
was naturally a subject for investigation, especially after Walter White’s failed talks with 
Sperry’s management in February.   
In preparation for the hearing the NAACP and NUL gathered all available material on 
discrimination.335  Walter White contacted Lieutenant Governor Charles Poletti who served on 
the State Defense Council with Thomas Morgan, president of the Sperry Corporation and 
chairman of the Sperry Gyroscope Company, to inquire about Sperry’s hiring policies.336  Poletti 
denied having any personal knowledge of Sperry’s hiring policies as he had spoken with Morgan 
only in his capacity as a fellow member of the State Defense Council.  According to Poletti the 
two had never discussed Morgan’s activities as president of Sperry Corporation.  The Lieutenant 
Governor explained to White that he had brought the issue of discriminatory hiring practices in 
war industries to the Defense Council as it related to the efficiency of war production, but was 
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given the general arguments for refusing to hire blacks used by most employers – foremen in 
these factories advise managers that employment of Negro workers would disrupt production 
indicating that white workers did not want to work with blacks.337   
White did not believe Sperry managements’ claims that they could not hire black workers 
and made his position clear to Lieutenant Governor Poletti.  White cited the garment industry as 
an example of factories in which blacks and whites worked together and were in the same unions 
without incident.  He also noted that blacks and whites worked together peacefully in the steel, 
automobile, rubber, and mining industries throughout the country, even in the south.  White 
further argued that companies with government contracts, which were by extension funded by 
taxpayer dollars, did not have the right to discriminate against black workers who were 
taxpayers.338  These arguments were part of the organization’s tactics to achieve integration of 
war industries.  Walter White and the NAACP hoped to dispel the myth that blacks and whites 
could not work together peacefully and productively, therefore undercutting the justifications 
many employers used for refusing to hire black workers.  The NAACP planned to use examples 
of companies with integrated work forces as evidence of the falseness of management’s claims at 
the Senate hearing.339 
A Senate investigation into the discriminatory hiring practices of companies with 
government contracts never happened.  Introduction of the resolution for the investigation into 
discrimination in the armed forces and war industries was postponed because Senator Robert 
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Wagner, who with Senator W Warren Barbour had taken the lead in plans for the probe, was 
ill.340  After Senator Wagner’s illness, the NAACP seemed to abandon its campaign for the 
Senate hearings.  It is not clear what caused the organization to desert this particular drive.  
Perhaps the passage of the Mahoney Act outlawing discrimination in New York State war 
industries in April and the success of the March on Washington Movement in pressuring 
President Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802 outlawing hiring discrimination in June 
prompted the NAACP to shift its focus.  Since the organization’s main approach to alleviate 
racial discrimination was the passage of legislation, when the Executive Order and Mahoney Act 
were issued NAACP leadership felt that battle had been won and moved on to try to pressure the 
state and federal governments to enforce those laws. 
It was difficult for black leaders and organizations to push employers into hiring blacks.  
This was especially true in the case of Sperry management because the interests of the company 
and the New York State government were intertwined.  The Sperry Corporation’s president was 
a member of the New York State Defense Council.  Though it is unclear what effect this 
relationship had on Sperry’s hiring practices, White worried that this connection would afford 
the company protection from state prosecution for discrimination.341  Despite White’s fears, the 
initial protests of the NAACP, the Brooklyn Joint Committee on Employment, and the NUL did 
have some positive results.  Sperry first hired African Americans in May 1941, a month after the 
passage of the Mahoney Act.342  By July, 1941 the Sperry Gyroscope Company had hired its first 
crew of skilled black production workers.  Five black workers were hired by the company, and 
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the four who accepted were put to work assembling sound locater horns.  The company also 
instituted an upgrading program for unskilled black workers already employed as shipping 
clerks, platform workers, and maintenance men.  Skilled work was to be offered to a number of 
shipping clerks and loading platform workers employed in the plant.  Some of these workers 
were already skilled in the trades needed, while others would be trained for skilled positions.  
The new policy extended to Sperry’s subsidiary company Ford Instruments whose management 
had hired its first black workers - an elevator operator and five maintenance workers - a week 
earlier, and would hire its first black skilled workers within the next two weeks.343   
These first black hires seem to have been a result of the campaigns and public protests 
waged by black leaders and organizations.  Years later General Manager R. E. Gilmore stated 
that though there was no labor shortage at the time, top management believed that more workers 
were needed and the most logical people to employ were qualified African Americans.  Gilmore 
also attributed management’s change of heart to the work of Negro organizations which had 
“much to do with convincing us of the logic and ethics of this policy.”344  Considering the small 
number of blacks hired by Sperry in the summer of 1941 it is unlikely that management hired 
them because of any need for new workers but more likely to alleviate the pressure for 
integration coming from black organizations.   
If Sperry management hired their first black workers to alleviate public pressure, the 
tactic did not work.  Leaders in the NAACP at the time did not believe Sperry’s new black hires 
constituted full integration of the work force and the organization continued its efforts to 
pressure the company to hire more African Americans.  The NAACP embarked on new tactics 
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after Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 in June of 1941.  The organization aimed 
to bring a suit against Sperry that would use the new state law outlawing discrimination in war 
industries to force the company to end its discriminatory employment practices.  Sperry in effect 
would be a NAACP test case of the new anti-discrimination law.  
William Johnston Jones, an African American man, applied for a position in the 
development laboratories at Sperry in March of 1941.  He was very well qualified as he had been 
trained in scientific coursework in high school and attained a Bachelor of Science in Electrical 
Engineering from Tufts College in Medford, Massachusetts.  Besides formal training, Jones also 
had work experience as a radio service man and sound recording technician.345  Sperry granted 
Jones an interview which he could not make because he was in school in Massachusetts at the 
time, therefore Sperry conducted a phone interview.346  The personnel department was 
sufficiently impressed with Jones’ qualifications that they offered him a position in the 
engineering department for which he would receive onsite training by the Engineering Training 
Committee.  Upon completion of his training, Mr. Jones was to be placed in the Research, 
Design, Product, or Service Engineering Departments.347  William Johnston Jones gladly 
accepted the position and was to report to work on June 2.  But when Jones reported for his eight 
week training he was told that the company could not employ him because he was a Negro.  On 
the following day Jones accepted a civil service job at Signal Corps Laboratories in New Jersey.  
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It was generally easier or blacks to find skilled positions in government agencies such as the 
Signal Corps Laboratories which was part of the US Army Signal Corps.  He worked as a regular 
engineer there with ten to twenty white men under him, making more money than he would have 
at Sperry.  Though happy at his current place of employment and with no reason to leave, Jones 
still wanted Sperry prosecuted for their discriminatory practices.348 
The NAACP and the Harlem YMCA tried to bring William Jones’ case to court in order 
to prosecute Sperry for breach of contract.  Henry Craft, Executive Director of the Harlem 
Branch of the YMCA approached White about using Jones’ situation to bring attention to the 
bigoted employment practices of Sperry.  Craft hoped that the publicity and embarrassment of a 
court case would “help them to realize that they can not with impunity snap their fingers in the 
face of the entire Negro group.”349  White turned over the case to Thurgood Marshall, Chief 
Council for the NAACP, for legal consultation.350 
Thurgood Marshall never pursued Jones’ case.  William Hastie, civilian aide to Secretary 
of War Henry Stimson, believed that Jones’ case would be an ineffective test case because Jones 
was no longer willing to take the job at Sperry.  Moreover Hastie argued that Sperry could very 
well use the defense that their hiring policies had changed since Johnston applied for 
employment.  In addition if the case was won there would be no way to test Sperry’s sincerity in 
employing Jones because he no longer wanted the position.  Hastie believed the resources of the 
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NAACP, the FEPC, and the Office of Production Management would be wasted on this case.351  
Robert Weaver, the Chief of Negro Employment and Training for the Labor Division of the 
OPM, agreed with Hastie’s opinion, telling Marshall it was important to find a better case to test 
the company’s new stated policy of hiring all qualified black workers without discrimination.  
He suggested finding a qualified applicant available for work to use to test for hiring 
discrimination.352  No such case against Sperry was brought to the court but the NAACP began 
to bring cases to the FEPC. 
In August of 1941 Walter White notified the FEPC of discriminatory hiring practices by 
Sperry in violation of Executive Order 8802.  Though the company had hired some new black 
workers, White argued Sperry was in violation of the President’s orders to fully utilize available 
local labor before recruiting elsewhere.  He alleged that Sperry recruited white workers from 
Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia to fill the labor shortage.  White asserted that these practices 
are bringing white laborers into Brooklyn creating a housing shortage.353  These claims were 
investigated by the FEPC and placed on the agenda for the FEPC’s August 28 meeting.354  The 
FEPC received corroborating information about Sperry’s hiring practices from the New York 
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State Committee on Discrimination and Robert Weaver but the organization at that time did not 
have enough field staff to investigate.355  The FECP investigation would wait until the next year.   
By September of 1941 the Sperry Company had hired 4 black assemblers.  It also 
published advertisements for help, pledging that there would be no discrimination in 
employment.356  The decision to hire black workers, some in skilled positions, was very 
significant given the level of discrimination exercised by the company’s management. Despite 
the fact that Sperry changed its hiring policy by integrating its workforce, the actual number of 
blacks hired was less than one percent of the corporation’s total workforce.  These initial black 
hires seemed to be an attempt by Sperry management to satisfy those advocating equal 
employment in hopes that token hires would end the protests and bad publicity.  The company in 
fact did not hire blacks in any significant number until later in the year.  The most important 
outcome of black protests surrounding Sperry’s hiring practices was that they led to government 
investigations into allegations of discrimination against blacks seeking skilled and semi-skilled 
jobs.  By mid-1941 the NAACP had changed its tactics to pressure government agencies to 
eradicate discrimination at Sperry.  Other organizations aimed at racial uplift joined in this effort.  
The NAACP, NNC, and NUL brought discrimination cases to the FEPC in hopes that they 
would investigate and eradicate discriminatory hiring practices using the new anti-discrimination 
laws.    
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The UE Fights for Black Rights at Sperry 
 
 The actions of black organizations like the NAACP, Urban League, and NNC brought 
public attention to Sperry’s discriminatory hiring practices which created pressure on company 
management to hire black workers.  The organizations also helped workers file complaints with 
the New York State Committee on Discrimination and local offices of the Fair Employment 
Practices Committee which eventually launched investigations into Sperry’s hiring policies.  
Black organizations however were not the only groups aimed at opening employment in war 
industries to African Americans.  Unions, especially those affiliated with the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO), worked towards that aim as well.  The activities of the United 
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) contributed to the employment of black 
workers at Sperry.  When the UE, a racially inclusive union, became the bargaining agent for 
workers at subsidiaries of the Sperry Corporation the prospect of union membership, and 
therefore employment, became available to blacks. 
The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, an affiliate of the CIO, 
strongly advocated for the membership and employment of black workers.  From its founding in 
1936 the UE’s policy was to admit to membership all workers in the industry “regardless of skill, 
age, sex, nationality, color, religion, or political belief or affiliation.”  The union rejected 
discrimination in any form under the premise that “it is only by uniting all workers in the 
industry that it is possible to defend effectively the interests and improve the working conditions 
of the membership.”357  These policies were reflected in the union’s constitution as well as the 
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constitution of UE’s District 4 which included the greater New York metropolitan area and 
Northern New Jersey.358 
United Electrical first won the right to represent workers at the Sperry Corporation’s 
subsidiary Ford Instrument Company in 1939.  Ford Instrument workers had been formerly 
represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) an affiliate of the 
American Federation of Labor.  Local 425 of the UE came to represent workers at Ford 
Instrument Company.359  The relationship between the UE and the IBEW was quite contentious 
with conflict between the New York locals stemming from the decision of 1200 workers at the 
Air-King Radio Company in Brooklyn to leave IBEW local B-1010 and affiliate instead with 
Local 430 of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America.360  The UE and 
IBEW competed to organize the workers of the radio and electrical instruments industry. 
The conflict between the UE and IBEW originated from events that led to the 
establishment of the UE.  James Carey, a professional labor organizer and one of the founders of 
the UE, was a young radio worker who organized a group of employees interested in union 
membership at Philadelphia’s Philco Radio.  Originally an AFL staff member, Carey had 
initially attempted to organize the local electrical workers in Philadelphia under the IBEW, but 
IBEW leadership, afraid that electrical workers would take over the union, offered them “Class 
B” non-voting membership.  Carey rejected the IBEW offer, instead collaborating with 
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independent local unions to form the UE.361  Carey founded the UE in response to the policies of 
the IBEW and subsequently worked to supplant the IBEW as the main union organizing 
electrical workers. 
Though the IBEW had a closed shop agreement with Sperry, United Electrical had 
developed tactics to organize workers in companies with closed contracts.  The UE had been 
founded to improve benefits for electrical workers during the Depression when company unions 
were cutting back.  However the founding of the UE coincided with increasing production levels 
and recovery in the electrical industry and as prosperity returned, electrical workers had less 
incentive to join the new union.  In response, UE leadership devised a strategy to convince 
company workers to vote for UE representation.  The union infiltrated the existing electrical 
industry unions by getting UE supporters elected to positions within the unions.  Once those UE 
supporters were elected they would win over workers support for the UE by illustrating that their 
tactics were more effective at getting acquisitions than the negotiations of the unions currently 
representing the workers.  These gains would persuade electrical workers to vote for UE 
representation when company elections were held.362  Using this strategy United Electrical 
challenged the IBEW and company run unions for the right to represent the electrical industry’s 
workers. 
These challenges were not always successful.  Air-King’s manager, who was also the 
chair of the Employers’ Association, locked out about 320 company employees who had voted 
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for UE representation.363  The matter went to arbitration by the US Conciliation Service of the 
US Department of Labor.364  Though the UE argued that they represented the company’s 
workers when the majority voted for UE representation, the arbitrators decided differently.365  
Arbitrators sided with the IBEW, declaring the labor contract between the Air King Corp and 
IBEW local B-1010 a closed shop agreement.  This meant that workers had to unanimously 
agree to change union representation which had not happened.  On that basis the arbitrators ruled 
that the UE local did not represent Air King Radio Corp workers.366  Despite this loss United 
Electrical continued their efforts to organize workers formerly represented by IBEW local B-
1010 and later that year won a similar case involving workers at the Fada Radio and Electric 
Company, Inc.  In that case an arbiter found in favor of the UE reasoning that the agreement the 
IBEW had made with Fada was not a closed shop agreement therefore allowing those 
represented by other unions to work in the plant.367  In this way United Electrical began 
representing the workers in electrical machinery industries. 
African Americans had a stake in the competition between the IBEW and the UE as their 
access to jobs in the industry was affected by which union represented the industry’s workers.  
Years earlier James Hubert, Executive Director of the New York Urban League had charged that 
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Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers discriminated against black 
workers.  Hubert cited a case in which twenty-five black workers were fired from Standard 
Electrical Equipment Corp. in Long Island City because the union had denied them membership. 
These blacks who had been employed for many years lost their jobs when the IBEW unionized 
the shop where they worked.368  The IBEW’s exclusion of African Americans was symptomatic 
of its affiliation with the American Federation of Labor.  The AFL and its affiliate unions 
excluded African Americans from membership and therefore employment at the companies 
whose workers they represented.  For African Americans the United Electrical, Radio and 
Machine Workers of America, with its inclusive ethos and constitution, offered them a much 
better chance of employment than the racially exclusive IBEW. 
When United Electrical took over representation of workers at Ford Instruments in 1940, 
those workers’ bargaining position was strengthened.  The UE was able to negotiate higher 
wages for the workers at Ford Instruments despite the fact that both Ford Instruments and Sperry 
Gyroscope were controlled by the same interests. 369  The union representing Sperry Company’s 
workers was a company union, one unaffiliated with the AFL or the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO).370  Subsequently, the UE then set its sights on organizing the workers at 
Sperry Gyroscope.371  Union organizers regularly distributed leaflets, held outdoor meetings, and 
visited contacts.372  By early 1941, the UE had taken the Brotherhood of Scientific Instrument 
Makers of America (BSIM), also formerly known as Sperry Hourly Employees Association, and 
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the Independent Instrument and Mechanical Workers Union, to the Labor Board a number of 
times to have them disbanded.373  The UE charged that the Sperry Company dominated the 
BSIM prohibiting the union from effectively advocating for the workers.374  
Prompted by the UE’s claims, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) investigated 
whether the Brotherhood of Scientific Instruments Makers of America should represent Sperry 
workers.  The NLRB issued a complaint against the union on February 19, 1941 and hearings 
began on March 24, closing on April 12.  The NLRB issued its intermediate report on July 24, 
recommending disestablishment of the Brotherhood of Scientific Instruments Workers.375  The 
report provided United Electrical with a chance to move in. 376   
The UE focused on establishing effective committees in the various departments at 
Sperry to persuade workers to support a change in union representation.  With the possibility of 
the NLRB ruling against the BSIM, the UE needed to persuade workers to vote for the union to 
represent them.  In an attempt to garner worker support the UE organizing committee prepared 
and distributed 4,500 cards with a petition to the Labor Board to hold an election and give the 
UE authorization to bargain on the behalf of Sperry’s workers.  In July 1941 the UE distributed 
the cards in pre-paid, self-addressed envelopes, which also contained an explanatory leaflet.  
According to some UE representatives Sperry workers received the petitions well, only a very 
small number were thrown away within their sights. 377  
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By the end of 1941 United Electrical was poised for victory.  In November the NLRB 
handed down its ruling on the case.  The Board found that the company dominated the employee 
organization and directed the Sperry Gyroscope Company to disestablish the Brotherhood of 
Scientific Instrument Makers as the bargaining agent of its employees at its Brooklyn plant.  The 
NLRB also directed Sperry to stop discouraging membership in Local 1202 of the UE or 
engaging in any other form of employee interference.378   After an appeal of the decision The 
NLRB conducted elections to determine who would represent Sperry workers.  In December of 
1942 the majority of workers at the Sperry Gyroscope company’s plants in Brooklyn and Nassau 
County, Long Island chose the UE to be their collective bargaining agent.379  In light of the 
NLRB ruling it is not surprising that the BSIM did not make headway towards black hiring.  The 
union had been controlled by the Sperry Company whose management had demonstrated in no 
uncertain terms that they had little interest in employing black workers.  Therefore when the UE 
became the bargaining agent for workers at Sperry, it signaled a better chance for black 
employment at Sperry as well. 
Though blacks were not in leadership positions in the UE and black involvement was not 
that important to the union’s victory because of the small number of blacks working in the 
factory; the change in union representation was important in facilitating black employment.  It 
opened up jobs to blacks and contributed to the shift in the company policy on hiring black 
workers.  This belief was held by black leaders and activists in the city as black organizations 
lobbied for black inclusion in labor unions.  In 1942 the New York Urban League accused the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, among other unions, of discriminating against 
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black workers and brought these charges of discrimination to the FEPC.380  The idea that union 
membership was important to black employment was shared by other black organizations, which 
cultivated good relations with unions open to black membership.  The UE developed a reputation 
for being one of the premier labor organizations dedicated to equality of opportunity of all 
workers including African Americans.  Thomas Jasper, the Chairman of the Labor Committee 
for the National Conference on Negro Youth expressed his gratitude to James Fitzgerald, the 
new President of the UE, for the work of the union in advocating unionism for blacks.  Jasper 
invited Fitzgerald to participate in the organization’s National Conference in 1941.381  The late 
1942 change in union representation to the UE was significant in that Sperry’s workers were now 
represented by a union that was not only open to African Americans but actively advocated black 
employment.  
Black support for the UE was predicated on the work the union did in fostering equal 
rights for all workers including African Americans.  During the war years the national leadership 
of United Electrical openly criticized employers and unions that did not accept African American 
workers.  In June 1942 the leaders of the UE stated that World War II was waged for equality 
and freedom for all, a principle that had not been recognized or practiced by war-time employers.  
The union published an official statement underscoring the need for companies to mobilize all 
Americans including African Americans for full support of the war.  The union asserted that 
blacks did not have the full equality in “all endeavors, political, economic and cultural” promised 
by the Constitution as they could not get jobs in skilled occupations and were segregated in the 
armed forces.  The UE condemned labor unions that did not treat Blacks equally and resolved to 
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speak up on the question of racial discrimination and put an end to the unfair treatment of 
blacks.382  That same year the UE conducted a concerted drive for the employment and 
upgrading of black workers in organized plants in Pennsylvania, New York and Connecticut.  
The union designed specific steps to speed integration.  In New York City Local 1227 announced 
that 20 percent of all union trainees placed in jobs since January were Negroes.  In announcing 
this development the president of that local Carl Geiser declared that to win the war, all-out 
production was necessary and that could only be achieved by utilizing all available manpower.  
Believing that Negroes must be given equal opportunity not only to fight, but to work for this 
country, Local 1227 focused on breaking down the barrier of discrimination in their shops.383  
With the outbreak of war the UE conducted special campaigns to integrate war industries.   
UE leadership seemed to want to uphold the tenets of the union’s constitution which advocated 
unity and solidarity of workers regardless of race or religion.  There was also a more practical 
reason for the UE’s inclusive stance.  Union leaders believed that if blacks were not brought into 
the union, blacks would be paid lower wages and would therefore depress the wages of workers 
in the industry as a whole.  Several locals worked out agreements with management guaranteeing 
that there would be blacks among all new people hired.  In some instances this required 
discussion among the workers, as well as community activity, which invoked the support of 
black organizations.  According to the UE the best example of the union successfully integrating 
a company was the Sperry Corporation, where the Negro organizations and the UE cooperated to 
pressure management to hire black workers.384 
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Though there is insufficient direct evidence with which to quantify the exact influence 
the UE had on the hiring of black workers, it is clear they had an important role in facilitating 
integration of Sperry’s workforce.  When United Electrical became the union representing 
workers at Sperry the doors opened for black employment at the Sperry Corporation’s 
subsidiaries.  Prior to UE representation the unions bargaining for workers in the company did 
not advocate black membership or employment.  The IBEW did not admit black members and 
the company dominated BSIM did not effectively advocate for the inclusion of black workers.  
The UE promoted equal employment opportunities for workers of all races, creeds, religions, and 
ethnicities, a factor that eliminated Sperry management’s argument that white workers would not 
work side by side with African Americans.  The FEPC, the NYS War Council’s Committee on 
Discrimination, and a 1943 labor shortage dealt the final blows to Sperry’s discriminatory hiring 
policies. 
 
Full integration in 1943: Government Activity for Fair Employment 
Under increasing pressure from black organizations like the NAACP, the National Urban 
League, and the National Negro Congress the federal government began to take a stand against 
the discriminatory hiring practices of war industries.  As Sperry’s business boomed, both the 
federal and state government used Executive Order 8802 and the Mahoney Act to monitor and 
combat the company’s biased employment policies.  Both the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee and the New York State War Council’s Committee on Discrimination investigated 
Sperry for discrimination against African Americans. 
In February of 1942 the FEPC investigated complaints of discrimination against black 
workers in the Sperry Gyroscope Company and the Ford Instrument Company.  In the complaint 
against Sperry, black workers represented by the Urban League accused company management 
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of discouraging Negro applicants, maintaining a separate file for black’s applications, and 
considering Negroes only for certain jobs.  According to the complaint, the company employed 
only 21 black workers out of a total 11,212 employees. African Americans filed a separate 
complaint of discrimination against the Ford Instrument Company.385 
The FEPC held a public hearing in New York City on February 17 and 18, 1942 where 
complaints against both Sperry and Ford were heard.  At the hearing complainants, company 
representatives, and government officials testified.  Edward Lawson, field employment agent of 
the War Production Board, stated that while he had been assured that the company would employ 
blacks and give them equal opportunities, it had failed to do so.  Lawson declared that although 
the company had hired black trainees, they had not been given equal opportunities with white 
trainees for advancement.  A worker from General Agency, an employment agency used by 
Sperry, also supported allegations of discrimination when he testified that Sperry had specified to 
the agency that no Jewish or black workers were wanted.  All accusations were denied by the 
company’s counsel.386   
The FEPC found that neither company was in violation of Executive Order 8802 because 
each had hired black and Jewish workers in the time between the complaint and the hearing.  The 
committee ordered the case be held in abeyance for possible further action if the circumstances 
changed.  The FEPC did direct Sperry to instruct its labor supply sources and others responsible 
for administration of its employment policy to comply with the Executive Order.387  Though the 
FEPC did not directly instruct Sperry to hire black workers, it required the corporation’s 
subsidiaries to periodically submit its hiring statistics to the FEPC to ensure compliance with the 
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Executive Order.388  Though Sperry was not found to be violating fair employment mandates, 
government oversight of hiring practices prevented Sperry from firing the blacks it had hired and 
prompted the company to hire even more African American workers.   
After the hearings the company hired seventy-five African American employees by June 
with the new Long Island facility employing twenty-eight black workers.389  By mid-1942 Sperry 
reported further progress in black employment increasing the number of black workers from 35 
to 300.390  By August of 1942, six months after Sperry’s FEPC hearing, the Sperry Company 
employed 395 African Americans of a total 21,752 workers.391  Management at Ford Instruments 
also increased black hires.  In March of 1942 Ford employed only seventy-five blacks but by 
July had added forty more African American workers.392   
The increase of black workers at Sperry coincided with an increase of the number of 
blacks working in war industries in the city and state.  Though levels of African American 
employment by war industries remained low, in August 1942 Committee on Discrimination 
Chairman Frieda Miller declared that Negro employment rates were steadily rising and 
thousands more would be employed by the end of the year.393  Despite war industries increased 
employment of African Americans, this did not always indicate a change in the occupations 
blacks held.  Many of the blacks hired by war industries worked in positions traditionally open to 
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African Americans.  This was the case at the companies of the Sperry Corporation.  Of  the 115 
blacks working for Ford Instruments, 65 were porters indicating that the company, though hiring 
black workers, was hiring them for the unskilled service positions blacks had traditionally 
occupied.394   
Black women were also placed in jobs at Sperry, however these women seemed to be 
token hires.  The COD placed eleven Negro women in training for war work by August of 1942 
and eventually the company hired twelve black women.395  But that same month the company 
turned down approximately forty female black job applicants in its new Long Island City plant.  
Given a tip that they would be hiring women John Singleton, the head of the Jamaica, Queens 
branch of the NAACP referred the women there.  Sperry employment officials made these 
women wait for three hours for an interview, while white women were promptly called in for 
their interviews.  After the wait a single interviewer impatiently called in all of the black women 
and interviewed them at the same time.  The interviewer was not shy about expressing his 
reservations about employing the women greeting one woman by saying, “Oh you are from 
South Carolina too.” as if migrant workers were not acceptable.  Moreover, an American born 
woman of West Indian parents was denied a job because the interviewer said she was an alien 
though she had a proof of her American citizenship.  The interviewer asked all of the black 
applicants if they had experience working with precision instruments, although white women 
without experience were being hired without previous training or experience.396  Though Sperry 
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Gyroscope hired small numbers black women after their FEPC hearing, black female job 
applicants did not receive equal consideration as their white counterparts.  
Full acceptance and integration of black workers at Sperry began in the latter half of 1942 
with black employment peaking in 1943.  During that period there was a vast increase in black 
employment at the corporation as well as a diversification of the types of positions open to 
blacks at the company.  The continued scrutiny by the FEPC and a labor shortage in 1943 caused 
Sperry Corporation management to change their hiring policy.  In May of 1942 of 
24,361employees, only 586 (2.41 percent) were African American.397  However one year later, in 
May of 1943 there were a total 1,024 blacks employed out of 39,087 total employees (2.61 
percent).398  Though the change in the percentage of African Americans hired was minimal, the 
number of blacks nearly doubled.   
Even more significant than the increased number of blacks hired by the company, was the 
shift in the types of work for which black were hired.  Employment statistics submitted to the 
FEPC show that the number of skilled and semi-skilled blacks employed by Sperry increased as 
well.  In May of 1942 there were no African Americans in skilled positions throughout Sperry 
Company Inc., nor were there any blacks in jobs categorized as “other” (a category that usually 
included clerical help).  In fact the vast majority of those African Americans employed by Sperry 
were unskilled workers (83 percent).  Only 100 of the 586 (17 percent) black workers at the 
corporation worked in semi-skilled positions.399   
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Chart 1  
 
 
This changed significantly by May of 1943. According to FEPC records small numbers of 
African Americans were employed in both skilled positions and in jobs categorized as “other”.  
More significantly the number of blacks employed in semi-skilled positions dramatically 
increased.  Of 1,024 black employees, 386 (nearly 38 percent) were in semi-skilled positions.  As 
the chart below illustrates, the percentage of black workers in semi-skilled positions more than 
doubled over a twelve month period.  Moreover, the percentage of black workers in unskilled 
positions decreased to 61 percent. 
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Chart 2 
  
A labor shortage in 1943 contributed to Sperry’s increased employment of black workers.  
Thomas Morgan, President of the Sperry Corporation, contacted John Coleman, Chairman of 
Selective Service Board #5, about the labor problem at Sperry.  The company needed more 
workers because the draft was taking so many employees abroad to fight the war.  After a study 
of the metropolitan area revealed the best possible source of additional labor was available in 
Harlem, Mr. Morgan, upon Coleman’s recommendation, requested a conference with Roy 
Wilkins of the NAACP hoping to recruit black workers to fill open positions.  At this meeting 
Morgan said that the necessity of war had convinced him of the need to use all available labor, 
and to therefore make it easier to secure more Negro workers.  Morgan admitted that there was a 
lot of “red tape” that had to be negotiated when getting a job through the usual channels.  After 
conversations with black workers at Sperry Morgan also admitted that it was even more difficult 
for Negroes to obtain jobs with the company and expressed interest in making the process easier.  
To that end Morgan considered opening an employment office training center in Harlem to 
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attract black workers.400  Morgan assured Wilkins that the Harlem office would not be used to 
create a segregated unit in the factory, although a considerable number of black workers might 
work in certain departments.  He also pledged that the company was not hiring blacks to work 
for lower wages as a scheme to weaken the union as African American workers were accepted 
for membership by the UE.401  A few weeks later Morgan took steps to put his plan for black 
employment into action. 
On February 19, 1943 Sperry executives held a meeting to discuss the details involved in 
creating the Harlem employment office.  Roy Wilkins, Elmer Carter, member of the NYS 
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, Thomas Morgan, and other Sperry officials attended.  
At the meeting the men decided that black job applicants would be given one week training at 
the Harlem office, and then two weeks of training in the plant.  When one Sperry official 
expressed concern with black applicants’ lack of experience with machine precision work, 
Morgan replied that many men with no formal education had mechanical aptitude and that these 
applicants would be considered with that in mind.  Wilkins observed that though there were 
discussions about preparedness of Negro workers for industrial work, all those present supported 
the hiring of black workers and the creation of a Harlem employment office to facilitate this.402  
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Consequently in April, the Sperry Corporation opened an employment office in Harlem to recruit 
black workers for its subsidiary companies to fill those shortages.403  Frank Thomas, the 
Employment Supervisor of the Harlem office, promised that those who met minimum 
educational and vocational requirements would be trained for skilled and semi-skilled work.404   
The creation of Sperry’s Harlem office was just one tactic used by the company to recruit 
black workers. The company also continued to accept applications through the United States 
Employment Service and the Urban League.405  Sperry management applied to the USES for 
assistance in finding black workers.406  The labor shortage further motivated Sperry’s efforts to 
expand black employment in 1943 and amplified the FEPC’s efforts to prompt company 
management to hire African Americans.  
Not only did Sperry begin to employ black workers in skilled positions, they also altered 
the methods of production in order to hire fewer skilled trade workers and more general workers 
with less training.  Prior to the war, the Sperry Company, according to Morgan, employed about 
3,500 highly skilled workers.  In early 1943 the company was hiring 46,000 workers and 
expected to hire an additional 14,000 by the end of the year.  Because of the necessity for more 
workers and faster production Morgan explained the company had broken down the skilled 
production processes so that they could employ workers whom they never would have employed 
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before the war.407  Those workers included more African Americans.  This process was not 
unique at Sperry. A host of war industries all over the country similarly deskilled skilled jobs to 
hire more workers.  
In 1943 Sperry’s management had significantly increased the number of African 
American hires.  By January of 1944 the number of blacks employed by the company had nearly 
doubled from the number employed in December of 1942, increasing from 650 to 1,316.408  By 
early 1944 black workers comprised 3.7 percent of the total workers in the corporation, up from 
2 percent the previous year.  The corporation had added 658 black workers to their work force 
during 1943.  The most marked increase of black workers took place in the Sperry Gyroscope 
factory, as the number of black employees more than doubled from December of 1942 to January 
of 1944.  This is even more significant because this increase occurred after a four month period 
of declining black employment.409  In fact in 1944 the Sperry Corporation had achieved levels of 
black employment well above the 1.5 percent the FEPC declared was necessary for companies to 
be classified as having a “good or fair” number of Negro employees.410  
According to historian Martha Biondi, the employment of blacks during the war had 
prompted the Sperry management to change its philosophy about hiring black workers.  In 1944 
the company’s president, a new proponent of racial brotherhood, gave a speech about the 
benefits of industrial integration at the NAACP’s national convention in Chicago.411  In August 
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1944 Sperry Company General Manager R.E. Gilmore paid high tribute to the company’s black 
workers.  Gilmore said that black workers’ industrial efficiency equaled that of white workers 
and their habits were often superior.  In an extensive statement reviewing three years of 
experience in the employment of African Americans Gilmore said they were neither so prone to 
absenteeism as other workers nor did they change their jobs as frequently.412  This change in 
philosophy is evident in the attitudes of Sperry’s leaders.   
At the top levels of Sperry management discrimination would no longer be tolerated.  
The corporation’s president personally dealt with hiring discrimination at the employment 
offices of his company.  Thomas Morgan tried to recruit an African American worker for a better 
position in the building where the corporate offices of Sperry were located.  Morgan had 
observed the man’s work and deemed him a good mechanical worker who would be an asset to 
Sperry, however when the man applied and passed a preliminary test for a job at Sperry’s 
employment offices, he was offered a job as a porter.  Mr. Morgan intervened on the man’s 
behalf, calling the employment office and “gave them hell.”  The man was subsequently 
employed in a skilled position at Sperry and proved to be a good mechanic.413 
Robert Weaver who served as the leader of the War Manpower Commission’s Negro 
Labor Service, pointed to the labor shortage as being the primary reason discriminatory bars to 
black hiring were relaxed after 1943.414  It should be noted however that the investigations 
conducted by the FEPC and the State Committee on Discrimination and subsequent supervision 
of the Sperry Corporation’s hiring practices also played a significant role in achieving increased 
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black employment.  FEPC statistics show that the hiring levels in all Sperry subsidiaries during 
1942 in the wake of the initial FEPC investigations were comparable to those made in 1943 after 
the labor shortage.  From February to December of 1942, 564 blacks were hired by the 
corporation.  This was only 100 less than the number of blacks hired during 1943, despite the 
labor shortage.  Moreover by August of 1942 both Sperry and Ford Instruments had reached 
“fair” levels of black employment according to the FEPC’s standards.415  According to the FEPC 
in January of 1944 all plants with non-white workers comprising 1.5 and 4.99 percent of their 
employees had a “good or fair number of Negroes.”  The FEPC rightly contended that though 
these percentages seemed low, considering that Sperry had very few black workers before the 
investigations, these small increases were appreciable.416  Therefore it seems that the FEPC, in 
conjunction with the New York State’s COD which had the power to prosecute state industries 
discriminating against black workers, had made an important impact on the hiring practices of 
the Sperry Gyroscope Company.  The hiring of blacks begun in the wake of the FEPC and COD 
investigations was expanded due to the labor shortage of 1943, allowing blacks access to jobs 
previously closed to them at Sperry. 
 
Preserving Victory: Retaining Black Jobs in the Race of Reconversion 
 
As of 1944 Sperry employed African Americans in twenty-eight different occupations.  A 
third of black workers were in highly skilled positions, another third in semi-skilled occupations, 
and the last third in other jobs.  A small number of African American workers occupied office 
positions and there were three black engineers.  A considerable number of African Americans 
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acted as leaders (Sperry’s designation for people who were instructors and tool setters for groups 
of ten to twenty) and another was a foreman in charge of all internal transportation in one of the 
corporation’s plants.  White workers’ threats to refuse to work with blacks were just threats as 
few racially motivated conflicts were reported.  White workers’ doubts about the preparedness 
and ability of black workers disappeared as well.  Out of 300 shop stewards, 22 were black.  In 
fact an all white department had chosen an African American to represent them as shop 
steward.417   
Not only did blacks attain positions in the company which were once closed to them, 
black workers participated in the social activities sponsored by the company as well.  According 
to Sperry General Manager R. E. Gilmore, African Americans participated in many of the 
company’s social and recreation activities.  Sperry’s symphony orchestra had several black 
musicians.  African Americans also participated in the company’s choral society.  White workers 
in other recreational societies at Sperry including the ball teams, bowling teams, and the camera 
club accepted the company’s black workers as well.418  The social integration at the factory 
proved wrong management’s earlier claims that white workers would not accept and could not 
get along with black workers. 
The hiring wave at Sperry in 1943 allowed African Americans to fully integrate the 
company’s workforce.  The continued efforts of organizations advocating fair employment 
practices facilitated this integration.  In 1943 and 1944 the National Negro Congress, its offshoot 
the Negro Labor Victory Committee (NLVC), and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine 
Workers of America worked independently and cooperatively to continue the gains blacks won 
at Sperry.  One major hurdle to their efforts was reconversion.  As war production slowed and 
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soldiers returned from Europe at the end of World War I, industrial management laid-off black 
workers en masse and labor unions lost their influence over the government and factory owners.  
The NNC, NLVC, and UE worked to prevent the same from happening at Sperry at the end of 
World War II.     
United Electrical considered its efforts at Sperry a prime example of its achievements on 
the civil rights front and towards the end of the war actively worked to maintain black 
employment.  In a 1945 District 4 report to its locals the UE cited integration at Sperry as a 
prime example of how “we were able to secure jobs for Negroes, assure them equal pay, and win 
promotions and upgrading.”  The New York district sent this statement out to their locals to 
encourage them to keep up the efforts towards this end and for discussion with the membership.  
Victories such as the one the UE achieved at Sperry fostered black support for the union.419   
The work of the UE in integrating war industries and their focus in extending industrial 
employment to African Americans and other minorities is not a story that is limited to Sperry.  
The national office of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America sent 
memos to all General Vice Presidents and International Representatives expressing national 
union support for proposed legislation for a permanent FEPC.  National UE leadership urged 
locals to pressure state senators to vote in support of a full FEPC budget to support full 
mobilization for the war.420  The work of this particular union in integrating war industries is 
apparent in other major factories in the New York area.  It is not a coincidence that UE also 
organized workers at Babcock and Wilcox, a company that was investigated by the FEPC and 
subsequently changed their hiring policy.  The UE also organized workers at Becton and 
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Dickinson which was investigated by the FEPC, as well as Bulova which was investigated by the 
New York State War Council’s Committee on Discrimination.421  Representation by the racially 
inclusive UE helped facilitate integration of these war industries. 
With the prospect of reconversion looming on the horizon the UE worked to preserve the 
employment advances blacks made during the war.  This was an especially difficult task in the 
face of reduced demand, decreased production, and returning workers who had served in the war.  
In an effort to continue integrating war industries the UE signed an agreement with the FEPC to 
cooperate with the agency in investigations of discrimination complaints and adjustments of 
valid grievances.  After the war the UE formalized its existing fair employment practices by 
establishing a National Fair Practices Committee and directing Districts and Locals to follow 
suit.422   
With the end of the war in sight, in April of 1945 the UE began to consider what effect 
reconversion would have on black employment levels.  Officials of UE District 4 knew 
reconversion would bring the most severe cutbacks in the areas where its black union members 
had made their greatest advances – semi-skilled work.  Moreover, black workers made their 
biggest advances in industries which the union feared would experience the greatest post-war 
declines.  If that were the case, blacks were more likely to be laid off than the average worker in 
these occupations.  The UE acknowledged the “grave and immediate responsibility” of the union 
to address these issues.423  UE Local 1225, the local representing electrical workers in many 
Brooklyn and Queens factories, actively advocated equal employment opportunities for African 
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Americans.  In their annual “State of the Union” report, leadership of Local 1225 said they were 
nearing complete victory in all of their shops in the struggle against discrimination in hiring, 
upgrading and equal pay.  The major concern of the union moving forward was layoffs of black 
workers during reconversion.  They were grappling with the idea of making special applications 
of seniority laws to prevent the total ousting of recently hired black workers.  Their biggest goal 
was full employment but they were also looking to guarantee blacks the right to work in the 
industry.424   
The NLVC looked to collaborate with United Electrical in ensuring black employment in 
war industries during reconversion.  In September of 1944 Charles Collins, Secretary of the 
NLVC, asked Julius Emspak, Secretary Treasurer of UE, to gather a group of UE members to 
attend a conference to discuss job security for black workers during reconversion and after the 
war.  The meeting, sponsored by the NLVC, was to be conducted with various unions who 
included black workers.  The NLVC was quite worried about the ousting of new black hires 
because of seniority rules and the organization leadership wanted to begin discussing how 
reconversion may affect black employment.425  
The Negro Labor Victory Committee, its parent organization the National Negro 
Congress, and United Electrical worked to maintain integration of the work force of the Sperry 
Corporation.  At Sperry, the problem was particularly acute, as a return to the pre-war 
employment policies without adjustments to seniority laws and lay-off rules would mean the 
ousting of nearly all black employees. In order to ascertain if employment opportunities would 
still be open to blacks at Sperry after the war, the NNC sent an investigator to the company’s 
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Long Island firm which by late 1944 had the highest percentage of black workers.  Local 450 of 
the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, the union representing Sperry’s 
workers, cooperated with the NNC on this study.  At the plant seniority was based on 
occupation, and operated plant-wide and company-wide, therefore employees who changed from 
one occupation to another within the company carried their seniority with them making it 
cumulative.426 This meant that blacks who had been employed as porters or janitors and then 
upgraded to skilled or semi-skilled positions would have cumulative seniority.  This fact 
withstanding, the company had not hired its first black employee until 1941 and the majority of 
those working at that moment had been hired within the past four years.   Consequently 
cumulative seniority or not African Americans would be the first workers laid-off if Sperry did 
not adjust its seniority rules.  
 This reality was borne out in the NNC’s study.  According to the National Negro 
Congress African Americans comprised 7 percent of the 549 filers and burrers at Sperry’s Long 
Island plant.  In the case of a 50 percent layoff with unmodified seniority policies, the number of 
African Americans working in this capacity would drop from thirty-six to nine, comprising only 
3 percent of the workers in this occupation.  Negroes comprised 2 percent of the assemblers at 
Sperry’s Long Island plant.  If there were a 50 percent layoff with the same seniority rules 
practiced by management there would only be one of the thirty-seven Negro workers left.  The 
percentage of Negro workers in that occupation would drop from 2 to 0.1 percent.  There were 
23 black operators out of a total 973 (2 percent) working at Sperry.  If there were a 50 percent 
lay-off without changes to the seniority policy, no blacks would be employed as operators.  
These findings were similar to what would happen in many other plants, illustrating the need for 
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a modification of seniority rules in order to protect the gains blacks made in industrial 
companies.427   
 The New York District of the UE supported the position of the National CIO protecting 
the gains blacks achieved by preventing anti-union employers from taking steps designed to 
discriminate against black workers.  The district urged UE locals to find a compromise between 
sticking rigidly to seniority laws and retaining black workers who would all be lost under strict 
adherence to seniority.  The union’s objective was to maintain the gains won for blacks and the 
present levels of black employment.428   
To keep companies from returning to their discriminatory hiring practices, the District 
Executive Board developed a campaign for a permanent FEPC in New Jersey, for the 
appointment of trusted personnel of New York’s State Commission Against Discrimination, and 
the creation of a permanent federal FEPC.  The UE also advocated close cooperation between the 
union and the FEPC to eliminate any and all forms of discriminatory employment practices in 
plants where UE locals or organizing committees were in existence.  To minimize black 
unemployment and prevent blacks from being relegated to unskilled jobs the district was to work 
closely with the WMC to make sure that where lay-offs were unavoidable, black workers be 
given job referrals for jobs that utilized their highest talents and maintained their current pay 
rates.  In addition leaders of District 4 wanted the WMC to furnish lists of critical plants with 
manpower shortages, so that the UE could refer laid-off members there and work with black 
communities to man these shortages with black workers.  The district also pushed locals to 
concentrate on filling vacancies as far as possible with black workers and to push upgrading of 
black workers to help break through the still-existing practice of discriminatory hiring.  To 
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accomplish this, the locals were to provide special training courses to local blacks.  The District 
also wanted locals to include black members in leadership roles in shops, in locals, and within 
the district.  Perhaps most importantly, the UE urged locals to continue to engage in the tactics 
that had successfully secured jobs for African Americans – to initiate campaigns with the FEPC 
and black organizations to pressure companies with discriminatory hiring practices to hire black 
workers.429   
Though many locals of the UE supported the larger goal of maintaining black 
employment, changing the seniority laws was a hard prospect.  Labor unions had at all costs 
worked to implement and follow seniority laws as a way to protect workers from arbitrary abuses 
and firings by factory management.  Union leaders feared that tampering with seniority laws 
might mean the destabilization of the entire seniority system.  Moreover it would be indefensible 
to the public for unions to protect black employment at the expense of veterans returning from 
war who may lose their jobs if seniority laws were adjusted.  The UE recognized the problem of 
maintaining black employment during reconversion and acted boldly, stopping just short of 
altering seniority policies. 
 
Fulfilling the Vision: Black Employment after the War 
 
In 1945 the government had begun terminating some of Sperry’s production contracts 
and the company had reduced production levels.  The company did however continue to produce 
goods for the military as it had done before the war.430  In compliance with FEPC orders to 
continually send information on the race and religion of its workers in order to prevent 
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discrimination, the FEPC arranged a meeting with Sperry officials on May 4, 1945 to get 
information on current employment practices and indications of compliance with FEPC 
directives.431  At that time the number of black employees had declined to 852.  Though the 
number of black workers decreased, they comprised 7.5 percent of 11,321 employees at Sperry 
Gyroscope were non-whites.432  Even as the company’s black employment began to decline in 
1945, the black employment levels at Sperry were higher than the average percentage of blacks 
comprising the workforce of other state war industries.  According to 1944 COD investigations 
conducted all over the state, in almost every type of war industry the average percentage Negroes 
made of the workforce was 2 percent.  The rate of black employment at Sperry was also more 
than that of the 4-plus percent of the state population African Americans comprised according to 
the 1940 census.433  There is no exact way to tell what proportion of the city’s residents were 
African American in 1945 but the 7.5 percent black workers comprised of the Sperry Company’s 
employees was in the range between what the 1940 and 1950 percentage of the black population 
was in the city (6 percent in 1940 and 9.5 percent in 1950).434  Sperry unlike many companies 
employed a percentage of black workers comparable to their population in the city. 
Not only had black employment levels increased at Sperry but blacks continued to work 
in higher-paid, trained positions.  Of the 713 black workers at Sperry the majority (almost 60 
percent) were in skilled or semi-skilled positions.  Another 37 percent of black Sperry employees 
were unskilled workers and under 4 percent of African American workers were in skilled 
positions.  Though blacks made advances in semi-skilled positions, clerical and engineer posts 
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remained closed to them at the end of the war.435  In looking at the 1945 figures it was clear that 
Sperry, in response to FEPC directives and manpower needs, had changed its hiring policy 
resulting in a substantial increase of non-white employees in a wide range of categories.436   
 
Table 8: Classification of African American and other Non-White workers at Sperry Gyroscope, 
1945437 
 
Job Classification  Negro Other Non-
White 
Totals 
Skilled  28 1 29 
Semi-Skilled 
 
 424 4 428 
Unskilled 
 
 261 1 262 
 totals 713 6 719 
Other     
Clerical  3 0 3 
Guards  1 0 1 
Jr. Product 
Engineers  
 0 1 1 
 Totals 4 1 5 
 Grand 
totals 
717 7 724 
 
Sperry’s president, Thomas Morgan, had accepted the value of black workers and 
advocated equality for blacks at Sperry and beyond.  Morgan unequivocally maintained his belief 
in equal opportunity – that skilled workers of any race, creed, or religion should be able to work 
where they are qualified.  He believed the major reason for prejudice was economic and that 
division between the races would vanish as opportunity was equalized.  Key in this process 
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according to Morgan was access to education for blacks.438  Morgan became national chairman 
of the second annual campaign to raise funds for the United Negro College Fund in 1945.439  
Morgan pointed out the economic potentials of an educated black population and emphasized the 
importance of granting African Americans all the benefits of citizenship as “the Negro would 
play a large role in the welfare of this country.”  The institutions the fund was raising money for 
would also, he argued, have a major role in educating the quarter million blacks in the Army who 
planned to return to school and college.440  Norman Pickering, musician and engineer, conducted 
the Sperry Symphony Orchestra in a benefit Concert at Carnegie Hall which raised almost 
10,000 dollars for the United Negro College Fund.  The seventy piece orchestra was composed 
of Brooklyn and Long Island company workers.441  Black newspapers celebrated Thomas 
Morgan’s acceptance of black workers and activism to improve black access to education, 
training, and ultimately jobs.  Both the Amsterdam News and Chicago Defender ran articles 
chronicling Morgan’s activities and achievements in 1945.442  Many black editorialists hoped 
Sperry would remain a bastion of integration through the reconversion process. 
As reconversion began Sperry’s management attempted to find ways to maintain high 
production levels in order to maintain their employment rolls.  In an effort to expand its 
production capacity during the post-war slow-down Sperry Corporation purchased a one-half 
interest in Wright’s Automatic Machinery Company a producer of packing machines.  Sperry did 
so with the belief that “American industry will need and use more labor-saving machines in 
order that American working-men can continue to receive high wages and short working hours 
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and at the same time meet world competition.’”443  Sperry also continued a large program of 
research on military projects and focused on producing and developing new products for 
commercial sale.  The company tested its radio communication system for use in railroad 
applications, tested its long range location devices for use in navigating ships, and tested its 
automatic pilot navigation instruments.444  This was all done in the hopes of applying technology 
developed during the war to commercial items which would keep the factories producing and 
employing workers.  
Morgan was optimistic on the prospects of post-war black employment, believing blacks 
would maintain their industrial positions after the war.  He explained that there would be high 
demand for consumer goods that had not been manufactured during the war.  He also said that 
factories could put the new techniques learned producing war goods to good use producing civil 
goods for consumption, therefore maintaining and improving production capacity and preserving 
jobs.  The changed methods of production also created a situation in which production jobs 
needed less training.445  Be this as it was Sperry Gyroscope laid off a significant number of black 
workers (1,500) by the end of the summer.446  The reality of the employment situation at Sperry 
was that both black and white employees were being laid-off as the company ended war 
production. 
 The United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, was the only major 
labor union for a company employing large numbers of black workers to enact affirmative action 
reconversion policy.  UE locals in District 4 proposed a very limited affirmative action plan at 
                                                 
443
 “25 percent  Increase Seen For Meat Canning,” NYT, September 5, 1945, 29. 
444
 Annual Report, Sperry Corporation, 1945, Science, Industry and Business Library, New York Public Library. 
445
 A M Wendell Malliet, “Corporation President Sees Bright Future Ahead For Equality In Jobs: Sperry Prexy 
States Views on Post-War Era Points Out Industry's New Attitude; Says Our Workers Have Made Excellent 
Record,”  New York Amsterdam News (City Edition), May 26, 1945, 1A. 
446
 R.J. Thomas, “N.Y. Optimistic On Job Outlook: New State FEPC Law To Help Keep Jobs,” The Chicago 
Defender (National Edition), August 25, 1945, 5.   
197 
 
  
Sperry.  According to the seniority policies of the company the newest hired, which would 
include virtually all black workers in the company, were the first fired.447  Under this policy the 
numbers of black workers employed in the company began to dwindle during 1945 as the war 
ended and former soldiers reclaimed their jobs.448  As Sperry laid-off workers both black and 
white, the number of black Sperry workers represented by the UE fell from a high of 600 in 
1944, to 100 in December of 1945.449  In December of 1945 Sperry Local 450 voted 
unanimously to press for a new seniority plan designed to prevent the number of skilled black 
employees from dipping even further.  That local representing 5,000 Sperry workers, voted to 
make a maintenance of black employment clause a major part of the contract negotiations with 
the company.  Sperry Local 450 proposed a plan designed to prevent the number of skilled black 
employees from dropping below the level employed as of November 15, 1945.  The proposed 
plan created a black to white worker ratio that was to be maintained regardless of length of 
service.  Within the ratios seniority rules would still be observed.  This would allow some black 
workers to remain in skilled positions at Sperry.450   
The union was largely unsuccessful in convincing Sperry’s management to alter their 
seniority policies to allow skilled and semi-skilled black workers to retain their positions.  
Management agreed to adjust seniority rules for veterans but not for African Americans.  In 
some cases Local 450 found jobs for laid-off workers in other departments and in at least one 
other case “white workers in a department ‘unanimously agreed to allow a skilled Negro worker 
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to stay instead of one of them.’”451  These instances withstanding not even the racially 
progressive United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America could implement 
policies that would protect the jobs of skilled and semi-skilled black workers in the wake of 
conversion.452  Though Sperry President Thomas Morgan advocated and actively worked for 
black employment, company management was not willing to change seniority laws which had 
been enacted to protect the fundamental rights of workers.  The loss of black skilled and semi-
skilled positions at a racially integrated and tolerant company like Sperry illustrates the fate of 
many black workers in former war industries.   
The story was not completely bleak however for blacks in the post-war period.  Though 
blacks were laid off from Sperry, not every black worker was ousted from his job with the 
company.  In line with the larger employment trends of New York City black men at Sperry 
experienced displacement from their industrial jobs in the wake of the war.  Though doors closed 
to some black men at Sperry many gained valuable training and experience that allowed them to 
find jobs in industries elsewhere.     
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More importantly Sperry, unlike many other companies, increased the number of black 
workers it employed in the wake of reconversion.  In 1950 the Defense Production Act 
prohibited discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment on the basis of race, 
color, creed, or national origin.  To enforce this law President Truman issued Executive Order 
10308 in 1951 establishing a temporary Committee on Government Contract Compliance. 
(CGCC).  The CGCC was to examine and study the rules, procedures, and practices of the 
contracting agencies of the government to ensure the companies were complying with 
Government contract provisions prohibiting discrimination.453  Sperry retained its government 
contracts for production of weapons and technology for the armed forces after World War II and 
as the Cold War intensified the company expanded and diversified its manufactures.  Therefore 
the company was under the purview of the Defense Production Act as well as the CGCC and was 
expected to treat black applicants and employees equally despite their race.  This fact, along with 
the racially progressive attitude of the company’s President Thomas Morgan, and perhaps the 
fair employment laws in New York State, facilitated Sperry’s employment of black workers at a 
time when many other industries around the country did not. 
After President Truman issued the Executive Order the National Urban League did a 
survey of thirty industrial cities to ascertain if blacks were being discriminated against by 
industries.  The study, which the NUL sent to the CGCC, revealed that war industries embarked 
in widespread discrimination against black workers especially those applying for skilled and 
white collar positions.  Black women were generally excluded from industrial positions and few 
black men were included in in-plant training courses.  The study, which was funded in part by 
grants from the Marshall Field Fund, the United Community Defense Services and the Rosenstiel 
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Foundation, concluded that the discrimination appeared to depend on local conditions.  The 
Urban League described discriminatory employment practices in the South and Southwestern 
airplane industries; in Columbus, Ohio where forty plants with defense contracts did not employ 
blacks in clerical or technical jobs; and in Baltimore factories where blacks were excluded from 
most production jobs and all technical and clerical positions.  The report found that two defense 
employers in New York, unlike industries in other areas of the country, were employing black 
workers.  One of these New York plants was Sperry.  In fact the Urban League proclaimed that 
“the Sperry Corporation was employing Negroes in substantial numbers.”454  Despite the fact 
that this article does not give hard numbers on black employees, it is significant that the National 
Urban League deemed Sperry’s number of black hires substantial given that the organization had 
targeted the company just a decade prior for refusing to hire blacks.  Though the company had 
laid-off workers of all races at the end of the war and the lay-off of black workers was 
disproportionately high because of seniority regulations; company management hired black 
workers when production picked up after reconversion a practice that was not common among 
factories in the rest of the nation.   
The change in black employment at Sperry from the beginning of the war to the end is an 
example of how jobs opened to blacks at industries during World War II.  In just three years a 
company that had virtually no black workers, employed African Americans in skilled and semi-
skilled positions.  In this case, as in many other factories, it was a combination of factors that 
prompted Sperry’s management to do this.  Black activism for employment brought public 
attention to the discriminatory practices of the company and prompted the State Committee on 
Discrimination and local offices of the FEPC to investigate the corporation’s hiring policies.  
Moreover the radical United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America advocated for 
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black employment as they organized workers at Sperry’s plants.  Black employment steadily 
increased after the FEPC hearings and was amplified by a labor shortage in 1943 which 
prompted the company to actively recruit black workers.  Though these factors did not work 
exactly the same way in all war industries, in many of those industries that did hire black 
workers a combination of these events occurred.  Sperry continued its war-time policy of racial 
integration after reconversion as the company provided technology and produced weapons for 
the growing Cold War military industrial complex.  Part of this had to do with the nature of 
goods produced by the company, but it also can be traced to its racially liberal president, as well 
as the anti-discriminatory employment regulations imposed at the federal and state levels.  In 
these ways, Sperry represents both the larger trends and particularities of black employment 
during the 1940s and early 1950s and exemplifies the opportunities attracting blacks to migrate 
to New York City and other war production centers. 
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Chapter 5 
Busting Out: Black New York in the 1940s 
 
For the African Americans who left the Jim Crow south to find better paying jobs in the 
North and West a primary concern was finding a place to live.  Blacks could not live wherever 
they pleased in northern cities.  Most cities had a black district.  In cities like Detroit, Los 
Angeles and Chicago, traditional black neighborhoods became overcrowded, crime increased, 
and social services were never able to keep up with the influx of new residents.  At the same 
time, many whites moved out of cities to the suburbs during and especially after the war as 
higher wages created an expanding middle class and the GI Bill provided white Americans home 
loans to purchase houses in areas not open to black settlement.  As whites left the city, housing 
opened for African Americans.455   
As in other cities the World War II migration indelibly changed the face of New York, 
sparking trends that continued for the rest of the 1940s.  More than 200,000 African Americans 
moved to New York in the 1940s.  As in other urban areas, larger numbers of city whites began 
moving to the suburbs as home loans became more available to them after the war.  In addition 
the areas of black settlement in the city had many of the same problems as black areas in other 
cities - namely overcrowding, high rents, and insufficient social services.  The effects of the 
migration in New York however differed in some ways from other cities.  Most significantly, 
African Americans began moving outside the primary area of black settlement in the city – 
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Harlem – to other boroughs, creating by 1950 a second major area of black settlement in the city 
as well as integrated neighborhoods in other boroughs.  The dispersal of the city’s blacks into 
several neighborhoods created varying and complex dynamics in race relations in the city.   
Blacks began moving outside of Harlem in the 1940s due to the lack of housing and 
overcrowding in the neighborhood.  The vast increase of blacks moving to New York during the 
war years coupled with the lack of available housing exacerbated problems present in Harlem 
since the 1930s.  In 1940 there were nearly 300,000 blacks living in Manhattan and over the 
course of a decade an additional 100,000 came to the borough.  Overcrowding intensified, 
already high rents rose, and mortality rates worsened causing the living conditions of Harlem’s 
residents to further decline.   
Blacks reacted to this decline in living conditions in varied ways.  Some black leaders in 
the city advocated rent reductions and stabilization.  Many black New Yorkers took a different 
approach - they looked to live elsewhere in the city.  As blacks migrated to New York during the 
1940s Harlemites were moving to the Bronx, Brooklyn, Long Island, and Westchester.   
Moreover, some of the newly arriving, black southern migrants chose to make Brooklyn their 
home instead of Harlem.  It is no surprise then that over the course of the decade Harlem 
experienced less growth in comparison to other sections of the city.456   
Harlem’s blacks paid an inordinate amount of their income for rent.  On average Harlem 
residents paid 60 percent of their earnings to rent apartments that landlords neglected to 
maintain.457  Harlem building owners charged residents exorbitant rents because discrimination 
prevented blacks from moving elsewhere in the borough.458  Harlem proprietors claimed they 
were charging blacks higher rents to make back the money they lost due to the vacancies caused 
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by white flight.459  The high rents landlords charged blacks coupled with the low wages blacks 
earned caused economic hardship for blacks in Harlem. 
 Many black leaders and organizations advocated rent control laws to ease the financial 
burden of Harlem residents.  African American leaders tried to use the newly created Office of 
Price Administration (OPA) to exact rent control in the city.  Due to the nationwide decline in 
housing construction, which was exacerbated by a surge in the number of blacks migrating from 
the South, the housing market rapidly tightened in many urban areas. The federal government 
responded to the housing shortage (and the shortage of other consumer commodities) by passing 
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and establishing an Office of Price Administration 
(OPA).  The OPA had the power to freeze rents and prices in designated localities.  The United 
Tenants League, a Communist influenced tenant organization, the Citizens Housing Council a 
high-powered housing reform organization founded in 1937, and other consumer organizations 
pressed Mayor La Guardia to have the OPA immediately freeze rents in New York City.  La 
Guardia made the request, but the OPA refused action claiming the city's vacancy rate (7.5 
percent in 1940) was too high for mandatory controls.  Instead the OPA declared the city a 
"defense rental area," and called for a voluntary limit on rent increases, monitored by the mayor's 
office.460  This refusal angered many African American leaders and prompted them to take action 
to ensure that New York City rents would be regulated by the OPA. 
The failure of the OPA to impose rent controls became the rallying point for some black 
activists; and the fact that New York was one of the last major cities to come under rent control 
during the war prompted a concerted movement to influence the OPA to declare New York a 
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defense area subject to price control.  Activists from other cities came to New York to participate 
in the campaign for lower rents.  Edgar Brown, a leader in the National Negro Council, an 
organization aimed at uniting civil rights organizations and the labor movement, came to New 
York to conduct a similar campaign.  Brown, who had waged successful fights for rent control in 
Chicago and other major cities, wrote President Roosevelt a letter in August of 1942 protesting 
the discrimination directed against African Americans in the government’s administration of 
price control and rationing.  He urged the President to include Harlem as an OPA rent-controlled 
area since “half a million Negro residents are paying exorbitant and disproportionately high rents 
and suffer intolerable congestion and diminishing services.”461  The following month Brown held 
mass meetings in Abyssinian, Metropolitan, and Union Baptist Churches to recruit supporters for 
the fight for rent control.  Meeting attendees signed petitions that were sent to Leon Henderson, 
head of the Office of Price Administration, demanding he designate Harlem a war area in which 
rents could be controlled.462   
In addition, Brown and Donelan Phillips, President of the Consolidated Tenants’ League, 
opened a ten-day drive to get 100,000 Harlemites to sign a petition calling on the Federal Price 
Administration to designate New York City a defense area and to set a rent ceiling.  To continue 
the drive the March on Washington Movement and representatives from most of the city’s black 
churches formed a permanent committee under the leadership of the Consolidated Tenants’ 
League.463  The Tenant’s League partnered with other organizations in the city to up the pressure 
on the OPA to cap rents in the city.  Newly-elected Harlem city councilman Adam Clayton 
Powell, Jr., mobilized his People's Committee to support the petition to have Harlem declared a 
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"war emergency area.”  The National Negro Congress joined the drive by collecting petitions 
among its followers and even organizing rent strikes in individual buildings.  In other parts of the 
city the American Labor party made the struggle for rent control a major political priority. 
Congressman Vito Marcantonio, an advocate of rent control and public housing, pressed the 
issue on a federal level, as did American Labor Party councilmen Michael Quill, (Bronx), 
Benjamin Davis, Jr. (Harlem), and Peter Cacchione (Brooklyn).464  The campaign for the OPA to 
enact rent control did not achieve immediate success but would in November of 1943 when the 
OPA finally declared New York City a War Rental Area.  
Though many black organizations acknowledged the migration’s contribution to 
Harlem’s social problems, the black press generally did not.  While publishing articles on the 
troubles Harlemites faced, the Amsterdam News ran virtually no articles focused on the migration 
itself during the war years.  This was a stark contrast from World War I when black publications 
such as the Amsterdam News, New York Age, Crisis, and Opportunity constantly published 
articles on the expanding black population of Harlem.  Since the flow of blacks had never really 
stopped since World War I, perhaps black newspaper editors believed the continued trend did not 
warrant attention because it had become an accepted reality.  Though there is no definitive 
answer to explain the editors’ choice not to run articles on the migration, the absence of articles 
indicates that the migration in their opinion was not noteworthy.  By the 1940s black migration 
to the city had been going on for more than twenty years and Southern migrants were well 
integrated into the native New York community.  Moreover the problems Harlemites faced in the 
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war years were not new problems.  High rents, overcrowding, and crime were magnified with 
this increased wave of migrants to Harlem.   
Though the black newspapers did not believe the migration was noteworthy of news 
coverage, the mainstream press focused on the migration and its contribution to the deterioration 
of living conditions in Harlem.  Mainstream newspapers published articles linking the migration 
with the worsening conditions Harlem residents lived under.  Several such articles appeared in 
the New York Times.  An editorial blamed the sudden increase of blacks in the city for the 
inability of the New York City administration to provide the services necessary for their 
survival.465  Another argued that the migration of southern African Americans was the reason for 
overcrowding in Harlem and conditions prompting New York’s blacks to move out of that 
neighborhood.466  Another opinion piece blamed congestion, which was worsened by the 
migration, for many of the social problems in Harlem and advocated the dispersal of the black 
population in other boroughs.467  The migration and the social problems it wrought were ever-
present in the New York Times in late 1941 and early 1942.468   
As the editorials in the Times indicated, the migration worsened many of the social 
problems in the Harlem community.  Not only did the 100,000 additional African Americans 
who moved to Harlem intensify overcrowding and the need for housing, it also enabled landlords 
to continue to charge high rents because of the increased demand.  Very few of the census 
districts immediately adjacent to Harlem became black during the 1940s and the general 
geography of Harlem remained the same during the war years.469  Moreover, the additional 
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residents in Harlem also taxed the already inadequate educational and social resources available 
to area residents. The National Urban League, which dealt specifically with the condition of 
blacks in cities, emphasized the migration’s role in the problems plaguing Harlem in an effort to 
find solutions.  James Hubert, Executive Director of the New York Urban League, at an annual 
meeting for the organization, linked the increase in Negro population with declining conditions 
in Harlem and the increasing crime rate.470  Likewise, Lester Granger, Assistant Secretary for the 
National Urban League, concluded that the social and economic problems of Harlem were in fact 
national problems because the horrible living conditions in the South pushed migrants to come to 
New York.  Granger asserted that the conditions in northern cities could be improved by 
implementing a national program to achieve higher unemployment insurance and other social 
security measures, as well as better schools, hospitals, housing and judicial process for African 
Americans living in cities.  Responses to these problems were necessary because Granger 
believed the migration, and the difficult living conditions it exacerbated in Harlem, would 
continue.471   
These declining living conditions caused displeasure among Harlem residents and an 
undercurrent of discontent that contributed to the Harlem Riot in 1943.472  The police believed 
that the migrants had a direct role in causing the Riot.  The New York Police Department had 
received a report that “organized gangs of hoodlums from certain Southern cities” had been sent 
to Harlem to cause trouble and had been trickling in for some time.473  This line of thinking, 
though erroneous, reveals the mind-set of the police, and other New Yorkers, about the character 
of the migrants and the increasing black population’s negative effect on New York City.   
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The idea that black migration adversely affected northern cities was a belief held by some 
government officials.  United States Attorney General Francis Biddle linked black migration to 
the outbreak of riots in cities during the summer of 1943.  Biddle urged President Roosevelt to 
respond to the wave of urban race riots in various cities such as Detroit, Los Angeles, and 
Harlem, by forbidding the migration of African Americans to northern and western cities.474  
According to reports in the black press, the suggestion came as part of a six-point “Anti-Riot 
Program” submitted to the White House based on a study made by the civil liberties division of 
the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  Biddle believed 
overcrowding in centers of war production and increasing racial tensions could be alleviated by 
stemming black migration to the areas.  This would be accomplished through the War Manpower 
Commission which would close work sources to Negroes therefore eliminating the draw of better 
employment that attracted blacks to urban areas.475  Biddle denied heading any program that 
would prohibit the movement of black workers explicitly but did note that war employers and 
organizations needed to more carefully consider the effects of overcrowding before advocating 
or facilitating the migration of large numbers of black or white war workers into urban defense 
production areas.476  There was little provision made for housing for black or white migrants in 
the new war production areas.  The housing shortage in New York was indicative of a larger 
national problem.  Though there is no direct evidence that Biddle recommended a systematic end 
to black migration to northern cities, it is clear that he blamed the migration of southern blacks 
and the subsequent pressure the increasing black population put on the limited resources in urban 
areas for the outbreak of violence in summer of 1943.   
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New York’s black press quickly criticized Attorney General Biddle’s suggestion, 
highlighting the racism, discrimination, and social problems America’s blacks endured.  One 
author accused Biddle of colluding with “Southern plantation owners and Dixie industrial 
exploiters” to keep blacks in the south for cheap labor.477  The Amsterdam News published A. 
Philip Randolph’s response to Biddle’s proposal.  In his letter to the Attorney General, Randolph 
argued that if the government enacted Biddle’s proposal, it would in effect limit the employment 
opportunities of southern blacks migrating to improve their quality of life, and would therefore 
violate their constitutional rights.  Moreover Randolph asserted this kind of policy would amount 
to gross segregation and discrimination.  Randolph ended his letter with some suggestions about 
how to alleviate the racial problems facing America’s cities.  In Randolph’s estimation the only 
way to avoid future disturbances was to provide equal opportunities for blacks.  He wrote, “It is 
not the increase of the Negro population in war production centers that causes race riots, but it is 
the fact that Negroes have never gotten a fair break, and just and reasonable opportunities in any 
phase of American life, that is at the bottom of these conflicts.”478  Many black activists and 
organizations agreed with Randolph’s statement and called on Mayor La Guardia and other city 
officials to find solutions to the problems the city’s blacks faced – problems that were only 
worsened by the renewed wave of migration to New York during the war. 
 A month after the Harlem Riot 554 delegates from religious, education, civil rights, labor, 
economic, and fraternal groups attended a two-session meeting at Hunter College to find ways to 
eliminate discrimination against African-Americans in order to prevent another riot.   The 
resulting organization, the Citizen’s Emergency Conference for Interracial Unity, demanded that 
Mayor La Guardia appoint an interracial committee to study conditions among African 
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Americans in the city.  They also wanted black representation on bodies in the City 
administration including the Board of Education, Board of Higher Education, Police Department, 
and Health Department.  The conference resolved to end employment discrimination and urged 
the use of the FEPC and COD to fight discrimination in war industries.  They also demanded that 
unions remove bylaws that denied admission of members by reason of race, creed, or color.  
Moreover the Conference advocated more rigid enforcement of OPA regulations and urged the 
state government to develop a consumer department to prevent price gouging in under-privileged 
areas.  Lastly the organization wanted to take steps to end residential segregation and provide 
needed social services.479   
Mayor La Guardia responded to the riot and the Hunter College conference by creating 
the Mayor’s Committee on Unity (MCOU).  The new organization aimed to prevent future racial 
disturbances by promoting interracial unity and identifying conditions that contributed to racial 
conflict.480  In February of 1944, Mayor La Guardia appointed members of the committee, which 
acted as a watchdog for racism throughout the city.  Civic and social agencies also called on the 
organization for advice on matters concerning better integration of African Americans.481  The 
creation of the Mayor’s Committee on Unity meant that La Guardia had officially made race 
relations a priority and prevention of discrimination a duty of the city government.   
  Though no more major riots occurred in the 1940s, racial confrontations continued in 
Manhattan as African Americans moved into Washington Heights.  In October 1943, only two 
months after the Harlem Riot, skirmishes between new black residents and the white residents of 
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Washington Heights broke out.  Police broke up an alleged plot to run black residents out of the 
neighborhood, vandals damaged property recently occupied by blacks, and minor interracial 
clashes threatened to develop into a full-fledged race riot in the fall of 1943.482  As black families 
moved into Washington Heights, vandals painted swastikas on the buildings where African 
Americans resided.  Detectives investigating the vandalism said that white residents of the 
neighborhood resented the fact that Negroes had recently been moving in larger numbers.483  
Despite these incidents of racial antagonism, a large-scale violent riot between blacks and whites 
did not occur.  Similar racial antagonisms in other cities around the country prompted violence in 
1943.  Perhaps the dispersion of blacks into other areas of the city played a part in the prevention 
of a major race riot from erupting in New York City. 
Just as the Harlem Riot of 1943 impelled organizations and city officials to seek solutions 
to the problems plaguing Harlem, it also prompted the government to more closely regulate 
rents.  The upheaval of August 1943 prompted a nervous OPA to open a branch office on 135th 
Street and begin monitoring Harlem rents and prices.  The Consolidated Tenants League, Adam 
Clayton Powell's People's Committee, and left wing unions and neighborhood groups began 
flooding the OPA office with complaints.  At the same time, the city's CIO unions, especially 
Mike Quill's Transport Workers Union and the left-led National Maritime Union, argued that 
when lease renewals came up on October 1, 1943, landlords would violate voluntary restraints 
and institute massive rent increases. The mayor, in response to the pressure and complaints of 
these various groups, escalated his pressure on the OPA to control Harlem rents as well.  On 
November 1, 1943, the OPA finally relented and declared New York City a War Rental Area 
with mandatory ceilings retroactive to the levels of March 1, 1943.  From this point on those 
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advocating fairer rents in Harlem focused their attention on the OPA as it became a mechanism 
to achieve rent control.484  The OPA ordered a freeze on rents in Harlem designed to prevent 
indiscriminate rent gouging by Harlem landlords but the OPA did not effectively enforce the 
mandate. 485  Black activists and leftist groups would focus future fights for enforcement of rent 
control and lower rents in Harlem on the OPA.486   
 Despite the creation of the Mayor’s Committee on Unity to improve race relations in the 
city and the freezing of rents by the OPA many blacks chose to settle outside of Harlem to avoid 
the declining living conditions there.  Overcrowding in Harlem prompted new migrants from the 
South to settle in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn an area of the city that had a small pocket of 
black settlement before the war.  Black New Yorkers looking to escape the high rents and 
dilapidated housing in Harlem also moved to Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Other Harlemites chose to 
move to the south Bronx, an area with very few black residents before the war.  The dispersion 
of African Americans to different areas in the city created new black neighborhoods, allowing 
New York’s Negroes to escape the confines of a single black ghetto.  Though some whites 
opposed black residency outside of Harlem, whites did not mount any effective campaigns 
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preventing black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant or Morrisania as was done in Detroit.  
Perhaps this was the primary reason there was no major race riot in the city.   
The dispersal of the black population into other areas of the city relieved some of the 
pressure building up in black New York.  Though African Americans in the city still faced job 
discrimination, overcrowded neighborhoods, higher rents and substandard living conditions, the 
problems were not as acute as they surely would have been if all the city’s blacks were confined 
in one neighborhood.  In 1943 riots broke out in cities all over the country – the most notably in 
Detroit, Los Angeles, Beaumont, Texas, and New York.  In Detroit and Los Angeles the 
conflicts involved violence between whites and minorities and the violence was widespread.  In 
Detroit, where the worst violence occurred, rioting took place in districts covering approximately 
75 percent of city.  Thirty-four people were killed and more than 700 were injured.487  The 
dispersal of blacks into Bedford-Stuyvesant and Morrisania may well have prevented this level 
of violence and destruction in New York City. 
 
 
Brooklyn’s Little Harlem: Bedford-Stuyvesant in the 1940s   
 
The migration of blacks to New York City and the declining living conditions blacks 
experienced in Harlem ushered in significant demographic changes in Brooklyn during the 
1940s.  The racial composition of some Brooklyn neighborhoods – most notably Bedford-
Stuyvesant and Brownsville – changed.  There had been a small number of blacks living in 
Brooklyn since the turn of the century, however the creation of a single predominately black area 
of settlement in the borough occurred as a result of the large influx of blacks into central 
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Brooklyn and subsequent white flight in the World War II era. Bedford-Stuyveant became the 
second major area of black settlement in the city during the 1940s. 
Brooklyn from its establishment had black residents.  In the eighteenth century Brooklyn, 
like Manhattan had many slaves.488  Throughout the nineteenth century the population of blacks 
in Brooklyn increased, however the white population did as well, and by 1870 blacks comprised 
only 1.2 percent of Brooklyn’s population.  Brooklyn’s blacks did not live in one concentrated 
area of the borough, but were instead disbursed over various neighborhoods. 489  The elite black 
community in Brooklyn formed in the wake of the Draft Riots during the Civil War as 
Manhattan blacks moved to escape the violence.490   The most distinct black district emerged in 
the Weeksville-Carrsville community in present day Crown Heights.491  Brooklyn’s black 
population increased at a modest rate during the first two decades of the twentieth century.  As 
tens of thousands of blacks moved to New York during the Great Migration, the increase in the 
black population in Brooklyn lagged well behind the skyrocketing black population of 
Manhattan.  Subsequently Harlem became the center of black settlement in New York City and 
obscured the much smaller black communities in Brooklyn until the significant influx of black 
residents to Bedford Stuyvesant in the 1940s.492   
Though Bedford-Stuyvesant would not become a predominately black neighborhood 
until the end of the decade, blacks had lived in the Bedford area as slaves since its earliest 
development and by the turn of the twentieth century blacks resided along Atlantic Avenue from 
the western border of Bedford-Stuyvesant to Weeksville and beyond.  This settlement of blacks 
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in Bedford Stuyvesant was connected to the urbanization of the area in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century.  Between 1875 and 1900 the black population in the wards constituting the 
greater Bedford Stuyvesant area increased from 1,540 to over 7,000, accounting for over 40 
percent of Brooklyn’s black population by 1900.  Blacks lived in the homes along Atlantic 
Avenue and Fulton Street but did not find housing on the residential streets adjoining those 
major thoroughfares.  Despite the increase of black residents, Bedford-Stuyvesant remained 
overwhelmingly white in 1900.493   
Though most of Brooklyn’s black residents worked in unskilled low-paying jobs as 
domestics, janitors, common laborers, and servants; some blacks moved to the borough for better 
living conditions.  Brooklyn became known for its post-Civil War “aristocratic” Negro 
settlement as the Brooklyn Eagle noted the existence of a black elite they referred to as the 
“Negro 400.”  Better housing and less overt racism attracted a group of black leaders and 
intellectuals to the borough.  Affluent black residents founded institutions such as the Brooklyn 
Literary Union of the Siloam Presbyterian Church, the Concord Literary Circle, the Turner 
Lyceum and the Progressive Literary Union which engaged in concerts, lectures, and discussions 
in addition to running lending libraries.  Despite the absence of overt racism, whites in Brooklyn 
did not readily welcome African Americans into their neighborhoods.  The primary reason for 
white resistance to black residency was the anticipation of the devaluation of their property.494 
 World War I stimulated increased black migration as war production and deployment of 
soldiers served as pull factors attracting blacks to the North, and the boll weevil infestation and 
dropping cotton prices pushed southern farmers and sharecroppers out.  The flow of black 
southerners continued through the 1920s a decade in which the black communities in northern 
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urban centers were created.  In this period Brooklyn’s black population more than doubled from 
31,912 to 68,921.  Most of these migrants came from the South, and to a lesser degree the West 
Indies.  Brooklyn’s black population continued to be confined to the narrow axis extending along 
Fulton Street and Atlantic Avenue from the downtown and Fort Greene areas through the 
Bedford and Stuyvesant sections.495  Beyond these streets the districts of Bedford, Stuyvesant, 
and Crown Heights remained primarily white.496    
During the 1930s, the general northward migration of blacks slowed, but Brooklyn’s 
black population expanded at a more rapid rate than most northern urban centers.  Blacks moved 
into parts of Bedford-Stuyvesant adjoining the major avenues that were already dominated by 
blacks.497  The construction of the IND subway in the 1930s connected Harlem to Bedford-
Stuyvesant.  This new train line helped to promote the movement of blacks from Harlem into the 
area.  The new black residents lived mostly above stores on Fulton Street and Sumner Avenue.498  
This small community of black residents provided an alternative neighborhood for blacks who 
did not want to live in Harlem.  In the next decade Bedford-Stuyvesant became a black 
neighborhood.  61 percent of the borough’s black population resided in Bedford-Stuyvesant and 
as blacks moved in white residents moved to other neighborhoods.499 
Apartments became available for black settlement as whites left Bedford-Stuyvesant.  
Bedford-Stuyvesant was one of the older areas of Brooklyn that had emerged before extensive 
expansion of rapid transit.  Most of the housing had been constructed before 1900 and was 
growing old by 1930.  Newer more attractive housing was being built in areas such as Bay 
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Ridge, Coney Island, and Flatbush and new train lines were being constructed to these outlying 
areas.500  The availability of newer, affordable housing prompted white residents to leave 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, opening up space for black residents.  The actions of local real estate 
developers also contributed to the process of white flight. 
Real estate developers in the mid 1930s looked to recreate white middle class Bedford-
Stuyvesant, but their actions in the end facilitated black settlement.  Developers renovated area 
brownstones, believing that property values would increase with the construction of the Fulton 
Avenue subway line which would provide rapid transit to the area from Manhattan making the 
area attractive to white collar workers.  They also expected the subsequent dismantling of the el 
to raise property values.  These developers looked to renovate older one and two-family 
brownstones into more modern multifamily dwellings that would make more money for building 
owners therefore increasing property values as well.  These real estate developers mistakenly 
thought the higher rents they would charge for renovated apartments would discourage blacks 
from purchasing or renting homes in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Their plans backfired.  The subway 
construction and the temporary blight it brought to the neighborhood, as well as delayed 
dismantling of the el, contributed to decline in property values in Bedford-Stuyvesant 
precipitating white flight.  Moreover when the Fulton Avenue subway was finally completed it 
linked Bedford-Stuyvesant directly to Harlem while cutting the time of the commute nearly in 
half.  Therefore, blacks could live in the less crowded atmosphere of Bedford-Stuyvesant and yet 
be reasonably proximate to the entertainment of Harlem.501  The very changes white realtors 
believed would return Bedford-Stuyvesant to being a middle class white neighborhood actually 
encouraged black settlement.   
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White flight was further precipitated by New Deal policies of the 1930s.  New Deal era 
Federal Loan agencies began red-lining districts in an expanding New York City.  Subsequently, 
banks and loan agencies, most significantly the Home Owners Loan Corporation, began giving 
ratings to communities which were used to determine the property value as well as the ability of 
its residents to obtain loans for buying and renting homes.  Federal loan agencies gave the lowest 
ratings to areas with African American residents, causing property values to decline in these 
areas.  Moreover the agency steered federal funding for development away from these areas 
because of the low ratings, concentrating funding for new housing in outlying, middle class areas 
of Brooklyn.  As blacks moved into neighborhoods, whites moved to areas with better ratings 
which caused property values in black communities to decline.  White North Brooklyn residents 
were forced to choose between holding on to devalued property in declining areas and selling 
their homes and moving to perimeter districts with government guaranteed mortgages.  The red-
lining caused blacks to be trapped in the communities where they settled.  In New York those 
areas were Harlem and after the 1940s North-central Brooklyn.  In Brooklyn blacks had, prior to 
red-lining, been the least segregated ethnic group in the borough but were increasingly being 
relegated to a handful of neighborhoods.502  
The growing numbers of black defense workers in Brooklyn industries such as the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard (BNY) solidified the African-American presence in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  
Many black navy yard workers moved into the hundreds of rooming establishments that 
landlords subdivided out of the older houses in the neighborhood.  The Navy Yard, one of the 
largest war time employers in the city, was at the western end of the Bedford-Stuyvesant district 
and for some within walking distance.  As the population of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant grew 
so too did the number of blacks and minority workers employed by the Brooklyn Navy Yard.  
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During the war the Navy Yard employed approximately 5,500 people.  Many of these workers 
were temporary and most were let go at the war’s end.  However, because of the large presence 
of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant the Navy Yard again hired black workers after reconversion.  
By the time the Navy announced the closing of the Brooklyn yard in 1964 non-whites composed 
about 19 percent of the workforce (more than 1,900 employees).503   
The migration of blacks to Bedford-Stuyvesant ushered in some of the same problems 
that plagued Harlem.  One of the most pressing problems for Bedford-Stuyvesant’s black 
residents was high rents.  Landlords in the area charged the new black tenants higher rents to 
increase their profit.  In 1944 Louis Pink, the rent director of the New York City defense area, 
accused landlords of exploiting black residents by spending less money to maintain their rental 
properties while charging black residents higher rents than their former white tenants.  Bedford-
Stuyvesant proprietors looked to optimize their profit as they assumed that property values 
would depreciate rapidly as blacks moved into the neighborhood.  Moreover financial 
institutions were unwilling to make loans in these areas which also diminished property prices in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant.504 
Rents were so high in black areas of Brooklyn, that writer Richard Wright took the roll of 
aggrieved tenant when he led sixty-four families of a Brooklyn apartment building on a rent 
strike.  The Bedford-Stuyvesant building was converted for black tenancy and the building 
management increased rents by as much as $25 per month.  The Fansirene Realty Corporation, 
owner of the building, contended that it had made building improvements and on those grounds 
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petitioned the Office of Price Administration for the right to maintain the higher rents.  Wright 
and members of the building’s Tenant’s League, which he organized in the summer of 1943 soon 
after he moved into the building, were prepared to take the case to court.  They vowed not to pay 
a cent in rent until the corporation “puts the rent back … as the OPA ruled.”505  Though there is 
no evidence to point to the success of Wright and the tenant council’s initiative, the call to action 
by such a prominent figure points to the hardship the high rents placed on black tenants and the 
importance of the issue. 
Coinciding with the growth of the black population in Bedford-Stuyvesant was 
deterioration of the housing in that area.  As blacks moved into the neighborhood in greater 
numbers in the 1930s, realtors saw an opportunity to make profits by dividing homes into 
apartments and rooms for rent.  These realtors bought brownstones and homes and converted 
them into apartments for the new black residents.  Many of these homebuyers were absentee 
landlords who failed to maintain their properties, causing overcrowding and bad living 
conditions for the blacks who moved into their buildings.506  Despite the efforts of community 
groups to get federal authorities to take action against banks who made loans to these 
speculators, nothing was done.  This process continued through the 1930s and 1940s.  Homes 
continued to be subdivided and rented as apartments and private rooms.507  The living conditions 
got so bad that in 1941 tenants living in a tenement of Myrtle Avenue launched a rent strike to 
protest their living conditions.  There was no central heating in the building, and it had loose 
wiring, and gas and oil leaks.  Moreover the building was infested with roaches and rodents.508  
This was not the only building in the area with these kinds of sub-standard living conditions. 
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 As blacks continued to move into the area, Bedford-Stuyvesant became overcrowded and 
residents clamored for the construction of quality housing to alleviate some of the congestion.    
The result was the Kingsborough Houses, a public housing project located at Rochester Avenue 
and Bergen Street which opened in 1941.  Construction of the housing project was the direct 
result of a three-year fight by local civic and welfare organizations to better the conditions of the 
people living in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section.  Leading the campaign for this project was 
Albert Clarke, director of research for the Brooklyn Federation for Better Housing.  Clarke made 
a statistical survey of the conditions of blacks and whites in the uptown section of the 
neighborhood and submitted it to the New York City Housing Authority.  This report showed 
that congestion ills, juvenile delinquency, automobile accidents, lack of playground and 
recreational facilities, and overcrowding were the main contributors to the troubles arising in the 
vicinity.  With the belief that better housing would eliminate these problems, Clarke with the aid 
of Congressmen Emanuel Cellar and Andrew Sommers, kept the pressure on NYCHA until some 
effort was made to build better housing in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.509  In 1941 just outside 
of Bedford Stuyvesant, the New York City Housing Authority opened the Kingsborough houses.  
The complex consisted of over 1,100 units just blocks from Atlantic Avenue the center of black 
settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Situated on the then border of Bedford-Stuyvesant and Crown 
Heights near Weeksville the city intended to admit both black and white residents to the new 
housing complex.  Blacks occupied less than half the units and NYCHA remained committed to 
keeping the project open to white residents as well.  Though NYCHA had finally constructed a 
housing project that was integrated, this very integration decreased the number of units available 
to black residents in the Bedford-Stuyvesant and Crown Heights neighborhoods.  The complex 
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provided better quality housing units for blacks in the area, but not as many as advocates for 
better housing for Bedford-Stuyvesant’s blacks wanted.510   
Another problem blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant faced was school segregation.  As the 
black population of Brooklyn became increasingly concentrated in Bedford-Stuyvesant, de-facto 
segregation and the neighborhood school system prompted segregation in public schools as well.  
The Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) of PS 35 on McDonough Street, in Bedford-Stuyvesant 
charged that the Board of Education’s zoning fostered segregation and needed to be corrected.  
Board of Education zoning directed black children to PS 35 because it was located in a black 
neighborhood and its students overwhelmingly were black.  Even when there was a closer 
neighborhood school, black children were sent to School 35 because the school board wanted to 
keep black children in one school.  Black students residing just four blocks from PS 210 at 
Rochester Avenue and Park Place would have to travel approximately twelve blocks to attend PS 
35 while there were almost 1200 vacancies in PS 210.  The result was substandard conditions in 
School 35.  PS 35 was overcrowded and antiquated with lower grades holding classes in the 
dark, inadequate basement.511  These early efforts to desegregate public schools in Brooklyn 
were not successful.  Perhaps the focus of black civil rights organizations on equal employment 
caused them to delay activism on this issue.  School segregation remained a problem Brooklyn’s 
black leadership would confront in the 1960s.   
Social service agencies grew concerned that there were not enough recreational and 
community programs for the growing number of black residents in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  The 
Greater New York Fund asked the Riis House, a non-profit community organization in 
Manhattan aimed at ameliorating the living conditions of poor New Yorkers, to make a survey of 
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conditions in the area.  The November 1941 Riis House report showed bad economic, social, and 
health conditions and a high delinquency rate; an almost total lack of cultural and recreational 
facilities; and inadequate social agency activity, particularly among the black population, which 
resulted in “acute need for social service.”  The Board of Education (BOE), in cooperation with 
Riis House, offered after-school use of Public School 3 on Jefferson Avenue in Bedford 
Stuyvesant to serve as a part-time community center.  The BOE offered free custodial care and 
maintenance six days a week with boys’ and girls’ gymnasiums, game rooms, club rooms, stage 
and auditorium, health and dental clinics, and rooms for other activities, as well as several Works 
Progress Administration workers as assistants to the regular staff.  The Board of Education 
approved the idea and offered its cooperation while the Greater New York Fund promised money 
to implement Riis House’s recommendations.512   
As more and more African Americans moved to Bedford-Stuyvesant, the area 
increasingly became the subject of newspaper articles on black crime.  The New York Times 
printed articles highlighting the crimes committed in the sections of Brooklyn inhabited mainly 
by African Americans.  In the article on Harlem crime, complaints about crimes in the Bedford-
Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn were reported.  A rector at a Catholic church in the area 
complained that he cancelled evening services because parishioners were afraid to venture out at 
night.513  Crime in Brooklyn was again brought up in “Curbs on Crime in Kings Sought” in 
which the author suggested keeping Negro schools open during the evening hours for recreation 
so that black youths would be occupied instead of committing crime on the streets.514  White 
Brooklynites and publications linked the increase in black residency with increase in crime in the 
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Bedford-Stuyvesant district.  Whites in opposition to blacks living in the area cited increased 
crime as the reason for their antipathy. 
Crime and juvenile delinquency rates were indeed higher in Bedford Stuyvesant than in 
other areas of Brooklyn during the1940s and beyond.  According to the 1943 crime statistics for 
Brooklyn the ratio of Negro defendants was far higher than white defendants.  The crime rate for 
the Bedford Stuyvesant and Ft Greene Health Districts where many blacks lived was the highest 
in the borough.  Furthermore residents from these two areas committed 42 percent of all crimes 
in the borough.515  White opposition to black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant coalesced around 
the issues of black crime and juvenile delinquency to protest increasing black residency.    
The foundations for organized white opposition to black settlement in Bedford-
Stuyvesant during the 1940s were laid in the 1920s and 1930s.  One of the earliest leaders of 
white opposition to black residency in Bedford-Stuyvesant was Monsignor John Belford, the 
white pastor of the Roman Catholic Church of the Nativity.  He overtly advocated separate 
houses of prayer for each race.  Belford had come to the church in 1905 and as his parish faced 
the rising black population of Bedford-Stuyvesant and declining parish resources in 1922 he 
supported the erection of a separate Catholic church, St Peter Claver’s Church, for blacks in the 
neighborhood.  In his monthly parish newsletter Belford stated, “’our people do not want the 
Negroes in their church, in their homes or their neighborhood.”’ 516    
Belford continued his public campaign against black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  
In a 1939 letter to the Brooklyn Eagle, the Monsignor characterized the blacks moving into the 
area as ignorant, uncivilized, dirty, and destructive.  This was especially true of those coming 
from the south as “The South has kept the Negro in ignorance, superstition and vice.”  Belford 
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charged that assaults and crime committed by blacks in the area kept his parishioners from 
coming to service because they were afraid.  In his view the increasing black population 
adversely affected the quality of life for others living in the area.517   
White residents also organized to protest the decline in the property values in Bedford-
Stuyvesant.  Area whites formed the Midtown Civil League in 1938 to protect their interests in 
the neighborhood.  As stated by its president Sumner Sirtl, the organization’s primary purposes 
were to better conditions in the vicinity and stabilize declining real estate values, which was a 
direct result of the reluctance of mortgage companies to loan money to homeowners in the area 
due to the influx of Negro residents.518  Several leaders of the Civic League were prominent men 
in the Bedford-Stuyvesant community.  Sirtl was also the president of the board of directors of 
the Bedford YMCA, which would not allow black to use their pool.  Edward E Fay, a member of 
the League’s board of directors, was a United States Commissioner for the Eastern District of 
New York.519  Father Belford, Monsignor of the Roman Catholic Church of the Nativity in the 
neighborhoods cooperated and publicly supported the league.520   
The Civic League therefore focused on stopping black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  
Sirtl and other whites in the community proposed several ideas to keep blacks out of their 
neighborhood.  Sirtl urged that relief recipients, many of whom were black, be returned to their 
original townships.  He later joined with local realtors in advocating a segregated black 
community removed from direct contact with whites.521   
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African Americans accused the Civic League of even more nefarious activity to prevent 
black settlement.  According to the black press Sirtl led a group of the League’s members to the 
police department for pistol permits in an effort to threaten blacks living in the area.  Blacks also 
charged that when whites vacated houses in the Negro area, members of the League boarded 
them up to discourage blacks from moving in. 522  According to Reverend Theophilus Alcantara, 
an area minister and aspiring black politician in Brooklyn, the Civic League aimed to prevent 
blacks from holding property in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section by cooperating with area 
bankers who pressed the few black property owners in the area for early payment of the interest 
on their mortgages in an effort to make them default on their loans and lose their homes.  
Alcantara also accused white Brooklyn politicians of cooperating with the Midtown Civic and 
supporting their efforts to drive blacks out of Bedford Stuyvesant.523  Black community leaders 
also accused the civic league of circulating incendiary “propaganda calculated to stir up feelings 
against blacks.”524   
Racial tensions in Bedford Stuyvesant came to the fore in both the community and the 
press in the wake of the Harlem Riot.  In August 1943 the Midtown Civic League pressured the 
King’s County Grand Jury to study the condition of blacks living in Brooklyn, particularly the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant area.525  The Kings County Grand Jury charged the La Guardia 
administration with failure to check the crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  These charges, according 
to the NAACP, was a political attack on Mayor La Guardia who they thought was soft on 
Negroes and a racial attack on Bedford-Stuyvesant’s African Americans.526  After hearing more 
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than 100 witnesses, most of whom were white, the Grand Jury presented a grim picture of the 
living conditions in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  The jury claimed that lawlessness pervaded the area, 
that school children had been robbed and mistreated, and that the area was too dangerous for 
residents to travel after dark.527  According to the report gangs of hoodlums had assaulted, 
robbed, insulted and murdered innocent, law abiding people and prostitution marred a section of 
the area.  It also alleged that many of the area residents were on relief illegally.   
In a scathing condemnation of the La Guardia administration, the grand jury attributed 
these conditions to the insufficient number of police in the area.   They recommended that the 
city flood the area with law enforcement to solve the problem.  In addition, the jurors suggested 
the mayor add special auxiliary patrolmen drawn from the law-abiding citizens of the area.  The 
presentment also stated that a lack of spiritual training for area youth and lack of parental 
supervision also contributed to the lawlessness.  The Grand Jury demanded city and state 
regulatory and administrative agencies fix conditions in the area.528   
The recommendations of the Grand Jury were never pursued, but there was an enduring 
legacy that left negative popular perceptions of the area.  Perhaps in an attempt to downplay the 
role of race in their findings, the changing racial character of the area only received passing 
notice in the report.  However, if whites did not consciously do so already, they now increasingly 
identified Bedford-Stuyvesant as a Negro slum.529 
For well over a month the investigation, report, and reactions produced front-page 
headlines in the local press so that few citizens were likely to remain unaware of the area’s 
evolving demographics and problems.530  In the face of the World War II migration other whites 
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believed the area crime and vice was an outgrowth of black migration to the city.  In 1943 some 
whites voiced these feelings at a meeting held by the Midtown Civic League which was attended 
by both black and white Brooklynites.  At the meeting many whites called on Governor Dewey 
to fire Mayor La Guardia.  A white off-duty police officer from Brooklyn blamed black migrants 
for the social problems in Bedford-Stuyvesant, attributing the crime wave to “’the influx of 
sunburned citizens who come up from the deep South mistaking liberty for license.’”531  In his, 
and countless others’, view black migrants from the south were one of the major causes of crime 
and delinquency throughout the city.  Sirtl’s arguments against black settlement belied a racist 
undertone expressed by others. 
  Father Belford, like Sirtl, continued to place the blame for increased crime and vice in 
the area squarely on the shoulders of black residents.  Belford was not shy in expressing this 
belief not only to whites in the area but to blacks as well.  In an interview with the Amsterdam 
News Belford said that he believed one way to make matters better in the area was to “Quit 
teaching Negroes biology and instead teach them how to use modern home conveniences, how to 
live in a civilized community.”  Belford claimed that was not a “Negro hater” and said that he 
did not want to punish anyone but also admitted that he believed the majority of Negroes who 
have moved into Bedford-Stuyvesant were destructive, and that they further wrecked property 
that was already partially dilapidated.  In his estimation, the perhaps the best remedy was to 
colonize blacks in an agricultural area of the state where “they could learn how to live and act 
like other people.”532  Clearly in these statements Belford laid blame to conditions in Bedford-
Stuyvesant not just to the presence of blacks but to their depraved character. 
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 The Grand Jury’s report was also tinged with racist undertones, although it never 
explicitly named race as the reason for the crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Despite the fact that the 
report claimed it was not a race problem, the authors were sure to point out that the area was 
predominately inhabited by Negroes.533  Algernon Black, the chairman of the City-Wide 
Citizen’s Committee on Harlem, acknowledged the racial assumptions and implications within 
the report.  Black issued a statement saying that the Kings County grand jury statement “on the 
face of it [is] a severe indictment of the Negro community in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.  
However the grand jury has apparently failed to take into consideration the underlying social and 
economic causes giving rise to such conditions.”  Black specifically pointed out the restricted 
economic opportunities as a major reason for conditions in Bedford-Stuyvesant. 534  Though 
disagreeing with the causes of the situation in Brooklyn, Algernon Black agreed that social 
services provided by the city administration would be the best solution.   
Given the racism underlying the arguments made in the Grand Jury’s findings it is no 
surprise that African American leaders, organizations, and press condemned the report.  Walter 
White acknowledged that social problems did exist in Bedford-Stuyvesant, but argued that the 
jury’s report ignored the great number of law-abiding, church-going, home-owning black 
citizens who have been calling for remedial action on the conditions which produced the crime 
plaguing the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.  In his view the report criminalized the entire black 
population in the area when in fact those committing crimes comprised only a portion of the 
blacks living in the area.535  The National Negro Congress and the Bedford-Stuyvesant Congress 
of Industrial Organizations Community Council held a meeting to protest against the Kings 
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County grand jury report.536  Herbert Miller, Executive secretary of the Carlton Avenue YMCA 
appointed a committee of seven to conduct its own investigation of conditions in the Bedford-
Stuyvesant area to repudiate any statement which was falsely made by the Grand Jury.  They 
were also to prepare and make recommendations as to how residents of the community could 
better conditions.537   
The Amsterdam News criticized the Grand Jury for having no black jurors and only one 
black witness, George Wibecan, during the investigation.  The author of that article complained 
that the Grand Jury gave no credence to the testimony of Wibecan who pointed out the 
underlying reasons for crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Wibecan, a postal employee and former 
assistant to the late borough President Raymond Ingersoll, was a longtime resident and home 
owner in the area.  He was also a community activist and local political leader.  In his testimony 
Wibecan recounted the history of Brooklyn’s blacks blaming relegation of blacks into the 
Bedford-Stuyvesant ghetto with high rents and dilapidated living conditions as one reason for 
crime in the area.  Wibecan also criticized blacks for not working together to ameliorate the 
situation.538  The Grand Jury’s findings ignored Wibecan’s views and the structural and social 
causes contributing to crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant.   
Black newspapers published articles that proposed solutions to the underlying problems 
that fostered crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Acknowledging the crime in the Bedford-Stuyvesant 
section, the editors of the Amsterdam News ran an article laying out eight ways to resolve the 
issue.  The editors believed that if the city made provisions to lower over-crowding in schools to 
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improve education and constructed more play areas and recreation centers, and to supervise 
children better; juvenile delinquency would decline.  They also suggested the city disband the 
Midtown Civic League or make it operate as an interracial organization in order to better race 
relations in the area.  Editors believed the police department should hire more black patrolmen 
and detectives familiar with the area to precincts in the uptown (Bedford-Stuyvesant) area in 
order to improve relations between black residents and law enforcement and prevent police 
brutality.  The newspaper also recommended rent regulation to deal with the problem of inflated 
rents in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  The newspaper editors also suggested the uptown groups unify to 
create a plan to remedy the problems of Bedford-Stuyvesant for the majority of those decent, 
law-abiding people living there.539 
Like the black newspapers, Father S. J. Campion a priest at St. Peter Claver’s Church, the 
only Roman Catholic Church serving African Americans in the borough, believed structural 
social and economic problems were the main causes of delinquency and crime in the area.  He 
was quoted in the Amsterdam News as saying that until blacks were treated better in this country, 
given better economic opportunities, access to better living conditions and recreation facilities, 
they were bound to protest through crime and delinquency.  Campion believed the “so called 
outbreak of lawlessness in this area is but a symptom of the alarming growth of delinquency in 
every city of the country… due to war conditions.”  An opponent of the actions and ideology of 
Monsignor Belford, he believed it was unfair to put the blame for increasing crime and 
delinquency in the area solely on African Americans.540   
The social service solutions proposed by local African American leaders and Father 
Campion were also proposed by social welfare organizations.  The Brooklyn Council For Social 
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Planning, a consultative body whose membership was comprised of approximately eighty 
welfare agencies, recommended creation of a constructive social welfare program to alleviate 
crime and deteriorating social conditions in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Shortages in the field of family 
welfare and the lack of a health center within the district were among the worst problems.  The 
council suggested better housing, construction of a health center building, additional public 
playgrounds and parks, school community centers, new and modern school buildings and more 
services from voluntary social agencies for the area.541  .   
As social service agencies, the black press, and Father Campion proposed solutions 
addressing the structural problems causing crime and delinquency in Bedford-Stuyvesant, they 
also attempted to debunk ideas that these conditions were caused by the inherent nature of 
African Americans.  These ideas which were expressed by Sumner Sirtl, Father Belford, and 
other whites in Brooklyn helped sour race relations in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  The New York City 
Urban League increasingly focused its efforts on alleviating the racial tensions in the 
neighborhood.  In a 1945 fundraising pamphlet the New York Urban League asserted that they 
were working towards the alleviation of racial tensions through cooperation with the War 
Manpower Commission, police, industry owners and war agencies to improve employment 
opportunities, working conditions, and housing for blacks.   In its projected budget for the 
coming year almost half of the regional budget of $55,285 was allocated to Brooklyn, with 
Manhattan having the second largest allocation followed by Queens, the Bronx and Staten 
Island. 542  As it had since its founding, the New York Urban League in 1945 focused its efforts 
on helping southern migrants adjust to their new surroundings in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Clearly 
the Urban League clearly believed the increasing black population of Brooklyn required their 
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attention to alleviate the problems of African Americans in the developing black communities of 
Brooklyn. 
Despite the heightened racial tension in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn remained an 
attractive place for African Americans to settle.  According to Brooklyn Urban League Executive 
Secretary Robert Elzy, Brooklyn was not such a bad place for blacks in the latter half of the war.  
In 1944 Brooklyn was showing a sharp and increasingly steady decline in unemployed blacks 
and an increase in the numbers and types of jobs available to them.  Housing conditions for 
blacks in Brooklyn were like those available in other centers of black concentration.543  Elzy 
articulated the view of many of the blacks moving into Bedford-Stuyvesant. 
Despite the many problems plaguing Bedford-Stuyvesant’s residents, in the perspective 
of blacks it was a better alternative than Harlem in the 1940s.  Though blacks paid higher rents 
than whites to live in Bedford-Stuyvesant and the housing there was beginning to deteriorate, 
blacks moving to New York believed they could make a better life in Brooklyn than they could 
in Harlem.  According to an article published in the Amsterdam News the housing available in 
Brooklyn was better than that in Harlem and that the “homes are rated high” in the Bedford-
Stuyvesant area making that community one of the best rated in the city.  Though landlords 
aimed to make a profit from the higher rents they could get from black tenants, the Amsterdam 
News commended realtors in the area for finding apartments for black tenants, thus making the 
migration of blacks to Brooklyn possible.  In 1940 African Americans considered the Bedford 
Stuyvesant sector a prominent area with middle class black residents living there with buildings 
“remodeled on numerous occasions, and clean, modern homes were made available for 
boroughites.”  The article made clear that there was a vast difference between the flourishing 
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Bedford-Stuyvesant and Brownsville, the “sore spot in Brooklyn.”544  The author of this article 
made it plain that the blacks who migrated to Bedford-Stuyvesant could make a good life for 
themselves there. 
During the 1920s and 1930s Bedford-Stuyvesant emerged as the center of black Brooklyn 
and by the start of the 1940s Bedford-Stuyvesant had become the center of the borough’s black 
middle class.  The Brooklyn branches of the NAACP and Urban League, bastions of the black 
middle class, were located in Bedford Stuyvesant.  The Brooklyn NAACP was controlled by the 
borough’s black elite and did not focus on grassroots organization.  Its activities were generally 
non-confrontational, taking the form of voter registration drives, political lobbying, and 
campaigns against police brutality.  The local branch avoided movements supporting working-
class blacks.  Neither of these organizations was active in the Brownsville community where 
many of the borough’s lower class blacks lived.  Many Bedford-Stuyvesant residents perceived 
black Brownsville as low-class, and the area’s crime did nothing to decrease these prejudices.545   
Brownsville had been a working class community from its early years.  The area was full 
of low-lying marshes that were prone to flooding and had few aesthetic attractions and industrial 
development in the area discouraged middle and upper class settlement.  Though the 
neighborhood’s housing was shoddily constructed, in the mid nineteenth century living there was 
still a better alternative than living in the congested conditions of the Lower East Side of 
Manhattan.  By the turn of the twentieth century Brownsville was primarily inhabited by 
working-class Jewish immigrants who worked in textile factories.  Brownsville was home to 
working class blacks since the 1910s.  In the 1910s Brownsville expanded to the west and south, 
and many residents moved to buildings in the new sections.  Working-class blacks, desperate for 
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housing in a crowded Harlem, moved into these ageing and deteriorating buildings.546  As in 
other urban areas, the black population of Brownsville exploded during the 1940s as an effect of 
the World War II migration of blacks to the area.  Race relations in Brownsville were tranquil in 
comparison to other cities as black and white activists successfully fostered interracial 
acceptance and coexistence there. 547   Despite the good race relations the shoddy and dilapidated 
housing in Brownsville prompted blacks with the financial means to settle in Bedford-Stuyvesant 
instead.  
Even those blacks who lived in older black enclaves in other areas of Brooklyn moved to 
Bedford-Stuyvesant to improve their living conditions.  Some of Brooklyn’s black residents 
moved to Bedford Stuyvesant to escape the poor quality housing they inhabited in the downtown 
area of Brooklyn.  Many buildings downtown had been converted into furnished rooms occupied 
by more than two persons with the cooking done in the same room.  In some houses toilet 
facilities were in the yard, though generally they were in the hall with had as many as four 
families sharing one toilet.  Given the poor quality of housing in the downtown area, it is not 
surprising that blacks fled to new neighborhoods when they could.  The buildings in Bedford-
Stuyvesant offered more substantial construction and better living conditions.548   
Many of the migrants moving to Bedford Stuyvesant were middle-class and stable 
working-class blacks while poorer working class blacks moving to Brooklyn settled in 
Brownsville in the 1940s.  This created a more homogenous black population in Bedford-
Stuyvesant.  Little discussion appeared in black publications about class conflict between 
working and middle class black residents in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Perhaps Bedford-Stuyvesant’s 
blacks suppressed class differences as they faced organized white protests to black settlement.  In 
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their indictments of the character of African Americans, whites residents like Sumner Sirtl and 
Father Belford did not make a distinction between middle and working class blacks; therefore it 
is conceivable that blacks did not either.   
The influx of blacks into Bedford-Stuyvesant allowed African Americans in the borough 
to have more political power at the local level.  As Brooklyn’s blacks were more concentrated 
into a few districts in the borough, they could elect African Americans to local offices.  Before 
the 1940s local politicians rarely solicited the black vote because it would not make a difference 
in the election.  The black population for the most part was not big enough to vote in a bloc and 
therefore rarely determined the outcome of local contests.549  Given the geographic segregation 
in Brooklyn and the relatively small size of assembly districts which rendered racial 
gerrymandering more difficult, black candidates were successful in local elections by the late 
1940s.  Bertram Baker led the breakthrough of blacks into borough politics when he was elected 
to the State Assembly in 1948.  Electoral victories in contests for municipal judgeships and City 
Council followed in the 1950s and as blacks took over local party machinery political patronage 
added more blacks to government positions.550  Therefore the migration and the concentration of 
blacks into Bedford-Stuyvesant increased their local blacks’ political power in the years to come. 
  The demographic shifts of the 1940s indelibly changed the face of black Brooklyn.  The 
influx of African Americans into the Bedford-Stuyvesant area had soured race relations, 
prompted an unsuccessful attempt by white organizations to bar black settlement, and had 
precipitated white flight.  By 1950 blacks no longer lived in dispersed communities throughout 
the borough and the black population of Brooklyn had become concentrated in Bedford-
Stuyvesant.  Three quarters of the 200,000 residents in this formerly all white area were black.  
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Despite emerging social problems like high crime and delinquency rates, inadequate community 
recreation and resources, high rents and dilapidated housing, Bedford-Stuyvesant remained a 
better alternative to Harlem and Brownsville for middle and working class blacks in the city.  
The new demographic trends begun in the 1940s solidified during the 1950s resulting in the area 
becoming “solidly black as Central Harlem.” 551  By 1960 Bedford-Stuyvesant like Harlem had 
become a code word for everything black.552 
   
Movin’ on Up: Morrisania in the 1940s 
Though the largest number of blacks settling outside of Harlem chose to make Bedford-
Stuyvesant their home, some looked northward to the Bronx for reprieve from Harlem’s 
overcrowding and high rents.  Hundreds of Harlem’s black families began moving out of the 
historic center of black settlement and into the southwest Bronx in the hopes of finding cheaper 
rents and better living conditions.  To many Harlem residents the Bronx provided nicer 
apartments for less money, as well as better schools and more fresh air.  An area in the 
southwestern Bronx, a section referred to today as Morrisania, became home to thousands of new 
black residents as families relocated from Harlem.  During the 1940s most African Americans 
moving to the Bronx settled in the area from 161st Street to 169th Street and from Franklin to 
Prospect Avenues.  African Americans also lived in the blocks adjacent to the area of heaviest 
black settlement.553  These new residents significantly changed the demographics of Morrisania.  
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African Americans and Puerto Ricans joined, and in some instances displaced, the German, 
Jewish, Italian, and Eastern European residents of the area.554     
The Boulevard-Prospect area, located directly east of today’s Morrisania, exemplified the 
demographic changes that occurred in the south Bronx during the 1940s.555  This area, which had 
been overwhelmingly white at the start of the decade, became an interracial neighborhood by the 
end of the decade.  Boulevard-Prospect, also called East Morrisania and Crotona Park, was 95 
percent white in 1940.  More than a third of the area’s white residents were foreign born, mostly 
from Russia, Poland and other areas of southeastern Europe.  The majority of Boulevard-
Prospect residents were wage earners employed in skilled trades, crafts, clerical, and sales jobs.  
Generally, those living in the area were not as affluent as the general populations of the Bronx or 
New York City.  In 1940 the black population in the area was only 4 percent.  Despite the small 
black population at the start of the decade, there was evidence of a higher concentration of black 
residents in Boulevard-Prospect than in other Bronx neighborhoods.556  It was into this 
neighborhood that middle-class blacks moved in the early 1940s causing the number and 
concentration of African Americans to increase throughout the decade. 
African Americans were joined by Puerto Ricans, who also moved into East Morrisania.  
At that time, when school enrollment was indicative of the racial composition of neighborhoods, 
both African American and Puerto Rican school enrollment increased in area public schools.    
By mid-decade 40 percent of school children were from these new groups.  This was a 
substantial change.  Just seven years earlier in 1938 only 3 percent of the total school population 
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in the Boulevard Prospect area had been black.   East Morrisania transformed from an area that 
was racially homogenous into one that was “racially diverse.”557 
Most of the blacks moving to the area in the 1940s were from Harlem.  Many of those 
black families who moved in the late 1930s and early 1940s were relatively well-off black 
workers.  According to occupation classifications these workers would have been classified as 
working class, but they held steady jobs in occupations other than service jobs or unskilled labor, 
the traditional areas of black employment.  Many of the black men moving to Morrisania were 
postal workers or building superintendents.  Historian Mark Naison observed that there were two 
general paths African American families took in coming to the Bronx.  The first was that the man 
of the household got a job as a Pullman porter or postal worker in the borough.  The other was 
that black families moved into apartments in the Bronx because the man of the household 
worked as the superintendent of the building.558  In these ways many blacks found the economic 
means and available housing to relocate to Morrisania. 
Evelyn Melrose’s family exemplified the process by which Morrisania’s early black 
residents came to the area.  The family moved to 1618 Washington Avenue in the 1930s.  
Evelyn’s father worked as a mail handler in the post office on Tremont Avenue and took a 
second job as the building superintendent in a mainly Jewish building.    Her mother who was 
originally from the south did not work.  According to Evelyn there had been a nation-wide drive 
to recruit postal workers prompting many of her fathers’ male friends to come to New York to 
work for the post office.  The post office required that workers live in the neighborhood in which 
they worked, so those African Americans assigned to post offices in the south Bronx found that 
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acting as the super in buildings was the only way they could obtain apartments in the area.  
Evelyn’s father took the superintendent job as a means to get an apartment in the neighborhood 
because at that time most landlords were not renting to black tenants.559  It was, in part, through 
the position of building super that black residency in the Bronx became possible. 
Many other black families used similar means to facilitate their move to the Bronx.  
Ronald Marshall’s parents who were born in Savannah, Georgia, had moved to Connecticut 
during the 1930s.  His father took the civil service exam to work in the post office, and upon 
passing the test moved to 3rd Avenue in the Bronx in the late 1930s.  The family moved again to 
a building on Franklin Avenue between 166th and 167th Streets in 1941.  Ronald’s father also 
took a part time job as a superintendent of two buildings in the neighborhood.  Ronald’s paternal 
uncle also moved to the Bronx and took a civil service exam to be a sanitation worker.560  The 
draw of better paying employment through government offices and civil service jobs drew blacks 
to New York and the Bronx in particular.   
Like Ronald Marshall, his wife Gloria was a childhood resident of the Bronx.  She moved 
there with her family in the early 1940s.  Her family had lived in an apartment in Harlem but 
moved to the Bronx when her father was offered a position as a building superintendent.  So the 
family moved to the building her father worked in on Franklin Avenue between 167th and 168th 
Street.  In addition to his duties as building super, Gloria’s father also worked as a security guard 
for First National City Bank (which later became Citibank).  Gloria’s mother was a housewife 
who sometimes took part time jobs at the supermarket if the family needed extra money.561  
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Having a father with a stable blue collar job and a housewife mother signified that Gloria 
Marshall’s family was of middle class status.    
Elias Karmon, a Morrisania store owner at the time, observed that black women in the 
neighborhood had desk jobs, were teachers, and worked in the garment factories on nearby 
Westchester Avenue.  He also recalled that the men were mostly blue collar workers – many 
worked for the railroad and in the post office.  According to Karman, whose store had a large 
black clientele, many of Morrisania’s black residents had good stable jobs earning respectable 
and reliable wages.562  Many of the jobs his black patrons held were well paying union jobs not 
widely available to blacks prior to this time.  
Several of the areas longest black residents were professionals.  They included physicians 
Lowell Wormley and Athelstone Giddens; the president of the Bronx Women’s Council, Dr. 
Martha Seabrook; prominent realtors George James, James Johnson and Marcell Owens; and 
New York State auditor Alvin Morris.563  Long-time Morrisania resident Robert Gumbs’ father 
worked as an operating engineer for the US government taking care of internal maintenance of 
buildings.564  Gumbs’ father, like many other black men living in Morrisania, worked in an 
occupation uncommon for most African Americans in the 1940s.565   
The hundreds of African American families who moved to the Bronx in the 1940s 
considered Morrisania a better alternative to Harlem and believed settling in the area was an 
opportunity to improve their living conditions.  This was not just an opinion held by blacks in the 
1940s.  Many earlier residents of the vicinity viewed the area in a similar fashion.  Morrisania 
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was one of the earliest developed sections of the Bronx and after the turn of the twentieth century 
was ethnically and economically diverse.  It was a well-established area with homes, stores, and 
businesses and eventually developed into an area with diverse types of housing such as 
tenements, frame row houses, and brick flats.  At the turn of the twentieth century the 
construction of the Third Avenue el provided rapid and reliable transportation to the area which 
enticed developers to construct residential housing and attracted Manhattanites to settle in East 
Morrisania.  This increase in population prompted construction of new apartment buildings. 
Therefore in the early 1900s housing in the Bronx was plentiful, and of relatively high quality.  
Bronx apartments were usually newer, cleaner, and less expensive than those in Manhattan; 
conditions that attracted residents to the area.566    
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Bronx came to represent upward mobility for 
various ethnic, racial, and socio-economic groups in New York City.  The new demand for 
housing and a postwar construction boom prompted developers to construct new buildings in the 
1920s.  These new buildings and complexes were geared towards the middle class.  New middle 
class neighborhoods sprang up along University, Morris, Bainbridge and Sedgwick Avenues and 
along the Pelham and Mosholu Parkways.  This spate of construction continued into the 1930s 
and 1940s.  The new apartments attracted an upwardly mobile, status-conscious group to the 
area.567  Since housing was a reflection of social standing for status-conscious New Yorkers, as 
Bronxites became more prosperous they moved to better neighborhoods within the borough and 
eventually out of the Bronx to Westchester.  As the residents of the South Bronx moved to newer 
apartments in emerging middle class neighborhoods, those of lower social standing and 
economic means took the opportunity to move into the apartments the upwardly mobile left 
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vacant.  As a result lower income groups found housing vacated by those who had moved up in 
status allowing better living conditions to trickle down to lower-income Bronx residents.  
African Americans from Harlem took the opportunity to move into newly available apartments 
in South Bronx buildings.568  The Bronx “had become one of the places to which one moved in 
order to improve living standards,” a fact that prompted some important demographic shifts in 
both the borough and the city.569 
While many of the new middle class neighborhoods in the borough were growing, the 
South Bronx was not because none of the new construction took place there.  In fact in the 1920s 
the population in Morrisania’s oldest sections declined as residents moved into the borough’s 
newer neighborhoods.  After the 1920s only the Hunts Point-Crotona Park East area experienced 
increases in population as a result of the expansion of the Lexington Avenue subway line.  Some 
residents of the South Bronx moved out of the neighborhood and across the Bronx River as 
transportation became available with the extension of the subway.  The steady loss of residents 
was only reversed on the blocks where African Americans seeking better living conditions 
moved.570  Despite the multifamily housing, the constant residential mobility, aging housing, and 
the urban density; to many New Yorkers including African Americans the Bronx was an 
attractive place to live.  To black New Yorkers the South Bronx represented an opportunity to 
live better. 
The availability of better quality housing in the Bronx motivated many blacks to move 
out of Harlem.  Though there were sections of Boulevard-Prospect which were blighted and 
others on the downgrade in the 1940s, the housing there was generally better than that in many 
sections of Manhattan.  Most buildings in the South Bronx were built after the Tenement 
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Housing Laws of 1901, and thus constructed according to those standards of light, air, sanitation, 
and safety regulations.  Though the buildings were relatively new, lack of structural repairs 
impaired the soundness of the edifices and created safety hazards.  Statistics indicated wide-
spread neglect of structures in the Boulevard-Prospect area.  Most residents of the area, black 
and white, rented apartments.  Only 2 percent of area residents owned homes and less than one 
percent of those owner occupied homes were owned by blacks.571  Even though the buildings and 
houses of the South Bronx were in various states of disrepair, the living conditions they provided 
were better than those available to blacks living in Harlem.   
The majority of black families moving into Morrisania came from Harlem.  
Contemporary reports of real estate brokers in the Bronx estimated that 200 to 300 black families 
were moving into Morrisania each month during 1942.  The homes into which most of these 
families moved were private houses and apartments formerly occupied by Jewish, Italian, and 
Irish families who moved out as blacks moved in.  According to long-time black residents of the 
area, the buildings blacks moved into were in fairly good condition, some in excellent condition.  
There were a few tall apartment buildings and numerous private houses which afforded black 
residents more air and sunlight than the apartments in Harlem.  When several families new to the 
area were asked why they had moved from Harlem, they replied cheaper rents, a better 
environment and better schools.572  One such family was Cyril DeGrasse Tyson’s family who 
moved to Morrisania in the late 1930s in search of better living conditions. 
Cyril DeGrasse Tyson’s family immigrated from the West Indies during the First World 
War.  Originally settling in the San Juan Hill neighborhood in midtown Manhattan, Tyson’s 
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family moved to Harlem in 1934 and again to Morrisania in 1938.  Tyson recalls his family 
moving often in search of better housing, better quality schools, and a nicer community.  Many 
of the Jews living at the nexus of Prospect and Westchester Avenues in Morrisania were moving 
northward towards Pelham Park.  According to Tyson, some of those leaving the neighborhood 
kept their buildings and began renting to blacks.  Initially these landlords were very selective in 
choosing their tenants.  His family moved to a building on Longwood Avenue between Prospect 
and Westchester Avenues.  When they arrived the inhabitants of the area were mostly Jewish and 
the janitors were Irish and German.  As more and more blacks moved into the building the 
landlords stopped maintaining it and the Tyson family moved after three years to a building on 
Kelly Street between Intervale and Longwood Streets.  At that time Kelly Street was inhabited 
by mostly white residents but they had begun moving out.573   
Rosemary Brown’s family also moved to the Bronx to improve their quality of day to day 
life.  The Browns moved to the Bronx in 1940, because Rosemary’s father felt Morrisania would 
provide a safer environment to raise his large family of nine, “And, at the time the Bronx was the 
place for African American families.”  Upwardly mobile black families looked to the Bronx as a 
place to find better schools, nicer apartments, and safer conditions.  Her parents decided to move 
there after hearing testimonies from a family they knew who had moved to Morrisania.   The 
Brown family moved to a three-bedroom apartment on Prospect Avenue and 168th Street.574   
The availability of parks and other green spaces in Morrisania also attracted upwardly 
mobile Harlemites to the area.  Hetty Fox, a Morrisania resident, remembered her neighborhood 
as being lovely with trees lining Prospect Avenue – the main thoroughfare and shopping district 
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at the time.575  Many of Morrisania’s early black residents recall Crotona Park as a beautiful area 
where they enjoyed various types of recreation.  Of particular note among several Morrisania 
residents was the swimming pool in the park where they learned to swim.576  In fact Rosemary 
Brown’s most vivid memory of her childhood neighborhood was of the trees.577  Robert Gumbs’ 
family moved from Harlem to Morrisania in 1941 after a doctor advised his mother to do so 
because the “air was cleaner” in the Bronx.  Robert remembered the Bronx, and his street Lyman 
Place, as being very quiet.  He described his childhood as “comfortable” as children played 
stickball in the street and he went to the after-school centers to play basketball.578  The parents of 
these and many other families moved from Harlem to Morrisania to improve their family’s 
quality of life. 
As more and more blacks moved from Harlem to the Bronx, the new African American 
population began to build the bastions of community, none of which was more important than 
the church.  One indication that a black community was developing in Morrisania was the 
opening of the Russell Institutional Christian Methodist Episcopal Church in December 1942.  
The church which had a black congregation was purchased from the white Fulton Avenue 
Baptist Church.  Speaking at a service at the church Frederick A Wurtzback, president of the 
Bronx County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, told the audience that the 
church was sold because it could no longer render a service to its members who had moved out 
                                                 
575
 Interview of Hetty Fox, conducted by Mark Naison, Mark Smith, and Richard Richardson. N.d. Bronx African 
American History Project. 
576
 Interview of Hetty Fox, conducted by Mark Naison, Mark Smith, and Richard Richardson and Ronald and Gloria 
Marshall interview, conducted by Mark Naison May 2, 2005. Bronx African American History Project. 
577
 Interview of Rosemary Brown by Mark Naison, April 21, 2005. Bronx African American History Project. 
578
 Interview of Robert Gumbs by Mark Naison, Mark Smith, and Rachel Donaldson, n.d., Bronx African American 
History Project. 
248 
 
  
of the area.  Wurtzback believed that the new church would provide great services to what had 
become in his view a black community.579 
Morrisania’s early black residents do not recall racial tensions upon moving to the area.  
When she moved with her family in the mid-1930s, Margery Nichols felt the neighborhood was 
safe and never feared walking around even at night.  She did not remember experiencing racial 
tensions living there.580  Hetty Fox, another childhood resident, remembered that when her 
family moved into the neighborhood, two white girls teased her by telling her she didn’t belong 
in the neighborhood.  However Mrs. Fox explained that after that initial incident the girls didn’t 
give her any more trouble and eventually became friends.581   Ronald Marshall recalled that 
people of different ethnicities lived in his neighborhood but did not remember much racial 
tension.  Jewish, Italian, and German families lived on his block, but because each ethnic group 
pretty much stayed to themselves there was no racial tension that he could remember.  Ronald 
Marshall’s wife, Gloria Marshall also described her multi-racial block on Franklin Avenue.  She 
explained that Germans, Irish, and Poles, lived with African Americans in the neighborhood and 
most were friendly.582  
Many local blacks were proud to live in a multi-racial neighborhood.  In 1942 Mr. and 
Mrs. Edward Macy, who as sixty-two year residents of the area claimed to be the Bronx’s oldest 
black family, proudly noted in a 1942 newspaper interview that there were often interracial 
multi-dwelling buildings in the Bronx.583  The Amsterdam News also praised Morrisania in 1943 
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because the residents of this interracial community got along remarkably well.  Though there 
were some racial incidents and confrontations, many residents interviewed by Amsterdam News 
reporters found it hard to believe that any racially motivated conflicts or violence occurred 
between black and white residents.584   
White Morrisania residents also valued the interracial unity of the neighborhood.  More 
than 6,000 people representing every racial group in the Bronx gathered in a patriotic rally to 
support the war during a summer of intense racial antagonism across the country.  Revered Elder 
Hawkens, pastor of the St. Augustin’s Presbyterian Church said at the rally, “We will defeat the 
Axis only through unity.”585  The meeting tried to evoke solidarity among Morrisania’s residents 
as racial tensions escalated in cities all over the nation in the summer of 1943.   The integration 
and relative unity among of the residents of Morrisania may have been connected to the fact that 
many of the early black residents were middle-class families who shared many of the same 
middle-class values and the social norms as those whites already living in Morrisania. 
Though African Americans found better living conditions in the South Bronx, the 
migration of blacks to the area produced some negative effects.  As the complexion of 
Morrisania changed, many residents of the area became unhappy with their neighborhood.  A 
major concern for the Morrisania community in the 1940s was the lack of recreational facilities 
for the expanding population of black youth.  Several also complained of inefficient police 
protection at night.  A 1946 report commissioned by the Mayor’s Committee on Unity (MCOU) 
attributed the higher rates of delinquency among Puerto Rican and black adolescents in 
Morrisania, in part, to the lack of adequate recreation facilities for the increasing number of 
youths in the South Bronx.  According to the recognized contemporary standards of the National 
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Recreation Association, East Morrisania’s recreation facilities met the needs of only 7,500 
youths instead of the 51,000 children and adolescents living in the area.  Though other 
contributing factors to juvenile delinquency were difficult to eradicate and required complex 
solutions, the authors of the report urged the city to provide more recreation programs for youth.  
They also urged area churches and synagogues to provide recreation space and activities in 
community centers.586 
Gang violence no doubt contributed to increased juvenile delinquency in Morrisania.  
Fights between black, white, and Puerto Rican gangs concerned area residents.  Community 
leaders met this problem head on by creating the Bronx Youth Council, a community recreation 
organization for adolescents.  The association established offices throughout the South Bronx 
and workers contacted and collaborated with the gangs to gradually interest members in 
participating in council projects, thus diverting their attention away from gang activity.587   
Only a third of the residents interviewed by the authors of the MCOU study were 
satisfied living in Morrisania.  In addition to the rising levels of juvenile delinquency, some of 
these residents interviewed for the report complained about the condition of the housing in the 
area.  Area residents criticized landlords’ poor maintenance of area houses and buildings and 
complained that the Department of Sanitation neglected their neighborhood.  Many whites were 
anxious to move out of Morrisania into better apartments but were held back by a housing 
shortage that limited their options.  For these folks integration was neither a reason to leave nor 
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an effect of a desire to live with African Americans, but a result of the unavailability of better 
housing.588   
Whites were not the only people concerned about the effects of increased black residency.  
Some African American residents of Morrisania were also alarmed at the social changes 
accompanying black migration to the area.  A number of the more affluent black residents 
complained about the social effects of working class blacks moving from Harlem.  A candy store 
owner and former Harlem resident believed that though the Bronx offered better living 
conditions and had less crime than Harlem, things in the Bronx were getting worse as more 
blacks from Harlem moved to the neighborhood.  According to her, Harlem transplants brought 
bad habits with them as some youth were snatching pocketbooks, shooting dice on sidewalks, 
and using profane language in public.589  A class rift developed between longer-term middle-
class residents of Morrisania and those who had recently moved to the area from Harlem.  Many 
of the more established black Morrisania residents saw a need for social service organizations 
and recreation facilities to alleviate these conditions. 
Longtime black residents of Morrisania also complained about rising rents in the area.  
Residents of Morrisania paid higher rents as more African Americans moved into the 
neighborhood.  Because black residents paid higher rents in Harlem landlords charged more to 
lease apartments in Morrisania as blacks from Manhattan moved to the Bronx.  The Bronx 
Council of Social Agencies through a committee headed by Revered Elder Hawkins, pastor of St. 
Augustine’s Church the largest black Catholic church in Morrisania at the time, embarked on a 
campaign to stop landlords from raising rental prices in the neighborhood.590  A dressmaker who 
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had lived in the Bronx for years worried about the new trends.  She complained that Harlmeites, 
who were used to paying exorbitant rents, were moving into Morrisania and paying higher rents 
than they should.  Older residents of the area believed these new black residents should have 
consulted them to find out rental rates for an apartment in the neighborhood.  This would have 
prevented these new residents from agreeing to pay higher rents which allowed building owners 
to begin charging more to lease apartments in the area. 591   
Despite the concerns older residents had about the effects of blacks moving into 
Morrisania, African Americans continued to consider the Bronx a better alternative to Harlem 
and most were not looking to leave the area.  Despite her complaints about the changes the 
migration from Harlem caused in the neighborhood, the candy store owner interviewed by the 
Amsterdam News still believed a better life was available for blacks in the Bronx.  She 
highlighted the superior living conditions in Morrisania by pointing out that “living in the Bronx 
is one thing” while merely “existing in Harlem is another.”  Similarly though she complained 
about the recent changes in the neighborhood, the dressmaker also interviewed by the 
Amsterdam News still believed the Bronx to be a better alternative than Harlem, as there was 
ample playground space, parks and other places to go for relaxation.592  Though the movement of 
blacks into the area sparked some undesirable conditions, living conditions were better in 
Morrisania and residing in the Bronx continued to be a better option than living in Harlem.   
To address some of the problems caused by black settlement in the neighborhood the 
churches that served the blacks in Morrisania provided recreation activities for area youth.  St. 
Augustine’s church hosted many different activities and housed clubs.  The church held plays, 
basketball games, roller skating, choir rehearsals, cooking classes, and Girl Scout meetings and 
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parties.  It provided someplace for the neighborhood youth to congregate after school.593  
Thessalonia Baptist Church, the largest church for blacks in Morrisania, also provided many of 
the recreational activities for new black families living in the area.594  Thessalonia was first 
founded in 1892 by migrants from Flavannah County, Virginia and had moved to several 
different locations in the Bronx.  In 1942 the newly ordained pastor of the church James Polite, 
led the congregation to its present building at 951 Stebbins Avenue (now Rev. James A. Polite 
Avenue) in Morrisania.595  Thessalonia provided many activities for the neighborhood youth, 
sponsoring a youth choir, plays, lectures, and field trips in the summer.596  The church’s focus on 
community activism in the 1940s was an extension of the interests of Revered Polite who was an 
activist in the black community and involved with the Civil Rights movement.597  
  Despite the activities of the churches and community organizations there were still 
instances of discrimination in Morrisania, but racial antagonisms were sporadic and did not 
usually involve violence.  In one instance a landlord of a Jackson Avenue building mistakenly 
rented an apartment to Mr. Earle, an African American man whose skin complexion was fair 
enough to pass for white.  After paying for the apartment and receiving the keys, the Earles were 
scheduled to move in and arranged for the gas and electricity to be turned on in the new 
apartment and put in new flooring.  When Mr. Earle arrived at his new apartment he could not 
enter because the property owners had changed the lock on the door.  The landlords of the 
building insisted that they already had tenants renting that apartment and that their father, who 
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had made the rental agreement with Earle, had made a mistake.  They told the Earles that they 
did not want Negroes renting their property.598  Despite a general lack of racial tensions in the 
area, not all landlords in Morrisania were open to black tenancy or integrated neighborhoods.  
But the discrimination in Morrisania was nowhere near as systematic as in other areas of the 
Bronx. 
In Morrisania’s adjacent sections integration was not as welcome.  In fact the 
neighborhoods surrounding Morrisania remained off limits to blacks.  As a youth Rosemary 
Brown remembers not being able to go down the hill to Southern Boulevard or Intervale Avenue 
which were mostly Jewish areas.  She remembers being chased there as a youth.  By the late 
1940s, as more blacks moved into the area, those restrictions lifted and black children could go 
to Southern Boulevard; but there were still areas in the South Bronx where blacks could not go.  
Blacks were not welcome on Bathgate Avenue or in the Hunts Point, Melrose and Mott Haven 
sections.599  Despite the integration in Morrisania much of the rest of the South Bronx remained 
closed to black residency.  The discrimination against black residents was even more acute in the 
burgeoning white middle-class neighborhoods of Bronx. 
When a black family, the Blocksons, tried to lease a house in Baychester, a middle class 
neighborhood in the north Bronx, whites resorted to violence to prevent the family from moving 
in.  In July 1945 unidentified whites burned down a six bedroom bungalow in a residential 
section of Baychester to prevent the Blocksons from occupying the dwelling.  Not only did they 
destroy the house but they wrote racial slurs and messages on the ruined interior walls.  The 
vandals scribbled “It stinks, I hate Niggers.  I’m glad it burnt.  I hope Niggers don’t move in 
here.” on the walls.  The residents of Baychester were clearly not ready to welcome black 
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neighbors even if they were the most respectable of black families.  The Blocksons, were 
educated and affluent African Americans.  Mr. Blockson, who was born in Canada and had 
grown up in an affluent section of Providence, had studied pharmacy in Rhode Island, 
specialized in perfumes and cosmetics at Columbia University, and worked as an assistant 
manufacturer for D’Arsay Perfumes.  Racism and discrimination towards blacks were much 
more pronounced in more affluent sections of the Bronx than in Morrisania.600    
Even though discrimination and racial antagonisms were relatively minor in Morrisania, 
community leaders, activists, and organizations aimed to stop race tensions, preserve the 
interracial and multi-ethnic character of the neighborhood, and prevent white flight as part of a 
larger effort to prevent the South Bronx from becoming a ghetto.  Some focused their work on 
preventing segregation of neighborhood schools to prevent white flight.  This was one of the 
main goals of Dr. Jacob Bernstein, principal of Morris High School, and advisor to the Bronx 
Youth Council, a group of Bronx students who met to organize recreation activities for borough 
youth.  As whites moved out of the Morrisania area Bernstein appealed to the Board of 
Education for a re-zoning of school districts to prevent white students from fleeing.  Though 
there was considerable support for rezoning from many parent and community groups, 
opponents threatened race riots and one white politician obtained a doctor’s note claiming his 
son was unable to psychologically deal with Negroes.  Despite the opposition, the Board 
approved the re-zoning and a subsequent redrawing of the district lines.  The result was an 
integrated Morris High with blacks comprising 40 percent of the student population, down from 
70 percent.  Moreover black students entered Taft and Evander Childs High Schools which were 
previously predominately white.  The rezoning efforts successfully as the integrated schools and 
provided equitable education for black students.  The re-zoning had racial implications beyond 
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the classroom.  White students after associating with their black schoolmates during the day went 
home and told their parents that their ideas about blacks were wrong.  This would be another way 
to ease racial tensions in the area.601  There seemed to be a concerted effort on the part of 
Bernstein and other Bronx educators to avoid in the Bronx the white flight and segregation that 
plagued Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant.602   
With the increase in black students at Morris High School Dr. Bernstein looked for 
information on where to send his African American students for guidance and job information.  
Dr Bernstein’s request indicated the growing need for social service agencies and community 
organizations in Morrisania.  They Urban League answered Bernstein’s call.  The Urban League 
of Greater New York (ULGNY) believed the organization’s services must be extended to the 
Bronx.  According to Edward Lewis, the Executive Secretary of the New York Urban League, 
there were far more employment opportunities available in the Bronx than most people realized, 
but fair employment practices agencies had not made much headway in dealing with Bronx 
industries. Therefore the League focused more of its job placement resources in that borough.  
The increase of the African American population in the Bronx prompted the ULGNY to open its 
first office in the Bronx.  In response to the World War II migration of blacks to New York, in 
1947 the New York Urban League’s leaders appealed to the public to support its drive to raise 
$450,000 in funds which would be used to expand its facilities and to hire more staff and 
professionally trained experts to work in the employment, vocational guidance, health, and 
housing departments.  League leaders also said that part of the funds raised in the drive would 
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also be used to open the Bronx branch to meet the demands of the borough’s new black 
community.603   
The Bronx branch of the Urban League opened in 1948.  Its creation was funded by a 
$10,000 grant from the Nathan Hofheimer Foundation which was to be supplemented by gifts 
from Bronx sources and philanthropist Winthrop Rockefeller, a National Urban League board 
member.  The new branch provided job aid and council to blacks in the Bronx, services that were 
increasingly necessary as more and more blacks settled in Morrisania.604  As the 1940s came to a 
close, the Urban League of Greater New York worked to provide and expand employment 
opportunities to those who lived in this new area of black settlement.   
As the black population in the borough increased, William S Jackson, Executive 
Secretary of the newly formed Bronx Branch of the ULGNY, tried to prevent the South Bronx 
from becoming a black and Puerto Rican ghetto.  Like Dr. Bernstein, Jackson believed the key to 
preventing the ghettoization of the Bronx was to prevent white flight which would preserve the 
interracial and multi-ethnic character of Morrisania.  Jackson, the Norma and Murra Hearn 
Award recipient for distinguished social service from the New York School of Social Work at 
Columbia University, said that it was his aim “to see that the people of the Bronx all worked 
together to bring about an integrated population rather than isolation of the different racial 
groups.”605  The Bronx office of the ULGNY worked to maintain integrated housing in 
Morrisania in an effort to prevent white flight. 
In part the Bronx Urban League looked to maintain a racially balanced community.  
Leaders in the Bronx branch wanted to maintain a community in which 40 percent of the 
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residents were white, 40 percent black, and the remaining 20 percent other races.606  League 
officials set up a committee to lobby for a balanced racial population in the proposed Forest 
Housing Development being constructed in Morrisania.  Jackson wanted to keep the Forest 
Houses from being an all black housing project.  At the time the New York City Housing 
Authority (NYCHA) usually admitted tenants of only one race to public housing projects.  The 
League’s plan was to prevent segregation of housing projects in the Bronx by having blacks 
apply for housing outside of the areas where they lived and educating whites to move into the 
“so-called Negro housing areas.”  The League pushed   NYCHA to address this problem.607  
League leaders also wanted the Cooperative Woodstock Terrace, a middle class complex, to 
choose residents according to these quotas as well.  Neither initiative succeeded - the Forrest 
Houses and Woodstock Terrace both became predominately black complexes.608  The failure of 
the ULGNY’s attempts to integrate new housing projects proved to be a disturbing trend 
signaling the eventual segregation and ghettoization of the south Bronx over the next twenty 
years.  The fears of Jackson and Dr. Bernstein proved to be well founded.609 
 
Conclusion 
World War II was a period of mobility and opportunity for many African Americans.  
The employment opportunities in the nation’s war industries, along with Jim Crow laws 
discrimination in the south, prompted millions of African Americans to migrate to urban areas 
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throughout the country.  These demographic shifts caused many social changes in this nation’s 
cities including New York.   
In Detroit and Chicago new black migrants resided in the already extant centers of black 
settlement, increasing the population in already overcrowded ”Paradise Valley” and the South 
Side respectively.  The migration worsened overcrowding and strained the social services 
available in those cities.  This was also the case in Harlem.  As southern blacks migrated to New 
York, the extant center of black settlement became overcrowded and social service resources 
inadequate.  Landlords increased rents and living conditions declined, prompting Harlemites and 
new migrants alike to seek housing outside of the so-called “Black Mecca.”   
In the 1940s thousands of southern black migrants moved to the Bedford-Stuyvesant 
section of Brooklyn, creating a second area of black settlement in the city.  The availability of 
better-paying jobs in war industries and the construction of a subway line directly connecting 
Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant attracted middle and working-class blacks to the area.  
Apartments opened for black residency as whites moved to newly available housing in Queens 
and Long Island.  As the black population of Bedford-Stuyvesant increased, the area suffered 
problems similar to in Harlem.  Overcrowding, higher rents, deteriorating housing, and lack of 
adequate social service and health facilities accompanied the growing black population.  In 
response to these changes some area whites organized to protest. 
 Many white Brooklynites linked the problems in Bedford-Stuyvesant to the migration of 
southern blacks to the area. Organizations like the Midtown Civic League led campaigns to oust 
black residents and prevent further settlement by blacks.  They specifically linked black 
residence with declining property values and increased crime in the area.  The organization 
worked to prevent black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant and pressured the Kings County 
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Grand Jury to hold hearings on the condition of blacks in the area.  The New York Times 
coverage of the investigation and findings of the grand jury kept public attention on the negative 
effects of black residency in Bedford-Stuyvesant.   Therefore the migration played a much larger 
public role in Brooklyn than it did in Manhattan in the 1940s, as public interest was focused on 
the steadily increasing black population from the south.   
The organized white opposition to black settlement for the most part united the black 
community in Brooklyn against the activities of organizations like the Midtown Civil League.  
Black organizations attempted to provide community programs to decrease crime and juvenile 
delinquency in the area.  Despite the activities of the Midtown Civic League, black migrants to 
the city continued to view Bedford-Stuyvesant as an attractive place to settle.  Blacks moved to 
Brooklyn by the thousands and the increase in the African American population resulted in 
increased political power at the local level for Brooklyn’s blacks by 1950.  Increasing numbers 
of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s white residents left the neighborhood in response to the migration.  By 
the end of the decade blacks no longer lived in dispersed communities throughout the borough.  
Black residence instead became concentrated in Bedford-Stuyvesant and the area became known 
as “Little Harlem.” 
 A significant number of blacks looking to settle outside of Harlem chose to put down 
roots in the Bronx.  Thousands of Harlemites moved to Morrisania during the 1940s.  The 
availability of better housing, lower rents, fewer people, fresher air, and better schools prompted 
thousands of African Americans to move from Harlem to the South Bronx.  Though African 
Americans moved to the Bronx, Morrisania did not become a “Little Harlem” in the 1940s.  
While some whites did leave the neighborhood for better housing and in response to black 
residency, white flight did not occur in Morrisania in the 1940s.  Some of the working class 
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white residents of the area did not have the financial capacity to move to the newly constructed 
middle class housing in the upper Bronx.   
 Despite the movement of many blacks into Morrisania, relatively little racial tension 
resulted.  This was in part due to the fact that many of those moving to Morrisania, specifically 
in the first few years of the decade, were black middle class families that shared white residents’ 
values and social outlook.  Evidence of a class rift within the black community emerged in the 
early 1940s as long-time black Morrisanians complained about the lower-class Harlemites 
moving into the neighborhood.  Therefore black and white residents alike worried about the 
effects of the influx of residents from Harlem on their community.  There was a concerted effort 
among community organizations and activists to prevent crime and juvenile delinquency 
especially as black working-class residents moved there from Harlem.  They worked to keep 
Morrisania a safe and desirable neighborhood.  Others worked to keep Morrisania from 
becoming a “Little Harlem” like Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Activists like Dr. Jacob Bernstein and 
organizations like the Bronx branch of the Urban League of Greater New York aimed to do this 
by promoting unity among the races in Morrisania and preventing white flight.  Though it is hard 
to pinpoint whether or not these actions were the cause, Morrisania remained integrated.  This 
was a major accomplishment during the 1940s as many other cities, and parts of New York City, 
became racially segregated.   
The dispersion of New York City’s blacks to different pockets of settlement is one thing 
that set the city apart from others during the 1940s.  The spread of black settlement outside of 
Harlem provided a valve for the racial discontent building in New York City.  It changed the 
character and focus of the Harlem Riot of 1943 and ultimately may have prevented a major race 
riot from breaking out in 1943 as it did in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Beaumont, Texas. 
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The Second Wave of the Great Migration and the demographic shifts it precipitated in 
New York City constitute significant events in the city’s history.  The World War II migration 
had important effects on the demographics of the city and the formation of black communities in 
New York especially in the outer boroughs.  Moreover, African Americans in New York found 
better paying skilled and semi-skilled employment in some war industries.  Blacks were able to 
find these jobs because of the passage of federal and state legislation prohibiting discriminatory 
employment practices by war industries.  Government agencies, prompted by the activism of 
black organizations and groups working for racial uplift, investigated these companies and in 
some cases forced them to comply with fair employment legislation.  The advances blacks made 
in employment lasted well beyond the war years.  
Chapter 1 demonstrated that most black migrants came from Virginia, North Carolina, 
and South Carolina.  Black women in their 20s were the largest group to migrate.  Harlem, the 
existing center of black settlement in the city, and Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn were the 
primary areas where black migrants settled.  In fact Bedford-Stuyvesant, which in the 1930s was 
an overwhelmingly white area, became a black neighborhood during the war years.  The black 
population already living in New York City also moved to other boroughs during the war.  Black 
middle class families moved from Harlem to the Morrisania section of the Bronx creating 
integrated neighborhoods there. 
One of the reasons for black migration to urban areas during the war was the availability 
of better-paying jobs in war industries.  Industrial work had been largely closed to black workers 
before the war and had remained closed to blacks in the first two years of the conflict.  Although 
many scholars describe employment discrimination in this era, none of them explain exactly 
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which jobs were open and which were closed to blacks, the rationale used by employers for 
refusing to hire them, or the process that led employers to, for the first time, offer jobs to black 
workers.  This is the focus of Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 elucidates how the passage of state anti-discrimination legislation and 
Executive Order 8802 outlawing discriminatory hiring in war industries set the stage for 
integration of the workforce in some of New York’s factories.  The New York State Committee 
on Discrimination (COD) and Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) investigations of 
the hiring practices of factories with government contracts prompted some war industries in New 
York City to begin hiring black workers.   
The FEPC and COD would not have been as effective in prompting war industries to hire 
blacks had it not been for the constant pressure and cooperation from organizations focused on 
racial uplift.  Chapter 2 also describes how black organizations protested against the 
discriminatory hiring practices of war industries and pressured the state and federal government 
to prevent companies with government contracts from discriminating against African Americans.  
The National Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People used community meetings, direct action protests, boycotts, and press campaigns to first 
pressure the industries themselves to hire black workers, a tactic that was not very effective.  The 
NAACP, NUL, and black politicians shifted their focus to towards the state and federal 
government, pressuring the New York State Assembly and President Roosevelt to establish fair 
employment measures and establish government agencies to investigate war industries accused 
of discrimination.  The FEPC and COD continued to draw attention to war industries’ 
discriminatory hiring practices.  
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Though war industries began hiring black workers in 1942 it was not until 1943 that 
some industries fully integrated.  Chapter 3 explains how this happened.  A labor shortage in 
1943, further opened skilled and semi-skilled industrial jobs in the scientific instrument, 
electrical instrument, and shipbuilding sectors to African Americans.  Black women benefitted 
from war-time labor shifts as they found employment in factories that paid more than the 
domestic work they had done before the war.  The Negro Labor Committee (NLC), the Negro 
Labor Victory Committee (NLVC), its parent organization the National Negro Congress (NNC), 
and most importantly the Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) exerted pressure on the management 
of war industries and unions that discriminated against black workers.  These organizations 
cooperated with progressive labor unions and collaborated with anti-discrimination agencies to 
help facilitate the employment of blacks in skilled and semi-skilled positions in war industries.  
As war industries hired African Americans, the NNC and the Brooklyn Urban League began to 
use the FEPC to address cases of discrimination against black workers employed by war 
industries.  Both organizations were involved in a campaign to register discrimination complaints 
from black employees of the Brooklyn Navy with local offices of the FEPC. 
 The civil rights organizations used different tactics to open new areas of employment for 
African Americans, some of which were more effective than others.  The NAACP held mass 
meetings, letter writing campaigns, press campaigns, and meetings with companies to highlight 
discrimination and pressure industrial employers to hire black workers.  This drew the attention 
of government fair employment agencies to specific cases of discrimination, but did not directly 
result in opening of new areas of employment to African Americans.  The Negro Labor 
Committee and the Negro Labor Victory Committee (a subsidiary of the National Negro 
Congress) worked in conjunction with labor unions to secure employment for blacks in war 
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industries.  Both organizations worked with unions to accept black members and open training 
programs to black workers providing them with the skills necessary for industrial jobs.  Though 
both organizations were led by leftists and had similar goals, the Socialist led NLC and 
Communist Party linked NLVC often attacked each other for their political views and 
affiliations.  Of the two organizations the NLVC was more successful at opening new areas of 
employment to African Americans because of their cooperation with the Committee on 
Discrimination and their partnership with unions representing workers in war industries. 
The Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) was most successful at opening employment 
opportunities in New York City’s war industries to African Americans.  The BKUL worked with 
the New York State Committee on Discrimination to identify war industries engaging in 
discriminatory hiring practices.  The Industrial Secretary of the BKUL provided the COD with 
information on instances where blacks were discriminated against in order to aid the bureau in 
identifying war industries breaking the Mahoney Law which prohibited them from 
discriminating against employees on the basis of race.  The COD would then conduct 
investigations of these companies and in some instances order them to stop their biased 
employment practices.  The BKUL also continually published reports of this discrimination to 
maintain pressure on the COD to continue its investigations.  In this way the Brooklyn Urban 
League acted as part of the state infrastructure put in place to prohibit hiring discrimination in 
war industries and most effectively opened new areas of employment to African Americans.   
Unlike World War I, not all blacks were driven back to their jobs as domestics and 
unskilled service workers when World War II ended.  After the war many black women found 
work in clerical occupations, as phone operators, and as clerks in department stores.  These were 
better paying positions that were not open to black women before the war.  The war also caused 
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lasting changes in the employment available to black men.  Though many of the city’s African 
American men were ousted from their skilled and semi-skilled jobs when the war ended, five 
years after the war the number of black men working in service positions had declined and 
increasing numbers of black men worked in semi-skilled industrial positions, as skilled 
craftsmen, and in clerical jobs. 
The historical patterns facilitating black employment in New York’s war industries laid 
out in Chapters 2 and 3 are made clearer through the examination of how one New York war 
industry began to hire black workers.  The changing hiring practices of the Sperry Corporation 
are the focus of Chapter 4.   The Sperry Gyroscope Company, which produced scientific 
instruments for the Navy, employed very few blacks before the war.  By the end of the war they 
employed more than one thousand African Americans and more than half of those workers were 
employed in skilled or semi-skilled positions.  This represented a stark turnaround in the 
company’s employment practices.   
Sperry became the focus of black protests for equal employment opportunities because it 
held large government contracts to produce scientific instruments for the war but had virtually no 
African American workers.  The NAACP, the National Urban League, and the National Negro 
Congress each worked to pressure Sperry to hire black workers.  The initial efforts of the 
NAACP in particular prompted Sperry management to hire its first black workers in 1941.  But 
Walter White, president of the NAACP, did not believe those hires constituted full integration.  
He argued that the few blacks employed by Sperry were token hires to alleviate pressure from 
black organizations.  The NAACP, the NUL, and the NNC brought blacks’ allegations of racial 
discrimination at Sperry to the attention of the local offices of the Far Employment Practices 
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Committee and the state’s Committee on Discrimination prompting an investigation of Sperry’s 
hiring practices.   
It was not until local offices of the FEPC and the COD investigated Sperry’s employment 
practices in 1942 that the company began to hire larger numbers of blacks and more importantly 
placed them in skilled and semi-skilled positions.  A labor shortage in 1943 prompted 
management to make more black hires.  Some historians have argued that government fair 
employment agencies were ineffective in prompting war industries to hire blacks, however the 
statistics show that this was not true at Sperry.  Sperry hired comparable numbers of African-
Americans in the years before and after the labor shortage.  This indicates that Sperry changed 
their hiring policies before the labor shortage, likely in response to the FEPC and COD 
investigations.   
Chapter 4 also highlights the importance of the United, Electrical, Radio, and Machine 
Workers of America (UE) in facilitating black employment.  The progressive union, which 
advocated inclusion of black members, took over representation of Sperry workers in 1942 and 
pressed management to hire black workers as well.  At the end of the war, the UE cooperated 
with the Negro Labor Victory Committee to prevent lay-offs of all black industrial workers at the 
end of the war.  New York locals of the UE proposed to create a black to white worker ratio that 
was to be maintained regardless of length of service.  Within the ratios seniority rules would still 
be observed.  This would ensure that all the newly hired black workers would not be fired when 
veterans returned to their jobs.  Though the plan was rejected by company officials because it 
undermined the main function of labor unions which was to protect the rights of its workers 
through fair labor practices; it shows the union thinking about and experimenting with a form of 
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affirmative action.  The UE, like other unions, proposed other measures in lieu of seniority 
changes to preserve black employment in industries. 
The employment of blacks by Sperry also changed the attitude of the company President 
Thomas Morgan.  He became an advocate of fair employment for blacks in Sperry as well as in 
other war industries.  Morgan also advocated for black access to higher education, extending his 
activism to fundraising for the United Negro College Fund.  Morgan’s actions as Sperry’s 
President had profound effects on the hiring policies of the company, especially with regard to 
the employment of blacks after the war.  His actions and their affect on company policy show 
how sometimes individuals matter in history.   
The particularities in Sperry’s case caused the company to maintain black employment 
after the war.  Though company management laid-off most of their black workers when the war 
ended, when the company began producing goods for the American military after the war, 
company management rehired many African Americans.  Though this case study presents the 
particular conditions that led one business to integrate their work force, Sperry’s story sheds light 
on the complex combination of factors that prompted other war industries to hire black workers 
as well. 
The Second Wave of the Great Migration had profound effects on the urban areas to 
which the migrants moved.  Historians studying the effect of the World War II migration have 
asked important questions about the communities in which these African Americans settled.   
Where migrants lived and how they found housing; how whites reacted to black settlement; how 
this affected relations between the races; and whether class conflicts within the African 
American communities in these areas emerged are questions historians Thomas Sugrue and 
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Shirley Ann Moore asked about Detroit and Richmond during the Second World War.  They are 
questions that this study begins to answer about New York City in Chapter 5. 
The migration of thousands of African Americans to New York City strained the housing 
and social service organizations in Harlem.  High rents and overcrowding prompted black 
leaders in Harlem to protest and pressure the federal government to institute rent control.  
Moreover the frustration blacks felt at having to endure discrimination and deteriorating living 
conditions fueled the Harlem Riot in 1943.  The outbreak of violence in Harlem prompted black 
leaders and some whites to focus on the social problems in Harlem; problems that were made 
worse by the increasing black population.  Many African American leaders used the riot to 
highlight the poor living conditions blacks in Harlem endured and pressed the city government to 
address these problems.  Many African Americans took matters into their own hands and settled 
elsewhere in the city.  New migrants and Harlemites alike moved to the Bedford-Stuyvesant 
section of Brooklyn creating a second area of black settlement in the city.  Other Harlem 
residents moved to Morrisania in the Bronx.   
Blacks chose to move to Bedford-Stuyvesant during the war years for several reasons.  
Harlemites and migrants alike looked to Bedford-Stuyvesant because of the war jobs available in 
close proximity.  The Brooklyn Navy Yard, one of the major war-time employers of African 
Americans, was within walking distance of Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Moreover, a small black 
population already lived in the area which attracted more African Americans.  Bedford-
Stuyvesant was less crowded than Harlem and had better housing, two of the primary reasons 
blacks moved there.  Furthermore, the area was easily accessible from Harlem because of the 
new train line directly connecting the two neighborhoods.  Both working class and middle class 
blacks moved to the area.   
  270 
 
 
 
As the black population increased, many of the same problems that plagued Harlem 
developed in Bedford-Stuyvesant as well.  Overcrowding and high rents were the most acute 
problems for blacks.  Property values decreased which precipitated white flight during the 1940s.  
By 1941 poor health conditions, a high delinquency rate, and an almost total lack of cultural and 
recreational facilities and social agencies plagued Bedford-Stuyvesant.  The New York Times 
reported on the higher crime and delinquency rates in Bedford Stuyvesant, linking reported crime 
waves in the district with black migration.  Consequently, Bedford-Stuyvesant became known as 
“Little Harlem.”   
The increasing crime rate and declining property values prompted white Bedford-
Stuyvesant residents to organize to protest black settlement in the area.  Monsignor John Belford, 
a priest at the Roman Catholic Church of the Nativity, led white protests against increased crime 
in the neighborhood.  He embarked on a campaign against black residency by publishing articles 
in his parish newspaper and the Brooklyn Eagle highlighting the ignorant and destructive 
character of blacks migrating to the area.  He blamed blacks, especially southern migrants, for 
crime.  The Midtown Civil League, led by Sumner Sirtl, fought decreasing property values in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant by trying to prevent black settlement in the area.  In 1943 the League 
pressured the King’s County Grand Jury to investigate the condition of blacks living in Brooklyn 
and allegations that Mayor La Guardia had ignored crime in the neighborhood.  The Grand Jury 
reported a general sense of lawlessness in Bedford-Stuyvesant detailing the various types of 
crime and vice plaguing the area.  The report did not mention any of the structural reasons for the 
condition of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant.  Instead the grand jury blamed area crime on 
insufficient police presence.  
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African American leaders, organizations, and press condemned the report and worked to 
discredit its findings.  The NAACP, NNC, YMCA, and Amsterdam News argued that 
employment discrimination, high rents, overcrowded living conditions, and the lack of 
recreational organizations and social service agencies were the main reasons for higher rates of 
crime and juvenile delinquency among African Americans. 
Despite the racial tension, higher rents, deteriorating housing, and social problems in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, blacks still considered the area an attractive place to live.  The borough’s 
more modern housing and industrial job opportunities continued to attract middle and working 
class blacks from Harlem and the South.  Many of the migrants moving to Bedford-Stuyvesant 
were middle-class and more stable working-class blacks creating a more homogenous black 
population as many poorer working-class blacks moved to Brownsville.  Blacks in Bedford-
Stuyvesant, despite class differences, united in the face of white prejudice.  The continued 
settlement of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant and the social effects it created precipitated white 
flight from the area and by the end of the 1940s the formerly white neighborhood was 
predominately inhabited by African Americans.  
Black families from Harlem also moved to the Bronx in the 1940s to escape high rents 
and overcrowding.  These families settled in present-day Morrisania in the southwest Bronx.  
Most of the families who moved were members of the stable working class with fathers and 
husbands employed in stable jobs.  Very often these families had the economic means to move 
because black men were hired as postal workers or Pullman porters.  Many of the African 
American men who moved to Morrisania in the early 1940s were employed in civil service or 
blue collar jobs, while others were professionals.  Some of the earliest black residents of 
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Morrisania could not find apartments due to discrimination by white building owners; so black 
men took jobs as building superintendents to get apartments.     
The majority of the families that moved to the Bronx were looking for better living 
conditions than in Harlem.  The Bronx had better and newer housing, more parks, and better 
schools than Harlem.  African Americans were increasingly able to find apartments in 
Morrisania because many of the white residents were leaving for newer and more modern 
housing in the upper Bronx.  This left apartments vacant for blacks to occupy.  However many 
working class whites in the neighborhood did not have the economic means to move to emerging 
middle-class neighborhoods.  These whites stayed in Morrisania creating a racially and 
ethnically diverse neighborhood.   
Black Morrisania residents were quite proud of the fact that they lived in an integrated 
neighborhood.  Integrated neighborhoods were not common in cities across the country in the 
1940s.  In fact the growing black populations in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Chicago found 
themselves even more hemmed into distinct black districts as these cities became more rigidly 
segregated.  The residents of Morrisania, both black and white, worked together to foster a sense 
of unity which resulted in very little racial conflict in the area.  Perhaps the middle-class status, 
culture, and values of the blacks moving into Morrisania in the 1940s created a common outlook 
and fostered good relations between the different races and ethnicities living in the 
neighborhood.   
As in Bedford-Stuyvesant some negative effects accompanied black settlement in 
Morrisania.  Higher rents, increasing crime, and juvenile delinquency levels accompanied black 
settlement in the area.  Moreover the social and recreational organizations in the neighborhood 
lacked sufficient resources to deal with the expanding black population.  These affects made 
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some white residents of the area look for new places to live.  More affluent black residents in 
Morrisania were also unhappy with the social effects of increasing migration from Harlem, 
especially towards the latter half of the 1940s.  These black middle-class residents complained 
about higher rents, increased crime, and visible vice in the neighborhood as working-class blacks 
moved in from Harlem.  Despite these complaints, both middle and working class blacks 
believed living in Morrisania was a much better alternative to living in Harlem.   
Community leaders and organizations aimed at racial uplift attempted to keep Morrisania 
integrated by preventing white flight.  Men like Jacob Bernstein, principal of Morris High 
School, worked to have the school district re-zoned to ensure that his school and others in the 
area remained integrated.  Similarly the Urban League of Greater New York devoted more of its 
resources to address the social changes that accompanied black settlement in the borough.  The 
organization established a Bronx branch and focused on job placement activities for blacks in the 
area.  William S. Jackson, Executive Secretary of the newly formed Bronx Urban League, also 
tried to prevent white flight.  He led an Urban League initiative to pressure the New York City 
Housing Authority to keep the Forrest Houses, a proposed housing project for Morrisania, from 
accepting only African American residents.  Integration of the project they hoped would prevent 
the area from becoming all black.   Jackson’s plan was unsuccessful, NYCHA admitted only 
black tenants to the Forrest Houses.  Morrisania, however, remained integrated throughout the 
rest of the decade.  This changed in the 1950s as more and more whites fled the area leaving it to 
become a minority inhabited ghetto.   
The study of the demographic and social effects of the Second Wave of the Great 
Migration in New York City provides a different lens through which to view African American 
history and the history of New York City.  Particularities in the New York experience complicate 
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the story of the World War II migration of blacks to urban areas as well as the history of World 
War II era New York City.  This wave of black migration to New York and the subsequent 
changes in population distribution it created in the city was the foundation for settlement patterns 
of the black population there for the rest of the century. 
The creation of black enclaves outside of Harlem set the parameters for New York’s 
modern ethnic and racial composition.  Since the turn of the twentieth century blacks had been 
concentrated in Harlem, but in the 1940s a second area of black settlement emerged in Bedford-
Stuyvesant.  Though Brooklyn never became the intellectual and cultural center of black New 
York, its significant black population became a political and cultural rival to Harlem.  Moreover, 
in the 1940s blacks began to move into the Bronx.  The south Bronx, which later became the 
quintessential picture of urban blight, was a haven for middle and working-class blacks who 
were in search of better living conditions in the 1940s.  Morrisania was a distinctively integrated 
area uncommon in New York City and other urban areas in the country at the time.   
The dispersion of New York City’s blacks to different pockets of settlement sets the city 
apart from other urban areas in the 1940s.  In most cities to which blacks migrated, African 
Americans were relegated to distinct and rigidly defined areas of settlement.  The spread of black 
residency outside of Harlem provided a valve for the racial discontent building in New York 
City.  In the Harlem Riot, New York’s blacks focused their disgruntlement on property – 
damaging and destroying neighborhood stores.  Unlike the riots of Detroit and Los Angeles, the 
Harlem Riot in 1943 was not a traditional race riot in the sense that there was no violent 
confrontation between blacks and whites. 
The study of black New York in the 1940s also provides an alternative view of the 
activities of fair employment practice agencies.  The Fair Employment Practices Committee in 
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particular was thought by several historians to be unsuccessful in its goal of prohibiting 
discrimination in war industries.  They argue that the FEPC did not effectively end 
discriminatory hiring practices in war industries because it lacked the means to enforce 
Executive Order 8802.  Other historians argue that the COD was slow and ineffective in its 
investigations of companies with discriminatory hiring practices.610  Examination of the activities 
of these agencies during the war shows that their investigations did indeed have a positive effect 
on the employment situation of the city’s African Americans.  In New York the FEPC through 
its work with the Committee on Discrimination successfully expanded black employment into 
factories producing goods for the war.  The New York State legislation outlawing discriminatory 
hiring practices in the state war industries and the ability for the state government to enforce this 
legislation made the investigations of the local FEPC and COD relatively effective at 
desegregating the workforces of factories with government contracts. 
The goal of equal employment opportunity fostered the cooperation of organizations 
aimed at uplifting the black race.  Older civil rights organizations like the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League focused their activities 
on expanding the types of employment open to blacks in New York.  Leftist-led organizations 
like the Negro Labor Committee, the Negro Labor Victory Committee and its parent 
organization the National Negro Congress focused on working with labor unions to break down 
employment barriers to blacks in war industries.  These organizations worked separately and in 
collaboration to pressure company management and labor unions to accept black workers.   
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The most effective tactic used by civil rights organizations was the exertion of pressure 
on government agencies aimed at ending employment discrimination in war industries to 
investigate companies accused of discrimination.  If these agencies, in particular the COD, found 
war industries to have discriminatory hiring practices they would then force them to comply with 
state anti-discrimination legislation.  State legislation made it a misdemeanor for New York war 
industries (and the placement agencies that served them) to exclude a citizen of the state by 
reason of national origin, race, or color from employment.  Moreover, the State Industrial 
Commissioner could enforce the laws and require submission of information, records, and 
reports pertinent to an investigation of discriminatory hiring practices.     
As Nelson Lichtenstein and Robert Korstad argued and as this dissertation has shown the 
main issue on the agenda of civil rights activists in the 1940s was equality of economic 
opportunity.611   Black leaders found an opportunity during World War II to pressure the 
government into defending blacks’ economic rights.  African Americans and liberal politicians in 
New York believed as citizens of the state and nation African Americans deserved their equal 
share in the nation’s war-time prosperity.  The activism that publicly forced companies and the 
government to face the hypocrisy of employment discrimination by a government fighting a war 
for democracy resulted in expanding employment opportunities for African Americans in the 
city.     
Historian Eric Arnesen cites Martha Biondi among a new cadre of scholars who over the 
past twenty-five years have examined the contributions of grassroots campaigns for black rights.  
He criticizes Biondi and others for not addressing contemporary critiques and historians’ 
questions about the effectiveness of the Communist Party affiliated civil rights activists.  
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Arneson says this avoidance is facilitated by revisionist historians’ minimizing of the political 
effects of Communist Party affiliation.612  Arneson recognizes the genuine contributions 
Communist Party members made during wartime in building industrial unions and, within limits, 
supporting civil rights but also contends it was not as positive as revisionist historians contend 
either.613   
This dissertation falls in line with Arnesen’s assessment of the effectiveness of 
Communist civil rights activists during the 1940s.  Biondi begins her study at the end of World 
War II and focuses mostly on Communist affiliated organizations.  In New York, the NNC and 
its subsidiary the NLVC, did indeed contribute to the gains in employment blacks achieved 
during the war years most significantly in the opening of industrial unions to black workers as a 
way to expand employment opportunities and occupations available to black workers.  However, 
the NNC nor the Negro Labor Victory Committee were the most affective civil rights 
organizations in New York City in the 1940s. Though these organizations worked to secure 
employment for African Americans they were not the most important or effective actors on this 
front.  The Brooklyn Urban League was the most successful organization to expand the 
employment options available to blacks during the war.  By examining the activities of the 
Brooklyn Urban League it is clear that the Urban League, an organization often thought to be 
conservative in terms of its tactics by historians, was at the forefront of civil rights activism 
which was focused on equality of economic opportunity in the 1940s.   The Brooklyn and New 
York Urban league were far more effective in achieving concrete goals with regard to job 
placement and expanding war work to blacks and facilitated the most important material gains 
for blacks in World War II era New York. 
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  The 1940s was quite a unique period in the twentieth century fight for black rights.  
Organizations with different political and social agendas cooperated to work towards 
establishing equal employment opportunities for African Americans – the prevailing struggle of 
the day.  Middle class organizations like the NAACP and NUL worked together with leftist 
groups like the NNC to better the economic standings of blacks in the city.  It was a unique 
moment in which black activists across the political spectrum collaborated for a common goal.  
This changed at the war’s end as Communist influence in the fight for equal employment for 
African Americans declined.  Despite the end of this alliance, black protest for civil rights did 
not stop as Lichtenstein and Korstad have argued.614   The priorities of organizations fighting for 
black rights shifted after the war.  In the 1950s New York’s black activists focused their efforts 
on desegregating the city’s public school system.  Moreover the Civil Rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s no longer focused on economic inequality, but on expanding blacks’ legal 
rights as citizens. 
In New York the opening of skilled and semi-skilled jobs to black workers, the 
movement of thousands of blacks into the middle-class, the creation of the FEPC, and the 
establishment of a permanent state agency dealing with issues of Civil Rights were important 
results of the World War II era.   The explicit racial barriers to employment ended with the 
passage of the Ives-Quinn Law which outlawed discrimination by all employers in the state; that 
was the legacy of the 1940s.  That did not mean that there were no other issues facing the black 
population.  School desegregation, fairer distribution of government services and resources, and 
other challenges to structural inequality and institutional racism were issues that had taken a back 
seat during the 1940s but would assume prominence in the next decades.            
                                                 
614
 Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, “Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil 
Rights Movement,” 786-811. 
  279 
 
 
 
Appendix 
All figures in Tables 1.1-1.15 and Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4 have been taken from the 1940 and 1950 United States 
Population Census. 
 
Table 1.1: New York City 1940 Statistics 
Ages 
all 
classes 
total 
white 
white 
males 
white 
females 
total 
negroes 
negro 
males 
negro 
females 
all ages 7,454,995 6,977,501 3,455,003 3,522,498 458,444 205,727 252,717 
15 to 19  606,942 571,412 284,588 286,824 34,678 15,574 19,104 
20 to 24  649,153 607,184 289,049 318,135 41,099 15,251 25,848 
25 to 29  697,153 644,590 301,328 343,262 50,978 20,008 30,970 
30 to 34  691,027 637,687 308,050 329,637 51,180 21,924 29,256 
35 to 39  669,421 614,219 304,806 309,413 52,186 23,418 28,768 
40 to 44  628,714 584,118 294,594 289,524 41,789 20,299 21,490 
45 to 49  550,743 518,427 266,165 252,262 30,381 14,802 15,579 
50 to 54  467,020 444,170 231,787 212,383 21,468 10,251 11,217 
55 to 59  346,871 331,865 170,782 161,083 14,251 6,675 7,576 
60-64 267,974 258,161 127,865 130,296 9,285 4,311 4,974 
 
Table 1.2: New York City 1950 Stats and Difference from 1940 statistics 
Ages 
all 
classes 
total 
white 
white 
males 
white 
females 
total 
negroes 
negro 
males 
negro 
females 
all ages 7,887,380 7,110,275 3,452,480 3,657,795 749,080 336,860 412,220 
  
5.80% 1.90% -0.07% 3.84% 63.40% 63.74% 63.12% 
15 to 19  466,835 419,210 205,370 213,840 46,400 20,825 25,575 
  
-23.08% -26.64% -27.84% -25.45% 33.80% 33.72% 33.87% 
20 to 24  592,970 522,360 246,015 276,345 68,330 27,215 41,115 
  
-8.65% -13.97% -14.89% -13.14% 66.26% 78.45% 59.06% 
25 to 29  662,020 574,330 273,470 300,860 84,790 36,070 48,720 
  
-5.04% -10.90% -9.25% -12.35% 66.33% 80.28% 57.31% 
30 to 34  645,815 566,900 261,110 305,790 76,480 32,460 44,020 
  
-6.54% -11.10% -15.24% -7.23% 49.43% 48.06% 50.46% 
35 to 39  656,895 580,175 273,590 306,585 74,125 31,725 42,400 
  
-1.87% -5.54% -10.24% -0.91% 42.04% 35.47% 47.39% 
40 to 44  640,995 577,235 277,555 299,680 61,265 27,770 33,495 
  
1.95% -1.18% -5.78% 3.51% 46.61% 36.80% 55.86% 
45 to 49  588,420 535,035 261,560 273,475 50,680 23,370 27,310 
  
6.84% 3.20% -1.73% 8.41% 66.81% 57.88% 75.30% 
50 to 54  553,645 513,115 253,135 259,980 38,155 18,420 19,735 
  
18.55% 15.52% 9.21% 22.41% 77.73% 79.69% 75.94% 
55 to 59 452,330 426,360 213,670 212,690 24,405 11,665 12,740 
  
30.40% 28.47% 25.11% 32.04% 71.25% 74.76% 68.16% 
60 to 64 365,035 346,385 174,030 172,355 17,515 7,805 9,710 
  
36.22% 34.17% 36.10% 32.28% 88.64% 81.05% 95.22% 
NYC Difference between 1940 and 1950 as a percentage of 1940 
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Table 1.3: 1940 Census Statistics for Manhattan 
Ages 
all 
classes 
total 
white 
white 
males 
white 
females 
total 
negroes 
negro 
males 
negro 
females 
all ages 1,888,942 1,577,625 780,455 797,170 298,365 133,930 164,435 
15 to 19  129,209 107,957 53,271 54,686 20,718 9,430 11,288 
20 to 24  158,152 132,357 61,824 70,335 25,173 9,603 15,570 
25 to 29  178,462 143,463 67,070 76,393 33,814 13,335 20,479 
30 to 34  181,251 144,586 69,353 75,233 35,028 14,948 20,080 
35 to 39  186,173 147,564 73,637 73,927 36,292 16,281 20,011 
40 to 44  174,962 143,723 73,445 70,278 29,141 14,228 14,913 
45 to 49  153,273 130,767 67,421 63,346 21,057 10,229 10,828 
50 to 54  132,697 116,869 61,614 55,255 14,725 6,986 7,739 
55 to 59  98,996 88,574 46,136 42,438 9,818 4,598 5,220 
60-64 77,105 70,514 34,773 35,741 6,175 2,816 3,359 
 
 
Table 1.4: Manhattan 1950 Stats and Difference from 1940 statistics 
Ages 
all 
classes 
total 
white 
white 
males 
white 
females 
total 
negroes 
negro 
males 
negro 
females 
all ages 1,960,101 1,556,599 750,940 805,659 403,502 186,898 216,604 
  
3.77% -1.33% -3.78% 1.06% 35.24% 39.55% 31.73% 
15 to 19  98,604 76,465 36,314 40,151 22,139 10,074 12,065 
  
-23.69% -29.17% -31.83% -26.58% 6.86% 6.83% 6.88% 
20 to 24  152,300 117,393 53,133 64,260 34,907 13,990 20,917 
  
-3.70% -11.31% -14.06% -8.64% 38.67% 45.68% 34.34% 
25 to 29  181,601 135,675 64,257 71,418 45,926 19,859 26,067 
  
1.76% -5.43% -4.19% -6.51% 35.82% 48.92% 27.29% 
30 to 34  165,172 122,885 58,146 64,739 42,287 18,435 23,852 
  
-8.87% -15.01% -16.16% -13.95% 20.72% 23.33% 18.78% 
35 to 39  169,944 127,252 59,373 67,879 42,692 19,043 23,649 
  
-8.72% -13.76% -19.37% -8.18% 17.63% 16.96% 18.18% 
40 to 44  164,651 128,340 60,977 67,363 36,311 17,362 18,949 
  -5.89% -10.70% -16.98% -4.15% 24.60% 22.03% 27.06% 
45 to 49  158,069 127,738 62,883 64,855 30,331 14,954 15,377 
  3.13% -2.32% -6.73% 2.38% 44.04% 46.19% 42.01% 
50 to 54  150,130 126,374 62,724 63,650 23,756 12,126 11,630 
  13.14% 8.13% 1.80% 15.19% 61.33% 73.58% 50.28% 
55 to 59 119,960 104,897 52,792 52,105 15,063 7,602 7,461 
  21.18% 18.43% 14.43% 22.78% 53.42% 65.33% 42.93% 
60 to 64 100,945 89,789 45,486 44,303 11,156 5,402 5,754 
  30.92% 27.33% 30.81% 23.96% 80.66% 91.83% 71.30% 
Manhattan Difference between 1940 and 1950 as a percentage of 1940 
Red signifies increases of 90% or more. 
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Table 1.5: 1940 Brooklyn Census Statistics 
Ages all classes total white 
white 
males 
white 
females 
total 
negroes 
negro 
males 
negro 
females 
all ages 2,698,285 2,587,951 1,282,485 1,305,466 107,253 47,744 59,519 
15 to 19  241,176 231,806 115,414 116,392 9,186 4,093 5,093 
20 to 24  250,217 239,457 114,182 125,275 10,612 3,693 6,919 
25 to 29  258,285 246,250 115,542 130,708 11,824 4,545 7,297 
30 to 34  241,824 230,476 111,852 118,624 11,052 4,729 6,323 
35 to 39  233,449 212,368 105,305 107,062 10,622 4,729 5,893 
40 to 44  209,508 200,784 100,976 99,808 8,300 3,946 4,354 
45 to 49  183,759 177,542 90,768 86,774 5,940 2,901 3,039 
50 to 54  157,401 153,026 79,546 73,480 4,191 1,948 2,243 
55 to 59  119,469 116,603 59,764 56,839 2,780 1,280 1,500 
60-64 93,761 91,744 45,634 46,109 1,961 924 1,037 
 
 
Table 1.6: Brooklyn 1950 Stats and Difference from 1940 statistics  
Ages all classes total white white males 
white 
females 
total 
negroes 
negro 
males 
negro 
females 
all ages 2,738,175 2,525,118 1,236,097 1,289,021 213,057 97,933 115,124 
  1.48% -2.43% -3.62% -1.26% 98.65% 105.12% 93.42% 
15 to 19  173,482 159,339 78,277 81,062 14,143 6,505 7,638 
  -28.07% -31.26% -32.18% -30.35% 53.96% 58.93% 49.97% 
20 to 24  213,318 192,726 93,335 99,391 20,592 8,188 12,404 
  -14.75% -19.52% -18.26% -20.66% 94.04% 121.72% 79.27% 
25 to 29  231,005 205,792 99,324 106,468 25,213 10,986 14,227 
  -10.56% -16.43% -14.04% -18.55% 113.24% 141.72% 94.97% 
30 to 34  222,460 201,311 94,445 106,866 21,149 9,196 11,953 
  -8.01% -12.65% -15.56% -9.91% 91.36% 94.46% 89.04% 
35 to 39  230,698 210,878 98,633 112,245 19,820 8,864 10,956 
  -1.18% -0.70% -6.34% 4.84% 86.59% 87.44% 85.92% 
40 to 44  213,274 197,774 95,909 101,865 15,500 7,280 8,220 
  1.80% -1.50% -5.02% 2.06% 86.75% 84.49% 88.79% 
45 to 49  190,251 177,561 87,018 90,543 12,690 6,069 6,621 
  3.53% 0.01% -4.13% 4.34% 113.64% 109.20% 117.87% 
50 to 54  179,541 170,217 84,019 86,198 9,324 4,606 4,718 
  14.07% 11.23% 5.62% 17.31% 122.48% 136.45% 110.34% 
55 to 59 147,326 141,356 71,229 70,127 5,970 2,920 3,050 
  23.32% 21.23% 19.18% 23.38% 114.75% 128.13% 103.33% 
60 to 65 119,429 115,272 57,901 57,371 4,157 1,887 2,270 
  27.38% 25.65% 26.88% 24.42% 111.98% 104.22% 118.90% 
Brooklyn Difference between 1940 and 1950 as a percentage of 1940 
Red signifies increases of 90% or more. 
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Table 1.7: 1940 Bronx Census Statistics 
Ages 
all 
classes total white 
white 
males 
white 
females 
total 
negroes 
negro 
males 
negro 
females 
all ages 1,394,711 1,370,319 677,620 692,699 23,529 11,048 12,481 
15 to 19  117,378 115,052 57,342 57,710 2,268 957 1,292 
20 to 24  120,681 118,211 56,483 61,728 2,423 916 1,507 
25 to 29  130,082 127,798 59,118 68,680 2,212 941 1,271 
30 to 34  129,525 127,175 61,488 65,687 2,253 1,037 1,216 
35 to 39  124,739 122,183 60,049 62,124 2,436 1,170 1,266 
40 to 44  117,451 115,391 57,745 57,646 1,924 1,002 922 
45 to 49  103,925 102,329 52,628 49,701 1,495 789 706 
50 to 54  86,439 85,384 44,832 40,552 1,023 568 455 
55 to 59  62,367 61,660 31,765 29,895 675 326 349 
60-64 46,227 45,764 22,926 22,838 444 230 214 
 
Table 1.8: Bronx 1950 Stats and Difference from 1940 statistics 
Ages 
all 
classes total white 
white 
males 
white 
females 
total 
negroes 
negro 
males 
negro 
females 
all ages 1,541,277 1,391,662 697,621 694,041 99,615 45,966 53,649 
  
10.51% 1.56% 2.95% 0.19% 323.37% 316.06% 329.85% 
15 to 19  93,847 86,566 42,729 43,837 7,281 3,317 3,964 
  
-20.05% -24.76% -25.48% -24.04% 221.03% 246.60% 206.81% 
20 to 24  109,615 100,126 49,161 50,965 9,489 4,095 5,394 
  
-9.17% -15.30% -12.96% -17.44% 291.62% 347.05% 257.93% 
25 to 29  110,539 99,227 47,301 51,926 10,692 4,738 5,954 
  
-15.02% -22.36% -19.99% -24.39% 383.36% 403.51% 368.45% 
30 to 34  109,272 99,582 45,568 54,014 9,690 4,135 5,555 
  
-15.64% -21.70% -25.89% -17.77% 330.09% 298.75% 356.83% 
35 to 39  121,755 112,610 51,269 61,341 9,145 3,978 5,167 
  
-2.39% -7.83% -14.62% -1.26% 275.41% 240.00% 308.14% 
40 to 44  119,687 112,092 53,853 58,239 7,595 3,615 3,980 
  1.90% -2.86% -6.74% 1.03% 294.75% 260.78% 331.67% 
45 to 49  109,894 103,730 50,675 53,055 6,164 2,914 3,250 
  5.74% 1.37% -3.71% 6.75% 312.31% 269.33% 360.34% 
50 to 54  103,287 98,541 48,471 50,070 4,746 2,341 2,405 
  19.49% 15.41% 8.12% 23.47% 363.93% 312.15% 428.57% 
55 to 59 84,909 81,903 40,903 41,000 3,006 1,448 1,558 
  36.14% 32.83% 28.77% 37.15% 345.33% 344.17% 346.42% 
60 to 64 67,617 45,509 12,799 32,710 2,088 930 1,158 
  46.27% -0.56% -44.17% 43.23% 370.27% 304.35% 441.12% 
Bronx Difference between 1940 and 1950 as a percentage of 1940 
Red signifies increases of 90% or more. 
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Table 1.9: New York City Negro population change by Sex and Age 
Ages 1940 males 
1940 
females 
1950 
males 
1950 
females 
change in 
males 
change in 
females 
total 
change 
all ages 205,727 252,717 336,860 412,220 131,133 159,503 290,636 
15 to 19  15,574 19,104 20,825 25,575 5,251 6,471 11,722 
20 to 24  15,251 25,848 27,215 41,115 11,964 15,267 27,231 
25 to 29  20,008 30,970 36,070 48,720 16,062 17,750 33,812 
30 to 34  21,924 29,256 32,460 44,020 10,536 14,764 25,300 
35 to 39  23,418 28,768 31,725 42,400 8,307 13,632 21,939 
40 to 44  20,299 21,490 27,770 33,495 7,471 12,005 19,476 
45 to 49  14,802 15,579 23,370 27,310 8,568 11,731 20,299 
50 to 54  10,251 11,217 18,420 19,735 8,169 8,518 16,687 
55 to 59 6,675 7,576 11,665 12,740 4,990 5,164 10,154 
60 to 64 4,311 4,974 7,805 9,710 3,494 4,736 8,230 
largest population increase 
second largest population increase 
third largest population increase 
 
 
 
Table 1.10: Manhattan Negro population change by Sex and Age 
Ages 1940 males 
1940 
females 
1950 
males 
1950 
females 
change in 
males 
change in 
females 
total 
change 
all ages 133,930 164,435 186,898 216,604 52,968 52,169 105,137 
15 to 19  9,430 11,288 10,074 12,065 644 777 1,421 
20 to 24  9,603 15,570 13,990 20,917 4,387 5,347 9,734 
25 to 29  13,335 20,479 19,859 26,067 6,524 5,588 12,112 
30 to 34  14,948 20,080 18,435 23,852 3,487 3,772 7,259 
35 to 39  16,281 20,011 19,043 23,649 2,762 3,638 6,400 
40 to 44  14,228 14,913 17,362 18,949 3,134 4,036 7,170 
45 to 49  10,229 10,828 14,954 15,377 4,725 4,549 9,274 
50 to 54  6,986 7,739 12,126 11,630 5,140 3,891 9,031 
55 to 59 4,598 5,220 7,602 7,461 3,004 2,241 5,245 
60 to 64 2,816 3,359 5,402 5,754 2,586 2,395 4,981 
largest population increase 
second largest population increase 
third largest population increase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  284 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.11: Brooklyn Negro population change by Sex and Age 
Ages 
1940 
males 
1940 
females 
1950 
males 
1950 
females 
change in 
males 
change in 
females 
total 
change 
all ages 47,744 59,519 97,933 115,124 50,189 55,605 105,794 
15 to 19  4,093 5,093 6,505 7,638 2,412 2,545 4,957 
20 to 24  3,693 6,919 8,188 12,404 4,495 5,485 9,980 
25 to 29  4,545 7,297 10,986 14,227 6,441 6,930 13,371 
30 to 34  4,729 6,323 9,196 11,953 4,467 5,630 10,097 
35 to 39  4,729 5,893 8,864 10,956 4,135 5,063 9,198 
40 to 44  3,946 4,354 7,280 8,220 3,334 3,866 7,200 
45 to 49  2,901 3,039 6,069 6,621 3,168 3,582 6,750 
50 to 54  1,948 2,243 4,606 4,718 2,658 2,475 5,133 
55 to 59 1,280 1,500 2,920 3,050 1,640 1,550 3,190 
60 to 65 924 1,037 1,887 2,270 963 1,233 2,196 
largest population increase 
second largest population increase  
third largest population increase 
 
 
 
Table 1.12: Bronx Negro population change by Sex and Age 
Ages 
1940 
males 
1940 
females 
1950 
males 
1950 
females 
change in 
males 
change in 
females 
total 
change 
all ages 11,048 12,481 45,966 53,649 34,918 41,168 76,086 
15 to 19  957 1,292 3,317 3,964 2,360 2,672 5,032 
20 to 24  916 1,507 4,095 5,394 3,179 3,887 7,066 
25 to 29  941 1,271 4,738 5,954 3,797 4,683 8,480 
30 to 34  1,037 1,216 4,135 5,555 3,098 4,339 7,437 
35 to 39  1,170 1,266 3,978 5,167 2,808 3,901 6,709 
40 to 44  1,002 922 3,615 3,980 2,613 3,058 5,671 
45 to 49  789 706 2,914 3,250 2,125 2,544 4,669 
50 to 54  568 455 2,341 2,405 1,773 1,950 3,723 
55 to 59 326 349 1,448 1,558 1,122 1,209 2,331 
60 to 65 230 214 930 1,158 700 944 1,644 
largest population increase 
second largest population increase  
third largest population increase 
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Table 1.13: Manhattan Census Tract Statistics for 1940 and 1950 
Census Tract Statistics, Volume III 1950 Census Chapter 37 - New York, NY Census 
tract# negro 1950 white 1950 negro 1940 white 1940 
20 2,052 10,741     
133 1,099 7,921 1,405 7,129 
151 1,838 3,363     
164 5,634 7,868 3,639 9,131 
181 1,193 13,509 367 14,170 
182 4,128 8,204 1,278 10,940 
184 11,798 4,545 11,695 49,200 
186 7,534 1,266     
190 9,325 495     
196 1,561 5,543 295 6,060 
197 3,822 95     
198 3,727 1,628 2,814 3,405 
200 6,546 220 4,990 833 
201 6,935 95     
202 1,068 2,385 666 2,704 
204 2,072 1,355 824 2,714 
206 8,157 305     
208 13,339 143 11,877 252 
210 8,315 150     
212 13,002 65 12,835 124 
214 1,284 2 1 1,706 
216 16,472 265 14,796 942 
218 12,964 233 13,379 495 
220 13,031 118 12,241 199 
226 13,064 71 11,340 44 
227 6,657 235     
227 2,610 15     
228 11,652 49 11,826 24 
230 16,659 77 16,257 94 
231 8,935 135     
231 3,790 15     
232 15,414 38 16,198 19 
233 6,627 2,799 74 9,378 
234 8,779 21 8,282 15 
235 7,919 75     
235 3,943 12     
243 5,305 521 2,164 3,860 
236 5,579 65 6,060 33 
237 4,585 4,704 32 9,128 
239 3,833 41 2,926 1,113 
241 3,010 5,140 57 8,240 
245 3,390 12,255 91 17,071 
Census tracts with populations that changed from predominately white to predominately Negro. 
Census tracts that were predominately Negro and remained predominately Negro. 
NOTE: the above stats are for tracts with a significant Negro population (over 1000).  
Those entries without stats from the 1940 census are new tracts that did not appear 10 years prior. 
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Table 1.14:  Brooklyn Census Track Statistics for 1940 and 1950 
Census Tract Statistics, Volume III 1950 Census Chapter 37 - New York, NY Census 
tract# negro 1950 white 1950 negro 1940 white 1940 
71 1,777 5,128 175 3,879 
127 1,789 2,511 1,620 2,913 
179 1,640 950 1,681 1,172 
185 1,268 6,827 21 5,474 
199 1,460 2,571 1,064 2,181 
201 2,858 1,956 1,322 2,583 
221 2,347 2,456 895 2,958 
227 5,158 187 3,182 891 
229 3,878 1,011 1,494 2,788 
231 5,152 1,713 2,587 2,700 
233 1,839 3,068 801 3,651 
243 4,045 1,365 1,581 3,005 
245 5,198 850 1,896 2,657 
247 2,324 670 1,137 1,740 
249 5,343 334 1,850 2,265 
251 4,413 1,442 1,917 3,132 
255 3,410 3,764 469 3,666 
257 1,344 5,474 383 5,926 
263 1,218 1,501 384 2,316 
265 5,634 353 3,430 2,203 
267 5,939 173 4,192 1,499 
269 4,589 151 2,218 1,753 
271 1,982 428 161 1,540 
271 1,918 278 1,497 424 
273 4,328 66 3,512 699 
275 5,804 144 852 4,548 
277 4,662 248 2,629 2,372 
279 3,282 2,330 2,015 4,313 
291 4,786 1,484 1,433 3,715 
293 4,461 737 1,513 3,106 
295 5,176 551 2,699 2,102 
297 4,718 311 2,809 1,673 
299 3,008 1,429 1,870 2,553 
301 1,976 3,410 1,371 4,045 
303 2,016 5,633 1,025 7,360 
305 3,118 3,088 1,858 3,454 
307 2,112 2,332 1,179 1,564 
311 4,636 666 2,675 2,736 
313 3,569 2,695 1,002 3,733 
377 2,040 3,590 160 5,153 
381 4,152 926 1,421 3,582 
383 4,494 1,510 914 4,585 
385 2,370 2,988 43 5,021 
387 1,324 3,439 52 4,398 
487 2,145 3,187 1,234 3,605 
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906 2,304 2,833 1,359 4,158 
910 2,392 1,970 838 4,076 
Census tracts with populations that changed from predominately white to predominately Negro. 
  288 
 
 
 
Table 1.15:  Bronx Census Track Statistics for 1940 and 1950 
Census Tract Statistics, Volume III 1950 Census Chapter 37 - New York, NY Census 
tract# negro 1950 white 1950 negro 1940 white 1940 
1 1,055 1,662 1,007 2,023 
75 1,653 10,633 138 11,235 
77 2,270 5,230 233 6,665 
79 1,139 9,216 490 8,958 
85 1,462 8,654 75 9,335 
87 5,769 11,210 1,706 15,730 
125 2,018 5,492 73 7,721 
129 3,219 7,793 1,170 9,262 
131 6,061 4,930 2,719 8,743 
133 6,875 2,346 1,336 7,292 
135 8,513 352 994 7,122 
137 9,683 1,370 134 10,049 
139 2,313 3,374 596 5,211 
145 3,090 3,467 52 6,779 
147 5,944 2,382 1,024 8,337 
149 3,535 3,438 34 7,982 
151 9,536 933 1,568 8,223 
153 2,805 12,513 135 17,275 
155 1,149 6,026 407 7,583 
169 4,659 5,929 1,346 10,064 
Census tracts with populations that changed from predominately white to predominately Negro. 
Census tracts with populations that became integrated. 
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Figure 1.1: 1940 Manhattan Census Tracts and Demographic Change 
 
 
The shaded areas on this map represent census tracts that changed from having a predominately 
white population to having a predominately African American population. 
In this map the outlined area is the Central Harlem health district. 
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Figure 1.2: 1940 Brooklyn Census Tracts and Demographic Change
 
 
The shaded areas on this map represent census tracts that changed from having a predominately 
white population to having a predominately African American population. 
  
 
Figure 1.3: Map of Brooklyn Neighborhoods from Kenneth Jackson , ed., 
Neighborhoods of Brooklyn 
 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998
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Figure 1.4: 1940 Bronx Census Tracts and Demographic Change 
 
 
 
 
 
The shaded areas on this map represent census tracts that changed from having a predominately 
white population to having a predominately African American population. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Table615 
 
 
Place of 
Hearing 
Total Employment Non-White Employment 
Total 
employment 
Summer , 
1942 
Total 
Employment 
Winter, 
1943-44 
Percent 
Increase 
Number 
of Firms 
Reporting 
42      / 43-44  
Number of 
establishments 
Reporting 
     42        /    43-44 
Non –white 
employment 
Summer, 
1942 
Non-
white 
% of 
total, 
1942 
Non-white 
Employment 
Winter, 
1943-44 
Non-
white 
% of 
total 
1943-
44 
Percent 
increase  
Los  
Angeles 
 
 
419,228 
 
618,557 
 
47.6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
48 
 
68 
 
15,729 
 
3.8 
 
44,899 
 
7.3 
 
185.5 
 
Chicago 
 
 
70,106 
 
98,933 
 
41.1 
 
8 
 
8 
 
18 
 
19 
 
963 
 
1.4 
 
3,831 
 
3.9 
 
297.8 
 
New York 
 
 
149,087 
 
295,291 
 
98.1 
 
6 
 
6 
 
21 
 
21 
 
3,754 
 
2.5 
 
19,215 
 
6.5 
 
411.9 
 
Birmingham 
 
 
37,903 
 
59,353 
 
56.6 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
5 
 
3,379 
 
8.9 
 
9,245 
 
15.5 
 
173.6 
 
Total 
 
 
676,324 
 
1,072,134 
 
58.5 
 
24 
 
24 
 
 
91 
 
111 
 
23,375 
 
3.5 
 
77,190 
 
7.2 
 
230.2 
 
                                                 
615
 Summary Table, “Compliance Data on All Establishments Throughout the Country of Firms Involved in Old Committee Hearings. FEPC Papers, Entry 75, 
Box 546, Folder – Statistics.3 
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Table 3.2  - Firms Appearing before FEPC at New York Hearings (all reporting establishments included)616 
 
 
Place of 
Hearing 
Total Employment Non-White Employment 
Total 
employment 
Summer , 
1942 
Total 
Employment 
Winter, 
1943-44 
Percent 
Increase 
Number of 
establishments 
Reporting 
     42        /    43-44 
Non –white 
employment 
Summer, 
1942 
Non-
white 
% of 
total, 
1942 
Non-white 
Employment 
Winter, 
1943-44 
Non-
white 
% of 
total 
1943-
44 
Percent 
increase  
 Babcock 
and Wilcox 
Co. 
 
544 
 
677 
 
 
22.6 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
31 
 
4.6 
 
3000.0 
Becton-
Dickinson & 
Co. 
 
1,100 
 
1,476 
 
3.4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
5 
 
.5 
 
14 
 
.9 
 
180.0 
Curtiss 
Wright 
Corp. 
 
100,216 
 
227,020 
 
126.5 
 
9 
 
9 
 
2,995 
 
2.6 
 
 
16,155 
 
7.1 
 
522.5 
Fairchild 
Aviation 
Corporation 
 
9,786 
 
14,482 
 
48.0 
 
3 
 
3 
 
17 
 
.2 
 
341 
 
2.4 
 
1905.8 
Sperry Corp. 
(w/ Ford 
Instruments.) 
 
35,776 
 
47,581 
 
32.9 
 
6 
 
6 
 
1,083 
 
3.2 
 
1,874 
 
3.9 
 
73.0 
Titeflex 
Metal Hose 
Company 
 
1,665 
 
4,065 
 
144.1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
54 
 
3.2 
 
800 
 
19.7 
 
1381.4 
Total 149,087 295,291 98.1 21 21 3,754 2.5 19,215 6.5 411.9 
 
 
 
                                                 
616
 Table 3 - Firms Appearing before FEPC at New York Hearings (all reporting establishments included). “Compliance Data on All Establishments Throughout 
the Country of Firms Involved in Old Committee Hearings. FEPC Papers, Entry 75, Box 546, Folder – Statistics. 
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Table 3.3 - Workers Employed in Eight Firms Appearing before FEPC at New York hearings, February 16 and 17, 1942617 
 
February 1942 
 (date of hearing) 
August 1942 
(6 months after hearing)  
December 1942  
(10 months after hearing) 
January 1944  
(23 months after hearing) 
Name of Plant Total 
Empl. 
Non-white 
Empl. 
Non-
white %  
of total 
Total 
Empl 
Non-white 
Empl. 
Non-white 
% of total 
Total 
Empl 
Non-white 
Empl 
Non-
white % 
of total 
Total 
Empl 
Non-white 
Empl 
Non-
white % 
of total 
 
Babcock and 
Wilcox Co. 
 
525 
 
0 
 
 
0.0 
 
544 
 
0 
 
0.0 
 
599 
 
0 
 
0.0 
 
667 
 
31 
 
4.6 
Becton, Dickinson 
and Co. 
 
 
1,002 
 
0 
 
0.0 
 
1,100 
 
5 
 
.5 
 
1,275 
 
3 
 
.2 
 
1,476 
 
14 
 
.9 
 
Fairchild Aviation 
Corp. 
 
1,749 
 
4 
 
.2 
 
2,411 
 
6 
 
.2 
 
2,857 
 
10 
 
.3 
 
4,206 
 
102 
 
2.4 
 
Ford Instrument 
Company 
 
5,076 
 
65 
 
1.3 
 
6,681 
 
110 
 
1.6 
 
 
7,488 
 
 
261 
 
3.5 
 
7,385 
 
405 
 
5.5 
 
Isolantite, Inc. 
 
 
805 
 
0 
 
0.0 
 
1,401 
 
30 
 
2.1 
    
1,299 
 
INA 
 
 
Sperry Gyroscope 
Inc. 
 
14,184 
 
21 
 
.1 
 
21,752 
 
395 
 
1.8 
 
24,060 
 
389 
 
1.6 
 
28,316 
 
911 
 
3.2 
 
Titeflex Metal 
Hose Company 
 
1,350 
 
65 
 
4.8 
 
1,665 
 
54 
 
3.2 
 
2,237 
 
175 
 
7.8 
 
4,065 
 
800 
 
19.7 
 
Wright 
Aeronautical 
 
22,263 
 
78 
 
 
.4 
 
26,203 
 
273 
 
1.0 
 
29,405 
 
750 
 
2.6 
 
40,599 
 
3,797 
 
6.9 
 
Total 
 
46,954 
 
233 
 
.5 
 
61,757 
 
873 
 
1.4 
 
67,921 
 
1,588 
 
2.3 
 
86,714 
 
5,060 
 
5.8 
                                                 
617
 Table 3 - Total and Non-white Workers Employed in Eight Firms Appearing before FEPC at New York hearings, February 16 and 17, 1942 “Compliance 
Data on All Establishments Throughout the Country of Firms Involved in Old Committee Hearings. Papers of the Fair Employment Practices Committee, Record 
Group 228, , Entry 75, Box 546, Folder – Statistics. 
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Table 3.4 - Total and Non-White Workers Employed in Skilled, Semi-skilled, unskilled, and other categories by 6 Firms 
appearing before the FEPC at New York Hearings618 
 May 1942 May 1943 
Name of 
Plant 
 Skilled Semi-
skilled 
Unskilled Other  total Skilled Semi-
skilled 
Unskilled other Total 
Fairchild 
Aviation 
Non-
white 
0 0 5 0 5      
Total 
 
270 242 308 676 2,096      
Ford 
Instrument 
Non-
white 
0 0 110 0 110 2 101 240 0 343 
Total 
 
3,282 936 468 1,294 5,980 2,059 2,902 1,227 2,070 8,258 
Isolantite 
Inc. 
Non-
white 
0 0 0 0 0 2 7 383 1 393 
Total  
 
65 0 819 87 971 117 725 1,073 341 2,257 
Sperry 
Gyroscope 
Non-
white 
0 100 376 0 476 1 285 305 10 681 
Total 
 
701 10,560 3,120 4,000 18,381 8,620 5,247 8,587 8,375 30,829 
Titeflex 
Metal Hose 
Non-
White  
    171 7 12 488 7 514 
Total 
 
    2,576 250 350 2,800 665 4,065 
Wright 
Aeronautical 
Corp. 
Non-
white 
16 15 241 1 273 75 816 798 14 1,703 
Total 
 
4,000 8,000 4,000 8,441 24,441 5,890 12,210 6,214 11,073 35,387 
 
Totals for 
the 6 Plants 
Non- 
white 
16 115 732 1 1,035 87 1,221 2,294 32 3,634 
Total 8,318 19,738 9,315 14,498 54,445 16,936 21,435 19,901 22,524 80,796 
                                                 
618
 Table 7 - Total and Non-White Workers Employed in Skilled, Semi-skilled, unskilled, and other categories by 6 Firms appearing before the FEPC at New 
York Hearings “Compliance Data on All Establishments Throughout the Country of Firms Involved in Old Committee Hearings. FEPC Papers, Entry 75, Box 
546, Folder – Statistics. 
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Table 4.1 Non-White Workers Employed in Skilled, Semi-skilled, unskilled and other categories by Sperry Company Inc.  
 
      May-42         May-43     
    Skilled 
Semi-
skilled Unskilled Other Total Skilled 
Semi-
skilled Unskilled Other Total 
  
Non-White 0 0 110 0 110 2 101 240 0 343 
Ford Instruments Total 3282 936 468 1294 5980 2059 2902 1227 2070 8258 
  
% Non-White 0.00 0.00 23.50 0.00 1.84 0.10 3.48 19.56 0.00 4.15 
  
Non-White 0 100 376 0 476 1 285 385 10 681 
Sperry Company 
Inc. Total 701 10560 3120 4000 18381 8620 5247 8587 8375 30829 
  
% Non-White 0.00 0.95 12.05 0.00 2.59 0.01 5.43 4.48 0.12 2.21 
  
Non-white 0 100 486 0 586 3 386 625 10 1024 
Combined 
company figures Total 3983 11496 3588 5294 24361 10679 8149 9814 10445 39087 
  
% Non-White 0.00 0.87 13.55 0.00 2.41 0.03 4.74 6.37 0.10 2.62 
  
Table 4.2 Total and Non-White Workers Employed by Sperry Company Inc.  (February 1942- January 1944) 
  
February 
1942 
(Date of 
Hearing)     
August 
1942 (6 
months 
later)     
December 
1942 (10 
months 
later)     
January 
1944 
(22 
months 
later)     
  Total Nonwhite % Total Nonwhite % Total Nonwhite % Total Nonwhite % 
Ford 
Instruments 5076 65 1.3 6681 110 1.6 7488 261 3.5 7385 405 5.5 
Sperry 
Company Inc. 14184 21 0.1 21752 395 1.8 24060 389 1.6 28316 911 3.2 
company totals 19260 86 0.45 28433 505 1.78 31548 650 2.06 35701 1316 3.69 
 
Information in Table 4.1 taken Table 7 –  Total and Non-White Workers Employed in Skilled, Semi-Skilled, Unskilled, and “Other” Categories for Six Firms 
Appearing Before the FEPC at New York Hearings”.  Information in Table 4.2 taken from  “Table 3 – Total and Non-White Workers Employed in 8 Firms 
Appearing Before the FEPC at New York Hearings, February 16th and 17th, 1942”.  Both documents in Compliance Data for Firms Involved in Old Committee 
Hearings. FEPC Papers, Entry 75, Box 546, Statistics Folder. 
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Figure 5.1: Neighborhood Map of the Bronx619 
 
 
 
                                                 
619
 Map taken from “Intersections: Grand Concourse Beyond 100”,  a project of The Bronx Museum of the Arts 
with the Design Trust for Public Space.  Accessed June 24, 2011. http://grandconcourse100.org/brief/maps   
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Figure 5.2: Bronx Street Map620 
 
 
 
                                                 
620
  AccessMaps.com,  http://www.aaccessmaps.com/show/map/bronx Accessed June 24, 2011. 
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